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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to fill a gap in knowledge about collaboration and the 
possibilities that exist for the achievement of collaborative advantage by examining 
in detail the way that institutional pressure and power impacts on  tenants and 
residents association (TARA) and council collaboration. Three levels of analysis 
are used to examine relations between institutional forces and power at the macro-
level (including legislation, traditions and customs) and their affect on the political 
environment within which organizations are located and collaborate at the meso-
level and individuals in organizations act at the micro-level. The thesis uses ideas 
and concepts that are part of institutional theory and theory on power to show what 
affect the national political environment has had on mandated TARA and council 
collaboration. 
 
The focus is on how effectively existing theory on collaboration and collaborative 
advantage deals with institutions, the ways in which they can impact on relations 
between collaborating organizations and the role of mandated collaboration when 
there are large inequalities of power between collaborating organizations with very 
different cultures and values. The research design comprised a longitudinal single 
case study to examine and analyse TARA and council collaboration. I adopted an 
ethnographic and grounded research approach to obtain people’s views and 
perspectives on collaboration for later coding and categorization that led to the 
emergence of various ideas, concepts and relations. My new concept that helps to 
explain how organizations can be involved in a process where they are 
disadvantaged in collaboration is introduced and developed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A Supposed New Era of Enlightenment 
 
Tenants and Residents Association (TARA) and council collaboration to decide 
priorities for action to improve neighbourhoods was encouraged by policies 
introduced by the New Labour government, elected in 1997. It is an explicit 
assumption in much of the New Labour rhetoric on collaboration and the literature 
on collaboration it is a ‘good thing’. This thesis challenges this assumption. In my 
role as a borough councillor in Corby, from May 1995 to May 2003, I saw how 
TARAs (that represent the interests of tenants living in council owned housing and 
residents who have purchased their homes from the council) and activists were 
sometimes unable to represent effectively the views and concerns of tenants or 
residents living in a community or neighbourhood.1 TARAs and activists were 
frequently constrained by collaboration that focused on getting them to organise 
and operate in ways prescribed and approved by central government or the 
council. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to fill a gap in knowledge about collaboration and the 
possibilities that exist for the achievement of collaborative advantage by examining 
in detail the way that institutional pressure and power impacts on collaborating 
organizations. More specifically, an issue exists concerning the subtle, often 
hidden, as well as obvious, ways that institutional activities and actions will help to 
shape collaboration and its outputs and outcomes. It is argued that much theory 
on collaboration and more specifically Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory on 
collaborative advantage fails to take adequate account of how the wider 
                                                          
1
 Here tenants are people who live in rented council-owned housing and residents are people who 
live in houses purchased from the council, are leaseholders, or own privately built houses. 
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institutional context impacts on collaboration. 
 
First, there are the existing institutional rules and regulations that encourage or 
make obligatory certain types of collaboration or collaborative behaviour. Second, 
what often remains neglected or overlooked in much of the literature on 
collaboration is how institutionalized customs and procedures can develop that 
subtly influence or determine whose values are viewed as important in 
collaboration and how collaborative agendas are set. The institutional environment 
will also help to determine what organizations emerge, and facilitate or constrain 
their development and the way that they challenge or legitimise institutional 
activities and actions. 
 
The New Labour government was keen to introduce policies and initiatives that 
would help to increase citizen involvement in different partnerships to tackle crime, 
employment, health, education, and regeneration problems (Foley and Martin, 
2000). The Labour Party Manifesto, published in 1997, had proclaimed: 
 
New Labour believes in a society where we do not simply pursue 
our own individual aims but where we hold many aims in common 
and work together to achieve them. 
 
An important strand of New Labour policy on partnership working and 
collaboration was the promotion of Active Citizenship (Raco and Flint, 2001). The 
New Labour government felt that for society to work well it was necessary to 
involve a greater number of active, critical, and engaged citizens in discussions 
and decisions that would affect them or the place where they lived (Woodward, 
2004). One would expect an organization such as a tenants and residents 
association (TARA), which represents the interests of people at the local level, to  
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be involved in different partnerships and collaborations to improve neighbourhoods 
and local services (see appendix 1 for a more detailed exposition of the New 
Labour philosophy). Nevertheless, how are TARAs and activists actually involved 
in these partnerships and collaborations and what are they able to achieve through 
partnership working and collaboration? 
 
This thesis examines and analyses TARA and council collaboration after the 
introduction of the Best Value regime in 1999 and the Tenant Participation 
Compact in 2000, which are described in later parts of this chapter.  The main 
research question is set out below. 
 
Main research question 
 
How have New Labour housing, Best Value, and Tenant 
Participation Compact policies changed the political environment 
and TARA and council collaboration? 
 
 
TARAs and tenants were more involved in different council-convened housing and 
neighbourhood consultations and decision-making to agree priorities for action to 
improve neighbourhoods and local services. However, the thesis will question how 
collaboration developed in a situation where it is mandatory, there can be large 
inequalities of power between the organizations involved, and the organizations 
have very different cultures and values. In the case of TARA and council 
collaboration, the council is a formal and bureaucratic organization with different 
lines of accountability for a wide range of functions and services whereas the 
TARA tends to be a relatively small and more informal single-issue organization. 
Moreover, little is known about the way these organizations have been working 
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together to deal with housing and neighbourhood problems since the introduction 
of the Best Value regime and the Tenant Participation Compact. 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines the effects of different housing and tenant 
participation policies on relations between central government, councils, and 
tenants. This includes Conservative housing and tenant participation policies in the 
1980s and early 1990s, and New Labour housing and tenant participation policies 
in the late 1990s.  The point is to gauge how these policies have helped to create 
an institutional and political context that enables or constrains different types of 
collaborative activity and action. Later sections of the chapter provide a detailed 
analysis of the New Labour government’s approach to collaboration. Some of the 
problems associated with collaboration examined include the rhetoric and reality of 
collaborative practice, the complexity of collaborative relations, conflict over 
collaborative purpose and resources, and the way that different rules of 
engagement will impact on different stakeholders. At the end of the chapter an 
outline of the thesis is set out. 
 
1.1 Central government and tenants 
  
How have New Labour housing and tenant participation policies helped to improve 
(or not) high levels of historical tenant and landlord mistrust?  To answer this 
question it is helpful to know something about the history of central government 
housing policies and the impact of wider external forces on relations between 
central government, councils, and tenants in order to understand the development 
of contemporary TARA and council collaboration. Records of tenant protest exist, 
which detail the actions of disreputable private landlords, the impact of poor 
housing conditions on people’s quality of life, and the problems caused by high 
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rents (relative to household incomes) as far back as the latter part of the 
nineteenth century (see Cole and Furbey, 1994). It is likely that a history of 
frequently conflictual and mutually mistrusting relations between private landlords 
and their tenants will sometimes continue to impact adversely on contemporary 
central government, council and tenant relations. 
 
In the early part of the twentieth century, central government took action to control 
rents and deal with housing shortages to prevent an escalation of tenant unrest 
and protest. In 1915, a Liberal and Conservative coalition government introduced 
the Rent and Mortgage Restrictions Act, which placed limits on the rents that 
private landlords could charge their tenants. Then, in 1919, the same coalition 
government introduced the Addison Act, which provided the first subsidies for 
council-house building. The first National Tenants Federation began operating in 
the early 1920s, which represented the views of a growing number of 
neighbourhood-based tenants’ groups. A cross-party political consensus was 
reached after 1945 that meant the ground could be prepared for the massive 
expansion of council-house building to replace war-damaged and existing poor-
quality homes (Malpass and Murie, 1987). The number of council houses built 
increased each year up until the late 1950’s but ultimately the central government 
vision for council housing set out in 1945 was not sustainable. In particular, after 
Crossman’s experiments in the 1960’s, with new types of housing design and 
building materials, the state was left with a surplus of housing that was of variable 
quality and expensive to maintain (see Crossman 1976). By the end of the 1970s 
the building of council housing had almost stopped. 
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Tenants groups and associations 
 
The first autonomous tenants’ groups that emerged in the middle of the nineteenth 
century represented people living mainly in private rented accommodation. Many 
groups formed to protest against poor housing conditions and the high rents 
relative to household incomes that landlords often charged. They often worked 
closely with the wider labour and trades union movements to campaign on housing 
issues and call for the municipal provision of housing for rent. After 1918, when 
there was an increase in council-house building, new tenants associations formed 
to represent people living in council-owned housing. In the 1920s, the first citywide 
tenants’ federations were formed and a National Tenants Federation was set up to 
lobby councils for more tenant involvement in housing matters that affected them 
or the area in which they lived. After the end of the Second World War, in 1945, 
new council estates were built to replace slum housing and deal with housing 
shortages. Many tenants associations emerged to represent the tenants living on 
these new estates. 
 
In 1948 the National Association of Tenants and Residents (NATR) was 
established. This association represented tenants living in council-owned housing 
and residents living in private rented accommodation or a freehold property. 
Meanwhile, the tenants’ associations set up to represent the tenants living on new 
council estates formed for a variety of reasons. Associations often provided a 
focus for the provision of recreational and social welfare activities but tenants still 
banded together to put pressure on the council over housing problems (Cairncross 
et al., 1992). In the late 1970s, the body called National Tenants Organisations 
(NTO) formed and in the late 1980s, the National Tenants and Residents 
Federation (NTRF) was set up. In the 1980s, many tenants associations were 
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renamed tenants and residents associations in recognition of the fact that many of 
their members owned their own homes or were leaseholders living in council 
owned flats. In 1998, NTO and NTRF merged to form Tenants and Residents 
Organisations of England (TAROE).  This new organization developed links with 
the trade-union-backed organization Defend Council Housing that protested 
against the New Labour government’s decision to retain Conservative legislation 
that allowed councils to sell off or transfer council owned housing to registered 
social landlords. 
 
The contemporary TARA can vary in size, and the geographical area that it covers 
can range from a single tower block or few streets up to a large estate that 
consists of many hundreds of houses and flats. A TARA is often a relatively 
informal organization that is heavily involved in the provision of different social and 
welfare activities, such as arranging dances and trips to the seaside, drop in 
sessions to help people with benefits problems, and fetes and jumble sales to 
raise funds. However, a TARA is also, at different times, likely to be involved in 
campaigning on housing issues, sometimes in very forceful or dramatic ways. 
TARA membership usually comprises all of the council tenants living in an area 
and house owners who want to be members. However, since the introduction of 
the Housing Act (1985) council tenants have a statutory right to be consulted on 
housing matters that affect them or the area in which they live (ODPM 2005). 
 
A tenants’ movement had emerged and developed in an environment where 
conflictual relations often existed between central government and tenants 
struggling to obtain improved housing conditions and fair rises in rents. The 
Hidden History of the British Tenants Movement website shows how this more 
organized tenants’ movement helped to consolidate feelings of antipathy towards 
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unscrupulous private landlords and enabled a coordinated campaign for access to 
well-built council housing to be undertaken.2  However, the question that arises 
concerns the extent to which tenants’ difficult relations with private landlords and 
struggles to obtain improved housing conditions caused some of them to be 
suspicious of central government and its plans for council owned housing. 
 
The next sub-section considers how Conservative housing and neighbourhood 
regeneration policies and a history of often difficult tenant and landlord relations 
impacted on TARA and council relations. 
 
Conservative housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies in the 1980s 
and 1990s 
 
In 1979, voters elected a Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher. 
This sub-section examines the housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies 
introduced by Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s. The different 
policies covered are listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Leeds Tenants Federation (2006) ‘The Hidden History of Tenants’, Leeds Tenants Federation 
web pages [online], http://www.tenantshistory.org.uk/ 
(accessed 17 December 2008). 
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Table 1: Conservative housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies 
 
 
  Housing and neighbourhood regeneration 
 
1980 Housing Act The introduction of right to buy means tenants can 
purchase their council houses 
1985 Estate Action 
Programme 
Support to tackle problems in deprived and 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
 
The introduction of the Tenant Management 
Organisation (TMO) 
1988 Local Government Act The introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) 
1992 Local Government Act Defined activities under CCT are extended to cover 
professional services (that include housing 
management and maintenance) 
 
Councils are allowed to sell off or transfer housing stock 
to Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) 
1994 Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB) 
SRB brought together a number of regeneration 
programmes from across different central government 
departments to work in partnership 
 
The Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, introduced the Housing Act (1980), 
which gave tenants living in council-owned housing the right to buy their homes at 
heavily discounted prices.3 The government’s figures for social housing sales 
show that since the introduction of this legislation, nearly three million council-
owned houses have transferred out of council ownership up to 2006 leaving just 
under three million remaining (Crown Copyright 2008d). In many areas, tenants 
who could afford to buy purchased the most desirable council houses in an area 
leaving councils with much housing stock that was in a bad state of repair or 
needed modernizing. Meanwhile, fewer council houses available for rent meant 
longer waiting lists. Many TARAs were campaigning to raise awareness of these 
waiting-list problems among politicians and others interested in housing matters. 
They were also lobbying central government to get it to back the building of new 
council-owned housing for rent by those people unable to buy a property of their 
                                                          
3
 Tenants who had lived in their homes for more than three years were eligible for a 33% discount 
on the market value of the property and tenants renting flats were eligible to receive a 44% 
discount. Tenants who had lived in their homes for more than 20 years received a 50% discount 
rising by 1% each year to a maximum of 70%. 
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own (Leeds Tenants Federation 2006). In some instances future TARA and 
council collaboration would need to find effective ways to deal with tenant 
concerns about the future of council owned housing caused by central government 
housing policies that meant they felt isolated and vulnerable. 
 
In 1985, the Conservatives introduced the Estate Action programme. This 
programme was the main vehicle of central government support made available to 
tackle infrastructure problems in deprived or disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The 
programme was wide ranging and designed to help councils tackle physical 
problems in an area to improve social, economic, and environmental well-being. 
Central government also wanted councils to find innovative ways to improve 
housing management, promote the diversification of housing tenure, and obtain 
private sector investment to repair and modernize run-down housing. Meanwhile, 
the Housing (Right to Manage) Regulations 1994 allowed a Tenant Management 
Organisation (TMO) to take over the running of certain housing services in an 
area.4 Tenants elect their own tenant-led management committee and take on 
responsibility for managing their homes and housing services (The National 
Federation of Tenant Management Organisations 2008). 
 
A Conservative government introduced the Local Government Act (1988) that 
included Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), forcing councils to put various 
public supply or works contracts (including refuse collection, the cleaning of 
buildings, and grounds maintenance) out to open tender. Different external 
organizations that had an interest in and were qualified to provide such services 
                                                          
4
 A TMO receives an annual allowance from the council and takes over the running of housing 
services (such as collecting rents and service charges and organizing repairs and aintenance) from 
the council. Tenants do not have to do these tasks themselves – they can employ staff; use 
seconded council housing staff; or employ a managing agent. Council and the TMO responsibilities 
are negotiated and set out in a management agreement. 
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could submit a bid to provide them in response to advertised contracts. The 
Secretary of State was able to intervene to serve written notice on councils that did 
not comply with the Act and ultimately remove their power to undertake particular 
functions or services. A Conservative government also introduced the Local 
Government Act (1992), which extended the range of council functions and 
services that had to go out to open tender to include the provision of various 
professional services (including the management and maintenance of council-
owned housing). At the same time, councils could sell off or transfer council-
owned housing to a not-for-profit Registered Social Landlord (RSL) with the 
agreement of a majority of tenants.5 
 
Meanwhile, it was also possible to raise the finance needed to support housing 
and neighbourhood regeneration activities through a Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) arrangement. Conservatives had introduced PFI because it was a way to 
raise private sector investment, through partnerships between public and private 
organizations, to regenerate neighbourhoods and provide public services. A 
council, for example, could sign a contract with a private organization and, during 
the specified contract period, that organization would provide a service currently 
provided by the council. In turn, it might be possible for a council to secure private 
sector investment to improve or modernise run-down council housing in return for 
performance-related payments for meeting agreed standards of service provision. 
The significant point here in terms of tenant involvement in housing matters is the 
varying extent to which tenants would be able to influence the policies and actions 
                                                          
5
 Registered Social Landlord (RSL) is a term introduced in the Housing Act (1996) to describe an 
independent, not-for-profit, local housing company, trust, cooperative, or association that is 
registered with the Housing Corporation (a central government backed regulatory agency). The 
RSL has more freedom than the council does to use rental and asset based income to improve 
housing stock or finance debt whilst it can retain any surpluses and use them to fund different 
social housing projects. In the case of Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer (LSVST), all council-
owned housing in an area is transferred to an RSL in a single transaction. Transfers are funded by 
the private sector but government subsidies may be made available to help a council to reduce or 
eliminate pre-existing housing revenue account debt. 
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of a private sector organization investing in the maintenance or modernisation of 
council-owned housing. 
 
The last significant programme of regeneration activity introduced by a 
Conservative government, before the election of New Labour in 1997, was the 
Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) work that began in 1994. The SRB initiative 
combined a number of central government programmes for regeneration to try to 
simplify assistance for regeneration activities carried out by local regeneration 
partnerships. SRB partnerships brought councils, tenants, and other relevant 
stakeholders together to find ways to improve housing and local services in 
deprived or disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The Conservatives put more 
emphasis on the value of councils working with tenants and their representative 
associations to obtain local ownership of decisions changing housing or 
neighbourhood management practice. 
 
In the 1990s, there was much TARA protest against the selling off or transfer of 
council-owned housing to RSLs despite the different partnership activities, 
involving tenants, undertaken to regenerate run-down neighbourhoods. The 
driving force for much of the tenant protest was fears about security of tenure in 
the future and the affordability of rent rises if the council sold off or transferred their 
homes to an RSL (Leeds Tenants Federation 2006). In terms of TARA and council 
collaboration, the context within which it was located and operated became more 
complex with the involvement of a wide range of organizations interested in the 
provision of different housing and other local services at the neighbourhood level. 
It was necessary for tenants to deal not only with the council but with private 
businesses and RSLs as well. In many instances, TARAs and activists could no 
longer simply turn to elected representatives and ask them to account for their 
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housing and neighbourhood policies because other organizations were involved in 
providing housing and neighbourhood services.  In chapters five through seven 
examples will be provided of the tension that existed between activists and the 
council in Sheffield over who should have control over housing matters and 
services and how they should work with TARAs and tenants in collaboration to 
achieve different housing and neighbourhood regeneration objectives. 
 
The next sub-section shows how New Labour developed their own distinctive 
approaches to housing and neighbourhood regeneration, and built on the housing 
and neighbourhood regeneration policies of previous Conservative governments. 
 
New Labour housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies in the 1990s 
and 2000s 
 
A continuing theme apparent across different governments seems to be the belief 
that council-owned housing provides accommodation for individuals and families 
who are unable to buy a home of their own rather than something that is inherently 
desirable. Renting a council house is, at best, a step up to owning property and, at 
worst, a stigmatised ‘safety net’ (Baldock, 1982). Whose values are dominant in 
deciding the purpose and future of council-owned housing? In addition, to what 
extent do tenants have a real choice over what happens in TARA and council 
collaboration to decide the future of council-owned housing and their rights as 
tenants? 
 
The market has been an important influence on New Labour thinking about 
housing and neighbourhood regeneration. Nevertheless, New Labour in 
government has adapted, in its own way, to an existing neo-liberal political 
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landscape to address the issues of free market orientation and social justice 
(Mouffe, 2005). Consequently, New Labour in government has continued to 
support Conservative housing policies that allow tenants to purchase their council 
houses and councils to transfer council-owned housing to RSLs. However, New 
Labour has eschewed the dogmatic drive, adopted by earlier Conservative 
governments, to privatise as many public services as possible. Instead, New 
Labour has adopted a more pragmatic approach that does not simply focus on 
competition and obtaining services at the lowest possible cost, but includes 
opportunities to consider carefully the quality and effectiveness of services 
provided at the local level. However, the introduction of new methods of regulation 
and audit, examined in detail in later sections of this chapter, has helped to ensure 
the maintenance of certain service standards at the local level. A number of 
important New Labour housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies are set 
out in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: New Labour: housing and regeneration policies 
 
 
 
New Labour and partnerships 
  
1998 Active Communities Unit 
(ACU) 
Set up in the Home Office to promote activities to 
encourage people to become more involved in voluntary 
activities 
1998 New Deal for 
Communities (NDC) 
Regeneration and increasing community capacity 
1998 Health Action Zones 
(HAZs) 
Stakeholders with an interest in public health working 
together to improve people’s health and well-being 
1998 Education Action Zones 
(EAZs) 
Stakeholders with an interest in education working together 
to improve educational achievement 
1998 Voluntary Sector 
Compact 
Partnership-working between central government and 
voluntary and community sector organizations 
1999 Local Government Act Introduction of the Best Value regime  
2000 Under the Local 
Government Act 1999 
Introduction of the Tenant Participation Compact 
2000 Housing Green Paper 
‘Quality and Choice: A 
decent home for all 
Introduction of the Decent Homes Standard 
Introduction of  the arms length management organisation 
(ALMO) 
2000 Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund (NRF) 
Regeneration and enabling people to do things themselves 
2001 White Paper Strong 
Local Leadership – 
Quality Public Services 
Introduction of the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) and 
different stakeholders working together to improve provision 
and delivery of services at the local level 
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The New Labour government decided on three preferred options for raising the 
extra investment needed to repair and modernize council-owned housing. The 
outcomes of TARA and council consultations and collaboration to find solutions to 
housing problems needed to be acceptable to central government and fit with its 
preferred options for the future management of council-owned housing. The three 
preferred options were stock transfer, a PFI arrangement, or the setting up of an 
arms length management organisation (ALMO). The ALMO option was introduced 
in the Housing Green Paper (2000) ‘Quality and Choice: A decent home for all’ in 
response to tenant concerns about stock transfer and PFI. The ALMO is a not-for-
profit company set up and owned by the council to manage and improve all or part 
of its housing stock. Central government consent for an ALMO depends on 
evidence of in-depth consultations with tenants and their majority support for the 
proposal. An ALMO board comprises one-third tenants, one-third council 
representatives, and one-third independent representatives. The ALMO takes on 
responsibility for housing repairs and improvements, rent collection and dealing 
with rent arrears, and the management of lettings. The council retains 
responsibility for the development of housing strategy, the administration of 
housing benefits, and policy on rents. Central government provides extra 
resources towards the costs of achieving its Decent Homes Standard to councils 
that set up ALMOs (Housing Green Paper 2000).6 
 
When New Labour was re-elected in 2001, it increased its commitment to the 
transfer of council-owned housing to RSLs. Ironically, central government had 
previously identified transfer and modernization costs of £4.2 billion, spread over a 
                                                          
6
 The New Labour government adopted a Public Service Agreement (PSA) target in 2000 to bring 
all social housing up to a decent standard by 2010. The standard applies to council- and 
registered-social-landlord-owned properties alike. All social housing should be in a reasonable 
state of repair, have reasonably modern facilities and services, and provide a reasonable degree of 
thermal comfort (see Delivering the Decent Homes Standard: social landlords’ options and 
progress, House of Commons Research Paper 03/65). 
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thirty-year period, for transferring a million council homes, in five years, to RSLs. It 
was estimated these costs were £1.3 billion more than the £2.9 billion cost of 
councils retaining ownership of their housing stock and using public funds to 
modernize it (Birch, 2003).7 However, stock transfers remained attractive to central 
government because they represented an opportunity to avoid future housing 
repair and modernization costs that would otherwise fall on the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). This is an important point when the Treasury was 
attempting to control state spending on public services. 
 
There was still a strong central government desire to encourage councils and 
tenants to work together to find alternative ways to raise the finances needed to 
repair and modernize council-owned housing. The aim was to continue to support 
the separation of housing management and strategy functions and encourage 
councils to become more involved in identifying different housing needs and 
finding ways to meet them rather than dealing with day-to-day housing 
management issues. The trades-union-backed campaigning coalition called 
Defend Council Housing that was trying to stop the transfer of council-owned 
housing to RSLs pointed out: 
 
The ‘New Labour’ manifesto, published in 2001, contained a 
commitment to transfer some 200,000 council houses a year out 
of the public sector.8 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The cost to the public purse of a transfer of council-owned housing to another landlord can arise 
for three main reasons: housing association borrowing costs are higher than those for councils, 
housing association rents are higher, which costs more in housing benefit, and there are 
transaction costs associated with progressing the transfer arrangements. 
8
 An extract taken from a Defend Council Housing briefing document for Members of Parliament, 
published in September 2003. In 1998, the trades union backed coalition called Defend Council 
Housing was set up by tenants’ groups to try to stop the selling off or transfer of council-owned 
housing to RSLs. 
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Meanwhile, TARA and council collaboration would need to include discussions 
about how to obtain the extra resources needed to complete housing repairs and 
modernization works and meet the Decent Homes Standard by the 2010 deadline 
set by central government. In such circumstances, how have central government 
preferred housing management options facilitated the implementation of its plans 
for council-owned housing or enabled tenants to influence decisions about the 
future management of council-owned housing? Tenants may have been steered in 
a particular direction by central government and councils, or encouraged to come 
up with their own innovative solutions to housing problems. To what extent has 
TARA and council collaboration helped to legitimise the activities and actions of 
central government and councils, or empowered tenants through giving them more 
control over important resources and decision-making processes? To answer 
these questions it is necessary to understand the extent of any shift of power away 
from central government and councils to TARAs, and the effects of an increase in 
TARA regulation through new housing, Best Value and tenant participation 
policies. 
 
The next sub-section focuses on New Labour and partnerships to understand how 
TARA and council collaboration was occurring in a context where central 
government continued to support the transfer of council-owned housing to RSLs 
and was promoting the separation of housing management and strategy functions 
at the local level. 
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New Labour and partnerships 
 
The New Labour government signalled its commitment to community involvement 
in partnerships to improve neighbourhoods when it formed the Active Communities 
Unit (ACU) in the Home Office in 1998. This unit promoted activities to get 
individuals to become more involved in voluntary activity that helped to tackle 
social problems and exclusion at the local level. Indeed, partnership and 
collaborative working has been encouraged across a broad range of public policy 
areas, including health, education, community safety and the environment (Bevir 
and O’Brien, 2001; Skelcher, 2004). The New Labour approach to partnership and 
collaborative working has encouraged (and often compelled) councils to work with 
different constituencies and involve different stakeholders in decision-making 
processes when agreeing priorities for action to improve neighbourhoods and 
service provision at the local level. Various public, private, voluntary, and 
community sector organizations are more involved in collaborative work at the 
local level, including TARAs. 
 
Much collaboration at the local level is concerned with countering the less 
desirable effects of unfettered free market forces or preventing the breakdown of 
community ties (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Such collaborations include the 
New Deal for Communities (NDC), Health Action Zones (HAZs), Education Action 
Zones (EAZs), and Voluntary Sector Compact, all introduced in 1998. The Local 
Government Act (1999) led to the creation of the Best Value regime and the 
introduction of the Tenant Participation Compact under the same Act in 2000. In 
addition, the first Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) partnerships were set up in 
2000 and Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) comprised of public, private, 
voluntary and community sector organizations working together to improve the 
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provision of services at the local level were introduced in 2001.  
 
To what extent have these and other partnerships and collaborations helped to 
produce favourable outcomes in terms of the empowerment of communities, and 
TARA and tenant involvement in decision-making on matters affecting them or the 
area in which they live? The New Labour government’s promotion of collaboration 
at the local level is, in part, a pragmatic response to the fact that no organization 
on its own is likely to be able to deal effectively with a range of complex social 
problems. The central government emphasis shifted towards capacity building in 
communities, and enabling people to help themselves.9 
 
The aim was to encourage different stakeholders to produce some sort of vision 
for an area that promoted inclusion and the collective ownership of ideas by public 
and private organizations and citizens (Newman, 2001).10 
 
In some circumstances, partnership or collaborative working might also help to 
counteract problems associated with the fragmentation of service delivery at the 
local level caused by an expansion of the number of organizations involved in 
public service provision (Greenwood et al., 2002). To what extent though have 
TARAs and tenants been involved in different types of partnership and 
                                                          
9See: www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=617 
10
 The New Deal for Communities (NDC) initiative and Health Action Zones (HAZs) were set up in 
areas where there was an urgent need to address different social and public health problems. The 
aim was to create proactive partnerships that comprised all of the key stakeholders who could 
contribute to the regeneration or well-being of an area and the local population (including the 
council and relevant public, private, voluntary, and community sector organizations). The Education 
Action Zones (EAZs) comprised two or three secondary schools working with the Local Education 
Authority (LEA), parents, businesses and community representatives to improve educational 
standards in disadvantaged areas. The Voluntary Sector Compact was introduced to promote 
partnership working between central government, public agencies, and voluntary and community 
sector organizations in England. In 2000, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) initiative was 
introduced to provide funds for regeneration and involve local people in the process of improving 
run down neighbourhoods and local services. In addition, the White Paper Strong Local Leadership 
– Quality Public Services was introduced in 2000, which encouraged councils to develop 
partnerships that comprised a broad range of public, private, voluntary, and community 
organizations working together to improve the provision and delivery of services at the local level. 
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collaborative working to solve neighbourhood problems? For example, existing 
research suggests that voluntary and community sector influence has been mainly 
over service delivery rather than policy matters (Taylor, 1997). 
 
• What can TARA and council collaboration achieve in a new political 
landscape full of burgeoning partnerships and collaborations at the local 
level? 
 
• How is TARA and council collaboration able to connect with or contribute to 
other types of partnerships and collaborations operating in an area? 
 
• What are the different stakeholder tensions and concerns that might arise 
during the day-to-day operation of partnerships and collaborations at the 
neighbourhood level? 
 
These are all pertinent and interesting issues explored in more depth during in the 
current research and reported in chapters five through seven. Mandated TARA 
and council collaboration may be problematic where there is a long history of 
frequently turbulent tenant and landlord relations in a neighbourhood or area and 
there are large inequalities of power that exist between the council and TARAs. 
 
Meanwhile, it is necessary to examine the Best Value regime and the Tenant 
Participation Compact in more detail because they have had a particularly 
pronounced impact on contemporary TARA and council relations and 
collaboration. 
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The Best Value regime 
 
The New Labour government’s Local Government Act (1999) introduced the Best 
Value regime, which replaced the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) 
regime introduced under the Conservatives.11 Under CCT, the aim had been to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local services but there was often an 
emphasis on cost at the expense of quality. The involvement of community-based 
organizations in the CCT process was usually minimal or non-existent. On the 
other hand, Best Value authorities that include councils, national parks, and police 
and fire services are obliged to work with relevant stakeholders, including local 
taxpayers, service users, and the wider community on their plans for services and 
the setting of performance targets. Under Best Value, councils are not obliged to 
outsource services to suppliers who can provide them at the lowest cost (Massey 
and Pyper, 2005) but must make arrangements to secure continuous improvement 
in the delivery of services, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness (DETR 1998). 
 
Almost all council functions and services are subject to Best Value review 
including housing, education, and social services. The emphasis is on partnership 
working and the use of the four ‘C’s’ (consult, compare, challenge and compete) 
that comprised the key elements of the Best Value review of services and their 
delivery at the local level. However, Best Value review does not simply consist of a 
focus on competition as the prime objective. Competition with other potential 
service providers might be one way to secure more efficient and effective service 
provision. However, a council also needs to compare its performance in securing 
or delivering services with the performance of other councils and organizations 
                                                          
11The Conservative Local Government Acts 1988 and 1992 introduced Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) for different defined council services. The New Labour Local Government Act 
1999 introduced the Best Value regime. 
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providing similar services, and challenge the reasons for providing particular 
services. The introduction of the Best Value regime created new opportunities for 
TARA involvement in consultations and collaborations to decide priorities to 
improve neighbourhoods and local services. However, central government 
retained much power over councils through the Audit Commission Best Value 
inspection process. Best Value inspectors were given statutory authority to 
conduct investigations to assess council performance and award star ratings 
based on no stars (poor) to three stars (excellent) for performance in delivering 
different local services. Central government can intervene where there is a 
significant level of Best Value failure. Ultimately, the Secretary of State can direct 
a council to take prescribed action to improve a service or remove the service 
concerned from the council’s control altogether. 
 
The Tenant Participation Compact, introduced under the Best Value legislation 
and implemented at the local level in 2000, has resulted in the creation of separate 
and specific negotiations between tenants and councils to decide how different 
stakeholders will contribute to the maintenance or improvement of a 
neighbourhood and local services. The next sub-section comprises a detailed 
explanation of the operation of the compact at the local level and its impact on 
TARA and council collaboration. 
 
The Tenant Participation Compact 
 
The National Framework for Tenant Participation Compacts (DETR, 1999) 
contains six core standards. The standards describe how compact discussions 
involving the council and TARAs should include discussions on: 
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• housing services (including rent collection, housing repairs, and tenancy 
issues) 
• information (on issues like tenant participation, council support for tenants 
groups, and housing management) 
• monitoring and measuring performance (in delivering housing services, 
compiling compacts, and encouraging tenant participation) 
• tenants’ groups (and their needs) 
• support for tenant participation (in the form of council funds and other types 
of assistance) 
• council and tenants meetings (how they are conducted, for example) 
 
The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR 1999) 
pointed out the compact should be an agreement between the council and tenants 
that sets out: 
How tenants can get involved collectively in local decisions on 
housing matters which affect them; what councils and tenants 
want to achieve locally through compacts, such as better ways of 
working together, improving local services or a better quality of life; 
and how the compact will be implemented and checked to make 
sure it is working properly.  
(p.1) 
 
The framework document also contains a number of organizational standards that 
TARAs are expected to achieve before they are eligible to take part in TARA and 
council collaboration and council-convened meetings held to discuss 
neighbourhood management issues and the provision of local services. TARAs 
should have: 
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• a written constitution 
• equal opportunities and race equality policies 
• regular elections 
• clear financial records 
• regular minuted meetings (including an annual general meeting – AGM) 
• a minimum tenant quorum before decisions are taken 
• a level of active membership agreed by the council and tenants 
• procedures to ensure information is available for tenants who are 
encouraged to participate 
• open membership 
• regular written communications with members 
• some means of showing how they have met their objectives. 
 
The compact did not set out to prevent the development of informal tenants’ 
groups and alternative types of involvement where tenants had decided that they 
did not want to join a council-recognized tenants’ group. However, central 
government and council devised standards for tenants’ groups, and a requirement 
to meet the standards in order to be eligible to receive a share of council-
controlled funds and assistance may mean tenants’ groups are sometimes under 
considerable pressure to conform to avoid marginalization and ensure their 
survival. This raises the question - how are TARAs that refuse or are unable to 
meet central government and council organization standards treated and involved 
(or not) in TARA and council collaboration? 
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Institutional (central government) policies and forces may cause councils to take 
action that forces TARAs to organize and operate in particular ways to obtain 
access to important council-controlled resources and assistance. More specifically, 
mandated collaboration, to solve neighbourhood problems, may serve to 
perpetuate existing inequalities of power in society (Leach and Percy-Smith, 
2001). Whose values, for example, are dominant in the thinking that underpins the 
Decent Homes Standard, the Best Value regime, and the Tenant Participation 
Compact? What sorts of power do the Audit Commission, the Housing 
Inspectorate, and TARAs have, and how are they able to influence decisions 
about the development of housing policies and strategies? 
 
The next section focuses on some of the assumptions that exist concerning the 
purpose of collaboration, the problems that might arise when collaboration is 
mandated, and the implications for TARA involvement in Best Value and compact 
deliberations and decision-making processes. 
 
1.2 Problems with collaboration 
 
The political environment within which a collaboration is located and must operate 
(and over which collaborating organizations have limited control) will impact on the 
opportunities that exist to achieve different sorts of collaborative outputs and 
outcomes. At the local level, collaboration can be one way to encourage co-
operation among different organizations and community groups, and the 
achievement of mutually desired neighbourhood or service improvement 
objectives. It may be difficult, however, to achieve desired collaborative outputs or 
outcomes in communities in which there is little history of trust and co-operation 
between different organizations and individuals (Lasker et al., 2001). At the same 
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time, the inequalities of power that exist between organizations and individuals 
might limit who is involved in partnership or collaborative activities, whose views 
are considered valid (or not), and who has influence over decisions made. 
Collaboration can also easily be overdone with nothing of substance accomplished 
(Hansen and Nohria, 2004). Ultimately, the value of TARA and council 
collaboration will vary according to different organizations’ needs to obtain 
legitimacy through collaborative enterprise, a share of the central government 
funds set aside to support collaborative working, and perceptions about what it is 
possible to achieve through collaboration. 
 
Partnerships and collaborative working are key policy instruments in the 
implementation of specific centrally initiated programmes of action (Skelcher, 
2004). Fundamentally, different public policy approaches (funding arrangements, 
programme objectives, and performance measurement regimes) will enable or 
constrain different types of TARA and council collaboration. It is useful to consider 
how the complexity of the national and local policy context, within which 
collaborations at the local level are located, impacts on TARA and council 
relations, and the potential for stakeholder agreement or argument over the 
purpose of collaboration and its management. 
 
The political environment 
  
This thesis investigates the development of TARA and council relations and 
collaboration in a specific historically contextualised central and local government 
institutional environment. In particular, the focus is on how institutions can endure 
in ways that transcend the organizations and individuals involved in their creation. 
A simplified representation of the institutional context within which TARA and 
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council collaboration often occurs (involving central government, the council, some 
type of area-wide umbrella TARA, neighbourhood-based TARAs and marginalised 
or excluded TARAs) is set out in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The political context and collaboration 
 
The institutional context is a hierarchical arrangement with central government in a 
strong position to impose rules and ways of working on the council, TARAs and 
collaboration (indicated by the thicker arrows).  In turn, the council and TARAs 
sometimes have influence over central government policymaking but are not able 
to demand central government acts or works in certain ways.  It is likely the council 
will often have a closer relationship with any area-wide umbrella TARA that exists 
than it does with any individual neighbourhood-based TARA.  Representatives 
from the council, the area wide umbrella TARA, and neighbourhood-based TARAs 
may be involved in TARA and council collaboration.  However, the national and 
local political environment might also help to cause the marginalization or 
exclusion of some TARAs and activists from TARA and council collaboration. 
Area-wide 
 umbrella TARA 
Neighbourhood-based 
TARAs 
Council 
Marginalised or excluded TARAs 
 
 
Collaboration 
 
Central government 
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The New Labour government has encouraged council engagement with 
communities and citizens to harness community resources and collaboration to 
help to solve complex social problems. However, an increase in the complexity of 
the policy-making environment might mean new forms of exclusion, as well as new 
opportunities to influence decision-making, emerge at the neighbourhood level 
(Taylor, 2003). The balance between TARA incorporation and empowerment will 
depend on the way that central government pressures (legislative and regulatory) 
on councils and council pressures (funding criteria and recognition requirements) 
on TARAs influence or determine the way that councils and TARAs work together 
to achieve central government or their own organizational housing-management 
and neighbourhood-regeneration objectives. 
 
The next sub-section considers how the focus on TARA and council collaboration 
and the management of council-owned housing has changed since New Labour 
introduced the Best Value regime and the Tenant Participation Compact. 
 
Rhetoric and reality  
 
In the modern context, there is a widespread belief that collaboration is a ‘good 
thing’ (Kanter, 1994). The Department for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR), not long after the election of the first New Labour government in 
1997, said that it wanted more citizen involvement in discussions and decision-
making to establish plans for neighbourhood regeneration and service 
improvements (DETR, 1998). The New Labour government suggested there was 
clear evidence that good quality tenant involvement in housing and neighbourhood 
matters delivers better, more effective and efficient services. In 1999, Hilary 
Armstrong, the Minister for Local Government and Housing, said, in the foreword to 
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the National Framework for Tenant Participation Compacts, that: 
 
 
The new ‘best value’ regime is all about making continuous 
improvements in the cost and quality of council services. Key to 
this is looking at new ways of involving local communities in their 
plans and programmes and in no service is this more important 
than housing […] Compacts will bring about real and lasting 
changes in the relationship between council landlords and tenants. 
They will bring tenants into the heart of decision-making affecting 
their homes and their communities. 
 
 
In addition, under the terms of the Local Government Act (2000) every council has 
the power to do anything (within statutory and legal boundaries) that it viewed as 
helping to promote the improvement of the economic, social or environmental well-
being of an area. This can include more involvement of relevant organizations and 
individuals in partnership-working and coordinated collaborative activity to achieve 
improvement objectives. 
 
Since the election of the first New Labour government, in 1997, partnership and 
collaborative working have become the organizational strategies most strongly 
espoused by central government for a wide range of policy initiatives (Wilkinson 
and Craig, 2002). Partnership and collaborative working are key components of the 
third way politics developed by Anthony Giddens and adopted by New Labour that 
focus on trying to deal effectively with the inefficiencies of bureaucracy and the 
inequity of some market solutions to social problems (Giddens, 2000). However, 
New Labour also values partnership or collaborative working for its own sake and 
not simply as a pragmatic response to the everyday challenges of local 
governance, which was the view of previous Conservative Governments (Lowndes 
and Sullivan, 2004). 
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Under New Labour, new opportunities have emerged for alternative service 
delivery directions within the public sector (Wainwright, 2004). Nevertheless, 
partnership policies are sometimes ambiguous because central government can 
use its power and control over important resources to determine the attributes of 
partnership working and obtain organizational conformity at the expense of 
organizational autonomy (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001). A tension exists 
between the level of central government involvement in the development of the 
rules of collaborative engagement, the emphasis placed on ‘forcing’ collaboration 
between public, private and voluntary sector organizations (Diamond, 2006), and a 
desire to devolve more decision-making to the local level (Bailey, 2003).  
 
It is not clear where TARAs fit into the ‘new localism’ that can be characterised as 
a strategy aimed at devolving power and resources away from central government 
to councils, communities and citizens within an agreed framework of national 
minimum service standards and strategic policy priorities. The problem is one of 
governance and the balance that exists between a central government focus on 
the effective implementation of national policies locally and respect for the 
autonomy of voluntary and community-based organizations and the unique 
contribution that they can make to a partnership or collaborative venture at the 
local level. 
 
The next sub-section elaborates on how the ‘rules of engagement’ that shape the 
development of a collaborative venture are decided. It shows how the ‘rules of 
engagement’ in turn help to influence or determine the focus of collaborative 
dialogue and what it is possible to achieve through collaboration. 
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The rules of engagement 
 
The National Framework for Tenant Participation Compacts (1999) contains a 
section on standards for tenants’ groups, which says: 
 
These standards try to make sure that tenants’ groups have a 
mandate to get involved by meeting reasonable criteria for formal 
recognition by the council. Councils should negotiate and agree 
these criteria with tenants first. The criteria should not place too 
great a burden on tenants’ groups, particularly small groups or 
those set up for mainly social reasons 
 (p. 21) 
 
However, it is likely the way that councils interpret the national guidance for 
compacts and decide to enforce (or not) the requirement that tenants' groups meet 
certain framework standards will vary (see page 24). For example, the extent to 
which a council uses the national TARA standards and criteria for recognition to 
put pressure on TARAs to adopt ways of working that fit with its bureaucratic 
systems and procedures might vary considerably. A council might simply want to 
tick the appropriate boxes regarding tenant involvement and concentrate on the 
work that needs to be done to implement central government housing and 
neighbourhood improvement policies effectively at the local level. 
 
At the same time, the compilation of the compact must occur alongside the Best 
Value review of different local services and the work undertaken to meet the 
Decent Homes Standard and other central government priorities for 
neighbourhood improvement. Ultimately, the Audit Commission and the Housing 
Inspectorate are involved in the assessment of compacts, which are a key 
component of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) targets 
introduced in 2002 and national tenant-involvement objectives. Councils are under 
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pressure to show that they are involving tenants in Best Value, Decent Homes 
Standard, and compact review and evaluation work. Some councils may choose to 
focus on implementing formulaic TARA- and tenant-engagement policies, that are 
not sensitive to difference and diversity, to try to satisfy central government 
inspectors and obtain favourable Best Value inspection outcomes: those that will 
ensure they are eligible to receive a share of the extra central government 
resources made available for housing repairs and modernization.12 
 
The danger is that the development of tenant participation compacts, national 
standards for tenants’ groups, and councils’ TARA-recognition policies involves a 
considerable amount of extra bureaucratic work. Much of this extra work is 
undertaken to satisfy central government and its inspectors that appropriate 
council action is being taken to meet Best Value, Decent Homes Standard, and 
other national housing and neighbourhood improvement objectives. As Whittle 
(2001) says: 
 
[There are a] proliferation of forums, working groups, task groups, 
consultative committees, focus groups, panels and communication 
mechanisms now associated with tenant participation. 
(p. 6) 
 
How might this proliferation of different formal consultative and collaborative 
initiatives help to create or eliminate opportunities for power-sharing and informal 
or loosely organized types of deliberation and decision-making at the 
neighbourhood level? Richardson and Hills (2000), for example, interviewed 
residents and academics to obtain their views on formally constituted 
                                                          
12The essence of a CPA framework is that it draws on a range of information such as performance 
indicators, assessments of corporate capacity, audit and inspection reports, and stakeholder 
opinions to reach a single judgement about the performance of a local body. Its strength is its 
results in a clear public rating on a local body's performance, at: www.audit-commission.gov.uk/cpa 
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neighbourhood-renewal partnerships, and concluded, “There was an underlying 
concern with the difficulties of shifting existing power balances in favour of 
communities” (p. 2). Meanwhile, Taylor (1997) has suggested key decisions 
affecting communities and neighbourhoods continue to be made within both formal 
and informal networks that many voluntary and community-based organizations do 
not have access to. A potential problem that might exist concerning TARA and 
council collaboration is the extent to which TARAs are differentially involved in the 
implementation of central government housing and service development policies 
at the local level, or formulating and challenging those policies. 
 
An increased central government emphasis on partnerships and collaboration has 
created a political context in which new opportunities for different types of 
collaboration exist. What needs to be understood is the extent to which different 
types of collaboration are skewed towards stakeholders reaching a consensus on 
issues of recognizing and dealing effectively with conflict. Also, how different 
opportunities for collaboration result in new forms of TARA and activist inclusion or 
exclusion in housing consultations, depending on how well they fit with prevailing 
developments in a dominant language of collaboration. 
 
This chapter has provided details about the history of housing and tenant 
participation polices and their impact on TARA and council relations. It has also 
set out the main research question that arose after examining the wider history 
and context of New Labour’s Best Value and tenant participation policies and 
reflecting on their impact on TARA and council collaboration. 
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Chapter two sets out the three-part theoretical framework used to examine and 
analyse collaboration at the macro-level of the institution, the meso-level of the 
organization, and the micro-level of the individual and their actions.  It draws on 
institutional theory, theory on collaboration, and theory on power to explain 
different organizations’ and individuals’ experiences of collaboration, collaborative 
events, and collaborative outputs or outcomes. First, institutional theory is used to 
examine and analyse macro-level relations between institutions and collaborating 
organizations. Second, theory on collaboration and collaborative advantage is a 
source of ideas and insights that help to improve understanding of some aspects 
of TARA and council collaboration and, more generally, the meso-level relations 
that exist between collaborating organizations. Third, theory on power is used to 
examine and analyse collaborative interactions at the meso-level between 
organizations and at the micro-level between individuals. The aim is to improve 
understanding of TARA and council collaboration and enhance theory on 
collaboration and collaborative advantage so that it is better able to explain what 
happens in a situation where there is mandated collaboration involving 
organizations with very different cultures and values and where large inequalities 
of power exist between those organizations. 
 
Chapter three discusses the research design and methodology employed to obtain 
data on TARA and council collaboration, explores the longitudinal single case 
study that was undertaken, and provides a detailed rationale for choosing this 
approach. Sheffield was chosen as the case study location because it had a long 
history of tenant and landlord activity, there were many active TARAs in the city, 
and problematic relations existed between an umbrella TARA called Sheffield 
Tenants and Residents Together (START), the city council, and some other 
prominent TARAs and activists. The chapter also focuses on the role of the lone 
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researcher, with limited time and resources to spend in the field, and their use of 
the case study to collect rich data on complex interactions involving organizations 
and individuals in real life situations. A description is provided of the ethnographic 
techniques and grounded research approach that influenced the way that the 
research was conducted. The research methods that comprised semi-structured 
interviews, observations of meetings and events, a questionnaire survey, and 
secondary data (minutes, pamphlets, and papers) used to collect data on 
individuals’ experiences of collaboration. 
 
Chapter four provides background information on Sheffield, the city council, and its 
relations with START and neighbourhood-based TARAs. Sheffield’s long and 
complex industrial and labour movement history is examined and its effects on 
contemporary tenant and landlord relations are assessed. The different roles of 
the TARA activist, councillor and council officer in collaboration and their efforts to 
deal with different neighbourhood problems are analysed. 
 
Chapter five starts with a description of the situation in Sheffield as I found it in the 
summer of 2002. Then the chapter examines and analyses the role of START and 
the tensions and conflict that existed between the council and TARAs over the line 
START took on the future of council-owned housing. Institutional theory is used to 
help explain show how central government policies and activities shaped the 
national and local political context within which TARA and council collaboration is 
located. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of organizational ‘isomorphism’ is a 
central theory used to explain how organizations can become more like each other 
as they adapt to cope with environmental pressures.  Sometimes organizations 
becoming more like each other can help to ensure that they maintain a strong 
position in a marketplace or service sector through joint working and combining 
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skills and resources. Alternatively, organizations becoming more like each other 
can lead to a loss of organizational diversity and innovation. TARA resistance and 
protest against unpopular central government housing and tenant participation 
policies is also considered. 
 
Chapter six examines and analyses three key events that occurred in Sheffield in 
the latter part of 2002. These events show how a spiral of increasingly problematic 
conflict and mistrust developed between the council and START. Theory on 
collaboration, including Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative 
advantage, is used to analyse the way organizations are involved in determining 
whether collaboration will be successful or not. The ability of the theory of 
collaborative advantage to explain the way that institutions shape the wider 
environment and circumstances within which organizations emerge, develop, and 
sometimes collaborate is also considered. The aim is to help explain how 
institutional forces can influence what organizations emerge and are able to 
participate in partnerships and collaborations at the local level.  
 
Chapter seven examines and analyses the worsening relations between the 
council and START up until the point when the council decided to stop funding 
START. A combination of ideas and concepts drawn from institutional theory and 
theory on power help to show how altered central government policy priorities 
changed the council’s views on housing problems and its relations with START 
and TARAs. Lukes (1974) theory on power provides a framework for 
understanding how power can operate in observable and unobservable ways to 
shape agendas and decision-making processes. Central government introduced 
legislation that shaped council actions to deal with housing problems, which 
impacted on TARA and council relations and collaboration. At the same time, the 
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way that central government culture and actions helped to create a language of 
collaboration can guide council decisions about the type of collaboration that is 
desirable is considered. This thesis provides evidence for a new concept called 
disempowering involvement that helps to explain how some TARAs and activists 
(and councillors and council officers) were paradoxically disadvantaged through 
more involvement in collaboration at the local level. 
 
Chapter eight provides a detailed account of the research findings and insights 
that suggest ways that existing theory on collaboration needs to be developed. 
More specifically, institutional theory and theory on power help to show how a 
series of related TARA and council activities and actions helped to create an ever 
more fraught and difficult collaborative environment. Some TARAs and activists 
were severely constrained by new central government devised rules and 
regulations that shaped collaboration at the local level. The problems that can 
arise with collaboration and result in damaged stakeholder relations are 
highlighted and a new way of conceptualising collaboration is developed that helps 
to explain the process that leads to damaged stakeholder relations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Institutions and Organizations 
Considerable rhetoric and debate surrounds the concept of collaboration, which 
leads to much confusion for academics and practitioners when both positive and 
negative outcomes of organisations collaborating are highlighted. Much of the 
central government and ‘good practice’ literature on partnership and collaborative 
working at the local level to manage and improve housing and neighbourhoods is 
prescriptive. It lacks a strong theoretical basis on the role of institutions and power 
in the development of collaborative relations (DETR 1998, DETR 1999, Housing 
Act 1980, Local Government Act 1988, Local Government Act 1992, Local 
Government Act 1999). Riseborough (1998), elaborating on tenant involvement in 
housing discussions and decision-making processes, says: 
 
The first and most common way of conceiving of tenant 
involvement in the ‘good practice’ literature is as a mutual 
partnership which is assumed to bring benefits for both tenants 
and landlord.  
(p. 222) 
 
Such ‘good practice’ literature on partnership and collaborative working does not 
provide a well-developed explanation of how partnership working and collaboration 
occurs within a wider institutional environment. In this wider institutional 
environment, a dominant institutionalised culture, set of core values, and ways of 
working can endure across time, helping to define particular fields or areas of 
activity, and shaping the actions of organizations and individuals operating in a 
field. 
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This thesis uses an approach to examine collaboration at the local level that 
consists of three interrelated levels of analysis: 
 
1. At the macro-level, institutions, including central government, can 
encourage or compel organizations to work together in certain ways in 
order to provide public services. For example, central government can 
make collaboration a condition of applying for funding or a requirement to 
achieve favourable audit or Best Value reports. 
 
2. At the meso-level, different organizations may work together to achieve 
organizational and collaborative objectives, and sometimes to satisfy the 
demands of institutions that they depend on for funds or other types of 
support. For example, central government may develop policies or funding 
regimes that influence or determine how organizations will co-operate or 
collaborate to achieve their own and central government imposed 
collaborative objectives. 
 
3. At the micro-level, the actions of individuals in organizations involved in 
collaborative ventures will vary in response to institutional pressures, and 
organizational processes and procedures, perhaps exerting control over 
agendas or exacerbating power differentials. 
 
The three levels of analysis constitute a way to examine relations between 
institutional forces and power at the macro-level (including legislation, traditions, 
and customs) and their affect on the political environment within which 
organizations are located and collaborate at the meso level and individuals in 
organizations act at the micro-level. 
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Different theorists have analysed collaboration from the macro, meso, and micro 
perspectives, and this chapter explores key institutional theory and theory on 
power debates in-depth, highlighting the ones that seem appropriate for 
understanding collaboration at the local level. This chapter, therefore, considers 
two theoretical questions in particular. First, how effectively does existing theory 
on collaboration and collaborative advantage deal with institutions and the ways in 
which they impact on relations between collaborating organizations? Second, how 
well does existing theory on collaboration and collaborative advantage deal with 
mandated collaboration where there are large inequalities of power between 
collaborating organizations with very different cultures and values?  In doing so, 
the key theoretical and conceptual bases for my research questions are 
developed. The aim is to enhance existing theory on collaboration and 
collaborative advantage through an in-depth examination and analysis of the way 
that institutions and power impact on the political environment in which 
collaborations are located, and the actions of organizations and individuals. 
 
The chapter begins with an outline of some perspectives on collaboration followed 
by an examination of existing theory on collaboration and the work of Huxham and 
Vangen and their theory of collaborative advantage. A number of points in the 
literature are highlighted that provide insights into collaboration at the local level. 
The chapter then moves on to examine and analyse institutional theory and theory 
on power to see how they can help to improve understanding of collaboration. At 
the end of the chapter, a working model or theoretical framework for 
understanding TARA and council collaboration is set out, which includes some 
illustrative examples that show how the framework helped to inform empirical 
research work. 
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2.1 Perspectives on collaboration 
 
The motivation to collaborate can stem from interdependencies that exist between 
organizations (Gray, 1985; Logsdon, 1991) and the form that collaboration takes 
can range from: 
 
Wide networks through loose alliances and tight federations to the 
creation of novel organizational entities, sometimes separate from 
the partner organizations, sometimes vested in one partner.  
(Cropper, 1996, p. 82) 
 
For example, organizations with an interest in neighbourhood regeneration or the 
delivery of local services might form different types of alliances or coalitions and 
combine different skills, knowledge, and funds to achieve different types of 
mutually desired regeneration or service development objectives. However, 
successful collaboration will depend on autonomous organizations developing 
shared structures, rules, and norms for decision- making and action (Wood and 
Gray, 1991). Organizations need to have structures in place that help to improve 
understanding of each other’s views and facilitate the development of inter-
organizational relations that will help them to achieve mutually desired objectives. 
Norms and rules that help to ensure collaboration is fair and equitable are also 
important. Successful collaboration depends on organizations developing a 
language based on norms and rules promoting inter-organizational 
communications and cooperation that help to reduce the scope for 
misunderstandings and the breakdown of deliberations (Hardy et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
 
  - 45 -  
Ideas on what makes collaboration a rewarding enterprise 
 
A broad literature exists on what makes collaboration a useful or rewarding 
enterprise for organizations. The literature provides examples of the mechanisms 
and resources that can help to facilitate successful collaboration and includes: 
 
• work on collaboration and success factors (Bruce et al., 1995; Mattessich 
and Monsey, 1992) 
• collaborative stages and the incremental development of collaborative 
relations and objectives (Austin, 2000; Kanter, 1994) 
• collaborative competencies (organizations’ willingness and capacity to work 
together) and productive collaboration (Foley and Mundschenk, 1997; 
Simonin, 1997) 
• collaborative tools (Eisenstadt et al., 2003; Nidamarthi, 2001) 
• checklists (Borden and Perkins, 1999; Osborne et al., 2002).  
 
These mechanisms and resources include effective foundation building and 
planning, understanding each other’s culture, values, views and aspirations, 
sharing power and building a shared vision, and obtaining access to needed 
funds, information, and expertise.  The use of these mechanisms and resources 
during the development of collaboration at the local level will help to determine the 
extent to which it is equitable, sustainable, and able to effectively recognize and 
address different stakeholder concerns. 
 
Organizations will collaborate for different reasons. For example, they may want to 
obtain power and control over the environment within which they are located and 
have to operate (Astley, 1984) or want to learn from each other and search for 
solutions to problems that extend beyond their own limited vision of what is 
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possible (Gray and Wood, 1991). A tension might arise between central 
government and aspects of its policies that give it more control over a political 
environment, organizations at the local level that want more control over the same 
environment, organizations capacity to learn from each other, and doing things in 
genuinely different ways to achieve national and local objectives. Collaborating 
organizations can find out what each other’s views are on issues and try to agree 
shared priorities for action to manage conflict over resources and policy matters 
(Fredericksen, 1996) and develop innovative solutions to problems (Hardy et al., 
2005) to achieve more together than they can working alone (Kanter, 1994; 
Roberts, 2000).  The issue is the extent to which collaboration at the local level is 
about organizations doing these things as opposed to manoeuvring to obtain 
advantage over each other in collaboration sometimes to satisfy demands from 
other external bodies that they operate in certain ways and do certain things. 
 
Business organizations tend to establish collaborations built on strong 
interdependencies (Burton, 1994) and a desire to increase their market 
competitiveness through arrangements to share knowledge, resources, and risk 
(Kanter, 1994; Konsynski and McFarlan, 1990).  At the same time, opportunities 
for strategic collaboration with some of its competitors can help a business gain 
competitive advantage over other similar businesses in a field (Dyer and Ouchi, 
1993; Dyer, 1998). This means that, by combining skills and resources, 
collaborating organizations are in a better position than other organizations in a 
field to gain a lead in developing new products and services. Collaborations 
involving voluntary and community-based organizations may be set up for some of 
the same reasons as collaborations between businesses but voluntary and 
community-based organizations do not compete with each other to maximize 
profits for owners or shareholders. The non-profit making status of these 
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organizations combined with a frequently strong desire to balance individual 
interests with those of the community as a whole will have particular implications 
for collaboration, capacity building, and the empowerment of organizations and 
individuals at the local level. Voluntary and community-based organizations will 
often want to ascertain how their involvement in a collaborative enterprise can 
facilitate the effective inclusion of different stakeholder voices. Voluntary and 
community-based organizations are often involved in representing the views of 
marginalised or excluded community groups and citizens in collaboration 
(Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Many voluntary and community-based 
organizations are also involved in collaboration for some explicit social purpose. 
For example, the empowerment of communities through shared ownership of 
decisions (Hardy et al., 2003) and action taken to deal with complex social 
problems (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). The focus is on democracy and equality 
in collaboration as well as the provision of different services at the national or local 
level. 
 
The political environment within which collaborations are located and operate will 
impact on their shape and the extent of opportunities to focus on democracy and 
equality issues as well as the achievement of collaborative objectives. The political 
environment will also affect how collaborating organizations work together. For 
example, the political environment will help to determine the levels of trust that 
exist between different collaborating organizations (Melaville and Blank, 1991) and 
how effectively organizations are able to combine resources and skills to solve 
complex problems (Imperial, 2005). The possibilities for achieving community 
empowerment will also change in different political environments. The 
opportunities will vary for empowerment meaning groups and individuals at the 
local or neighbourhood level have more power and control over important 
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resources and decision-making processes that impact on their lives and the places 
where they live. Empowerment will depend on the influence that organizations and 
individuals have over the environment within which they are located as well as 
collaborative structures and decision-making processes (Fawcett et al., 1995). In 
the case of collaboration at the local or neighbourhood level, central government 
has considerable ability to influence or determine the environment within which it is 
located, through legislation and guidance that sets out what it should consist of 
and what it should achieve. 
 
The next sub-section focuses on two possible characteristics of collaboration. The 
first is instrumental and is about achieving some practical outcome, such as 
improved local services, and the second is ideological and is about collaboration 
that challenges established policies or ways of working. 
 
Instrumental and ideological collaboration 
 
Huxham (1996) has produced a framework consisting of eight dimensions, each 
describing elements of collaboration that can complement or conflict with each 
other. She has drawn on the work of a number of authors to construct a framework 
that provides an interconnected set of contrasts or dimensions of collaboration 
used to improve understanding of the purpose of different collaborations (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Dimensions of collaboration (adapted from Huxham, 1996) 
 
Much collaboration is likely to be mainly instrumental and concerned with achieving 
practical outputs or outcomes. Collaboration may comprise one group of 
stakeholders mainly involved in implementing the policies or plans of another group 
of stakeholders. Alternatively, stakeholders are involved in working together to 
decide their own collaborative plans and objectives. 
 
Some [collaborations] have very broad aims. For example, in 
some locations, the major agencies produce a joint social and 
economic development strategy for the area with the aim of 
providing direction for individual and other, less broad, 
collaborative initiatives. Others will be more specifically focused on 
a particular policy area such as education, health or crime. Yet 
others will be narrowly focused on a particular project, for example 
the upgrading of physical facilities such as roads or civic buildings.  
(Huxham, 2000, p. 340) 
 
 
Dimensions of collaboration 
 
Ideological Instrumental 
Participation 
Changing power relationships 
Empower the weak 
Resolving conflict 
Coalition forming 
Exchange of information 
Information exchange 
Organizations working together 
Effecting task-based change 
Increase own power 
Advancing a shared vision  
All party collaboration 
Joint agreements 
Enhancing another’s capacity 
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Whatever form collaboration takes, there is an instrumental aspect to effecting 
task-based change and the achievement of some type of practical outcome and an 
ideological aspect to changing values and power relationships. In different 
situations, collaboration can empower weaker organizations and help them to 
achieve their own objectives, or increase a more powerful organization’s power to 
achieve its own objectives. Collaboration can also comprise the exchange of 
information for mutual benefit and the sharing of power to enhance the 
organizational capacity of weaker organizations and help them to achieve their own 
and collaborative objectives. 
 
For some people […] collaborations also carry ideological 
connotations associated with participation and empowerment […] 
the main concern is an ideological belief that stakeholders should 
be involved. In the extreme this means empowering such 
stakeholders to take a central, rather than peripheral, role in the 
collaboration, including having direct authority for spending its 
budgets.  
(Huxham, 2000, p. 340) 
 
However, the accumulation or transfer of organizational power is not necessarily a 
zero-sum game (where one stakeholder’s gain or loss results from the losses or 
gains of other stakeholders). For example, stakeholders may find a way to resolve 
conflict in collaboration that comprises reaching a consensus on issues without the 
requirement for a shift of power between them. On the other hand, a group of 
stakeholders may decide to form a coalition to bypass or undermine particular 
collaborative discussions and decision-making procedures.  
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The dimension of collaboration that distinguishes between its instrumental and 
ideological elements is particularly useful when examining and analysing relations 
between collaborating organizations. In the case of collaboration at the local or 
neighbourhood level, it is a dimension that can be used to help to determine how 
collaboration has impacted on community-based organizations ability to get their 
neighbourhood management or improvement priorities onto relevant agendas. 
Other dimensions of collaboration are also likely to be useful in the examination 
and analysis of collaboration at the local or neighbourhood level. They include the 
way that conflict is recognised and dealt with, the distribution of important 
resources, and the extent to which collaboration increases an organization’s own 
power at the expense of empowering other organizations. 
 
At the same time, examining and analysing the institutional environment within 
which collaboration is located and how opportunities for different types of 
collaboration emerge will help to show how collaborative advantage can be 
achieved or not. 
 
Collaborative advantage and inertia 
 
Huxham (1991) began to develop ideas about the structure and mechanics of 
collaboration when working with public organizations and their employees to 
develop strategies for collaborative working at the local level. She was interested 
in organizations’ capacity to collaborate to help ensure the efficient and effective 
use of resources to tackle complex problems. By combining skills and resources, 
organizations can create a ‘synergy’ or collective way of working that helps them 
to avoid some of the pitfalls of excessive individualism. The pitfalls of working in 
isolation can include a reduced capacity for organizational learning and the 
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inefficient development of products or provision of services (Huxham, 1993c). 
 
Huxham (1993) also suggests that ‘synergy’ between organizations facilitates the 
achievement of the collaborative advantage that she has described. This ‘synergy’ 
comprises two or more organizations working together to create a greater effect 
than might be expected if the organizations worked separately. It is likely the ability 
to create ‘synergy’ will depend on the skills that the convenors or managers of the 
collaboration possess, their understanding of stakeholder motivations for 
collaborating, and the identification and appropriate use of resources (Lasker et 
al., 2001). In turn, collaborative advantage will occur when: 
 
Something unusually creative is produced – perhaps an objective 
is met – that no organization could have produced on its own and 
when each organization, through the collaboration, is able to 
achieve its own objectives better than it could alone.  
(Huxham, 1993b, p. 603) 
 
Organizations need to develop shared ways of communicating and operating that 
make the collaborative relationship work to stand a chance of achieving 
collaborative advantage (Kanter, 1994). In addition, organizations need to agree 
clear aims and goals (Huxham and Vangen, 1996) that fit with the purpose of the 
collaboration (Eden and Huxham, 2001) and address the concerns of individual 
organizations as well as collaborative agenda items (Huxham, 2003). 
 
The theory of collaborative advantage focuses on phenomena that occur at the 
organizational level. They include communications between organizations and the 
conduct of meetings (Huxham and Vangen, 2000b), who is involved in 
collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2000a) and how they assist (or not) in the 
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building of relationships (Huxham, 1993b). Different facilitators of collaboration 
have been identified that deal with how organizations work together (Huxham, 
1993b). They focus on organizations creating a shared sense of mission and 
strategy, the possession of shared values and beliefs, the equitable distribution of 
power and control over resources, agreement over who to involve, high levels of 
stakeholder interdependence, a belief in the value of collaboration, stocks of 
mutual trust, and an awareness of each other’s goals (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Facilitators of collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1993b) 
 
Sometimes the focus of Huxham and Vangen’s argument shifts to individuals in 
collaboration who can help to make it a success. There are individuals who cannot 
easily be replaced without severe disruption to the collaboration (Huxham and 
Vangen, 2000a). For example, because they champion or nurture collaborative 
relationships and collaborative working (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). The same or 
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other individuals may steer or sometimes control collaboration, and be able to 
make judgements about the extent to which issues are of relevance or not to a 
collaborative agenda and the achievement of collaborative objectives (Vangen and 
Huxham, 2003). 
 
A focus on the organizations and individuals involved in collaboration and the way 
that different phenomena and events at the organizational level can contribute to 
the achievement of collaborative advantage may provide useful information about 
the formation of collaborative relations. In particular, such a focus might help to 
show how different organizational cultures and values or the distribution of power 
and control over important resources among organizations impacts on 
collaboration and the production of collaborative outputs or outcomes. In situations 
where large public and small community-based organizations come together, an 
understanding of their different contributions to the collaboration will most likely 
produce many useful insights. 
 
Huxham and Vangen (2004) also developed the concept of collaborative inertia to 
help explain unexpected poor collaborative performance. Collaborative inertia 
exists when: 
 
The output from a collaborative arrangement is negligible, the 
rate of output is extremely slow, or stories of pain and hard grind 
are integral to successes achieved.  
(p. 191) 
 
They identified various factors that can induce the onset of collaborative inertia 
(see Figure 4). There may be much procrastination over the purpose of 
collaboration because of the diversity of organizational and individual concerns 
and aspirations that the collaboration has to deal with. Difficulties with 
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communications can arise because of differences in organizational cultures and 
values or the languages that different organizations and individuals use. 
Organizations with very different ways of working may struggle to develop modes 
of joined-up working. The management of power inequalities and the building of 
trust will sometimes be a protracted and problematic business. Keeping 
organizations on board and accountable whilst valuing their autonomy and 
contribution can be a difficult balancing act. Moreover, dealing with the 
complicated logistics of working with other organizations and individuals may 
create difficulties for organizations and individuals. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Factors inducing collaborative inertia (Huxham and Vangen, 2000a) 
 
Organizations may not have the collaborative capacity (structures, funds, people, 
time, and commitment) needed for collaboration (Huxham, 1993a) or differences in 
the power that they possess (Huxham, 1996) and mistrust between them (Vangen 
and Huxham, 2003) undermine attempts to collaborate. It will be difficult without 
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the appropriate sorts of organizational capacity to obtain the levels of commitment, 
communication, and respect for each other’s values and views needed to develop 
sustainable collaborative relations and achieve mutually desired collaborative 
objectives. Mistrust in collaboration is likely to increase and frustrate attempts to 
build genuinely collaborative relations if a more powerful organization is able to 
behave in ways that help it to gain some unfair advantage such as preventing less 
powerful organizations from getting their ideas onto relevant agendas. Chapter one 
(section 1.1) outlined the history of often difficult tenant and private landlord 
relations that existed in many cities and towns in England, which caused mistrust 
between tenants and their new council landlords. In addition, TARAs are usually 
relatively small and informal organizations run on a tight budget by volunteers 
working in very different ways to the professionals and other experts employed by 
large and powerful organizations like the local council. Many small single-issue 
organizations in the voluntary and community sectors will have particular concerns 
about the prospect of losing control over their affairs if they are obliged or decide to 
work collaboratively with a broad range of other organizations (Vangen and 
Huxham, 2003). Moreover, such voluntary and community sector organizations 
may experience institutional pressure that encourages or compels them to fit with 
the ways of working of more powerful organizations like the council at the local 
level or be unable to get their priorities onto relevant agendas if they are unfamiliar 
with official procedures and practices. 
 
Once again, collaborative inertia like collaborative advantage is mainly concerned 
with phenomena and events at the organizational level. Huxham and Vangen 
(2005) suggest it is a concept that can help improve understanding of how 
organizations with different cultures, values, and power can or cannot work 
together. The public and community-based organizations that work together may 
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be more prone to experience the effects of collaborative inertia. In particular, 
because they have very different organizational cultures and values, and large 
inequalities of power exist between them, collaboration is particularly complex and 
problematic. The effective management of organizational tensions and conflict over 
the purpose of collaboration, power and resources, ways of working, and decisions 
about aims and objectives will be more difficult to achieve in potentially very 
turbulent circumstances. 
 
Organizations will consider the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration. 
Some will perceive collaboration to be a valuable means of achieving 
organizational objectives in changing or uncertain operating environments 
(Huxham, 1996). There are benefits to be gained from the sharing of knowledge 
and expertise, the exchange of information and ideas, and the transfer of ‘best 
practice’ between organizations. They include improved organizational capacity to 
cope with changing citizen or consumer demands and the development of superior 
products and services (Hansen and Nohria, 2006). However, an organization may 
take unilateral action to strengthen their power base or relative position in the 
collaboration (Lank, 2006). Sometimes organizations will experience a loss of 
control over their affairs, a loss of flexibility to take decisions, and increased costs 
associated with extra bureaucracy and meetings (Huxham and MacDonald, 1992). 
 
The two concepts of collaborative advantage and collaborative inertia can help to 
explain collaborative phenomena and events at the organizational level. What they 
do not do well is explain how collaboration is located in and affected by a wider 
institutional and political environment. 
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What’s lacking with the theory of collaborative advantage 
 
Huxham and Vangen (2000b, 2003, 2005) recognize the environment within which 
collaboration is located can impact on decisions about its purpose and how it is 
managed. They suggest that central government policies and funding regimes 
often influence or shape collaboration at the local level (Huxham, 2000) and 
relations between collaborating public, voluntary, and community-based 
organizations (Huxham and Vangen, 2000b). In addition, central government will 
sometimes push hard for the achievement of particular collaborative outputs or 
outcomes at the local level because the demands of the electoral system require 
quick and unambiguous indications of action on issues (Vangen and Huxham, 
2003). 
 
However, Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative advantage only 
briefly touches on the role of institutions in influencing or determining the shape of 
political environments and collaborations. Furthermore, they do not examine in 
detail the role of institutions and power in determining the opportunities that exist 
for organizations to participate in different types of instrumental or ideological 
collaboration. The effects of established traditions and institutional values and 
beliefs on the activities of collaborating organizations are not well developed. 
Something is also missing in terms of understanding how institutions might try to 
obtain control over what gets onto collaborative agendas and promote a type of 
deliberation that shapes collaborative activity in certain ways at the local level. 
 
The book Managing to Collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative 
advantage by Huxham and Vangen was published in 2005. Sydow (2006, p. 606), 
in a review of this book, says he would have liked the findings to be “Anchored in a 
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more thorough, formal and explicit theory of organizational and inter-organizational 
practice (such as Giddens’s structuration theory, to which the authors refer on 
several occasions)”. This is an important comment that links directly to the point 
made early on in this chapter that Huxham and Vangen’s work fails to effectively 
deal with the issue of institutions and collaboration. In particular, institutions are 
created by organizations and individuals, but can take on a separateness that 
allows them to endure across time and independently influence or determine the 
way that organizations are set up and operate. 
 
The nature of the structured relationships that exist between institutions, 
organizations, and individuals is something that Huxham and Vangen do not dwell 
on. Often, the literature on the subject portrays positive views of collaboration, 
including Huxham and Vangen’s work on collaborative advantage. A rational, 
management-oriented, view of collaboration underpins views on collaboration 
(Doyle, 2004). There is a tendency to ignore or underplay the role of institutions 
and the contested nature of power and decision-making in discussions about 
partnerships or collaboration (Diamond, 2006). 
 
The literature on collaboration and partnership-working is “Overwhelmingly 
concerned with solving the problems that partnership throws up in order to 
maximize the benefits of partnership” (MacDonald and Chrisp, 2005, p. 315). 
Indeed, much of the central government rhetoric on collaboration described in 
chapter one (section 1.2) suggests that if TARAs comply with national organization 
standards and sign up to council recognition policies they will obtain extra funds 
and official support, and be able to effectively deal with various housing and 
neighbourhood problems. However, the rhetoric does not adequately deal with the 
power that institutions gain from the way that institutionalised values, beliefs, and 
  - 60 -  
ways of working impact on the activities and actions of organizations at the local 
level. A better understanding of the way that opportunities for instrumental and 
ideological collaboration emerge and organizations make use of them should help 
to explain how central government, council and community-based organization 
relationships are structured and how collaboration works at the local level. 
 
The next section uses institutional theory and theory on power to examine and 
analyse macro-level institutional pressures and their effect on organizations at the 
meso-level and individuals at the micro-level. The focus is on how institutions can 
create or limit opportunities for collaboration (especially of the ideological kind) and 
opportunities for organizations to achieve collaborative advantage and avoid the 
onset of collaborative inertia. 
 
2.2 Institutions and power 
 
It is necessary to know something about the circumstances under which 
collaboration is established (Wood and Gray, 1991) and the environment within 
which it is located because it influences how stakeholders work together (Gray, 
1996; Reilly, 2001). Institutional environments embed social processes (Selsky, 
2005) and social action is not context free but constrained and shaped by the 
location in which it occurs (Selznick, 1948). Any particular situated organization or 
individual will confront a diversity of social forms that exist quite independently of 
whatever they may do since they stretch away across time–space according to 
their institutional embeddedness (Giddens, 1985; Zucker, 1977). The institutional 
embeddedness of social forms will depend on the extent to which ‘taken-for-
granted’ values and ideas about what is ‘normal’ or appropriate underpin people’s 
behaviour. 
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Institutions are associated with particular social systems and orders that transcend 
the activities and actions of organizations and individuals. Individuals are 
simultaneously involved in different relationships that they reproduce and produce 
anew (Giddens, 1979) and affected by institutions that are able to directly 
influence their views and actions (Giddens, 1983). As indicated in chapter one 
(section 1.1) the New Labour government’s Best Value regime and Tenant 
Participation Compact are top-down imposed initiatives. The basic power of 
institutions is their ability to cause organizations and individuals to behave in 
certain predictable ways (Parsons, 1951). The Best Value and compact legislation 
changed the institutional and political environment within which TARA and council 
collaboration is located and must operate. 
 
A focus on institutional pressures and ‘organizational isomorphism’ helps to show 
how institutions affect organizations and individuals. It also adds a much-needed 
perspective on the political struggles for organizational power and survival that is 
missing from the theory of collaborative advantage. 
 
Institutional pressure and ‘organizational isomorphism’ 
 
The term ‘isomorphism’ describes a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions.13 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) developed their theory of ‘organizational 
isomorphism’ to help to explain how institutional pressures on organizations can 
cause them to behave in certain similar ways. 
 
 
                                                          
13The term ‘isomorphism’ was first used in chemistry to describe the formation of identical 
crystalline structures. 
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Once disparate organizations in the same line of business are 
structured into an actual field ([…] by competition, the state, or the 
professions), powerful forces emerge that lead them to become 
more similar to one another.  
(p. 148) 
 
The institutionalization of organizations that change and become more like each 
other may be the product of a particular environment and set of pressures or social 
processes that promote a certain type of widespread response to environmental 
demands (Jepperson, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of 
institutional pressure affecting organizations that can cause ‘organizational 
isomorphism’. First, there is the coercive pressure to act in certain ways exerted 
on an organization by an institution or organization on which it is dependent. 
Second, there is the mimetic pressure to act in certain ways exerted on an 
organization that causes it to imitate other organizations perceived to have been 
successful in obtaining the legitimacy or resources they need to function 
effectively. Third, there is the normative pressure to act in certain ways exerted on 
an organization by professionals and influential others who have an interest in its 
affairs. 
 
Central government is able to exert coercive pressure on public and community-
based organizations through legislation, regulations and decisions about rewards 
or penalties for acting in particular ways. The impact of this type of pressure on 
public and community-based organizations will vary. Sometimes coercive 
pressure, in the form of standard operating procedures and performance 
management regimes imposed by central government, will have a direct impact on 
organizations and the way that they operate (Balloch and Taylor, 2001; 
Bowerman, 2002; Tiesdale and Allmendinger, 2001). However, coercive pressure 
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can also comprise different perceived institutional or funding body demands that 
cause organizations that depend on the institution or funding body for support to 
change and become more like each other. For example, central government may 
use the power that it possesses to mandate collaboration or ensure it has control 
over important resources, and can compel different organizations to work together. 
Often organizations will know a powerful institution or authority has access to 
coercive measures that it can use to obtain an organization’s support for its 
actions (Wood and Gray, 1991). Sometimes, central government pressure will 
promote the development of actual or apparent organizational support for 
traditional types of hierarchically structured public-sector partnerships (Davies, 
2004). Such partnerships or collaborations may be set up quickly to satisfy central 
government demands for increased stakeholder involvement in various matters. 
The downside is an inadequate amount of time is devoted to organizations 
learning about each other, building relations, and developing genuinely new and 
innovative ways of working together. For some partners, the main value of the 
partnership is its existence rather than the work that it does (MacDonald and 
Chrisp, 2005). 
 
The risk is mandated collaboration helps to maintain a particular type of ‘principal-
agent’ relationship between central government and organizations at the local 
level (Sullivan et al., 2006). At the same time, different central government 
departments and agencies can use their dominant position and control over the 
flow of resources (funds and authority) in a network to influence the shape of inter-
organizational relations at the local level (Benson, 1975; Hudson et al., 1999). An 
institution’s funding regimes can make organizational conformity to certain ideas 
and ways of working obligatory in situations where organizations depend on 
receiving funds from the institution to function effectively or survive (Bowerman, 
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2002). Consequently, it is not possible to comprehend fully how collaborating 
organizations work together in the absence of detailed knowledge about the way 
institutions and power are involved in shaping the environment within which 
collaborating organizations are located. 
 
The next sub-section provides an account of some of the criticisms of institutional 
theory, as a means to examine and analyse organizational interactions and the 
role of agency in the creation and change of institutions as well as challenging 
established institutional values and rules. 
 
A critique of institutional theory 
 
Some commentators suggest institutional theory has had trouble in dealing with 
political conflict as sources of change rather than just stability (Peters et al., 2005). 
The risk is the use of institutional theory to explain collaborative phenomena will 
miss the unique contribution that organizations and individuals might make to 
changing institutions. The charge sometimes levelled against institutional theory is 
that it is too inflexible and not able to explain adequately the complexity of 
contemporary political environments. Institutions need to respond to legitimate 
pressures that develop in the wider environment in situations where there are 
democratic deliberations and decision-making. Indeed, institutions, organizations, 
and individuals are involved in an ongoing process of interaction that produces 
change and even replacement of existing institutions (Peters, 2000). For example, 
TARAs and activists will respond to pressures coming from central government 
and adapt to meet its demands or challenge them. However, some proactive 
individuals may seek to change institutionalised rules to enhance their interests 
(Beckert, 1999). 
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It may be possible to assess the extent to which people consciously choose to 
comply with or ignore institutional rules and regulations and how they are involved 
in changing institutions, which requires conscious decision-making (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997). Consequently, the complex mix of institutional and agency forces 
at work in the relationship between central government, councils, and tenants’ and 
residents’ organizations should not be underestimated. A duality of structure exists 
because social practice has both a structural and an agency component. The 
structural environment constrains individual behaviour but also makes it possible 
(Giddens, 1976). At the same time, it is possible in some circumstances to have 
an increasing amount of activity and action amongst organizations and individuals 
that is not in line with established institutional rules or regulations. A weakness in 
some of the extant institutional theory is its lack of integrated mechanisms that 
show how cognitive capacity and emotional responses are involved in changing 
normative and regulative systems (Jennings and Greenwood, 2003). 
 
Sometimes a bias towards forming a ‘structuralist’ argument exists that seeks to 
develop some type of generalizable knowledge at the expense of understanding 
the uniqueness of individual organizations (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997). An aim 
of the thesis was to relate the findings from research to the way that institutions 
can shape the environment within which collaborations are located and 
understand the potential for different collaborative activities and actions at the 
organizational level using aspects of institutional theory. At the same time, theory 
on collaboration and collaborative advantage also provided ideas and concepts 
used to examine and explain collaborative phenomena at the organizational level. 
Institutions, organizations, and individuals are involved in mutual relationships that 
they equally produce and reproduce (Giddens, 1979). The point is to use 
institutional theory to explore the institution, its changing and enduring 
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characteristics, and connectedness to and separateness from organizations and 
individuals. In turn, investigating the involvement of institutions in the creation of 
contemporary national and local political opportunity structures might help to show 
what it is possible to achieve through collaboration, and why there will sometimes 
be failures to achieve desired outputs or outcomes in some circumstances. 
 
Sometimes manipulations of stakeholder resource dependencies can afford 
organizations a degree of autonomy to exercise strategic choice in the forging of a 
‘negotiated environment’ (Astley, 1984). Even the relatively small community-
based organization has some power of its own through the knowledge it has of an 
area and its legitimacy as a community-based organization representing the views 
of people living in an area. A community-based organization might be able to use 
this type of power in negotiations with other more powerful organizations to obtain 
some particular benefit for itself through collaboration. Alternatively, a community-
based organization might be able to join with other similar or sympathetic 
organizations to increase the power that it has in a collaborative venture. A single 
organization can make contact with other coalitions of organizations and power-
holding individuals that support its cause, and have control over the development 
of programme or project rules and ways of working (Pred, 1983). There may also 
be scope for organizations to seize or develop opportunities to enter into relations 
with influential allies to challenge established ideas and innovate at the margins of 
extant structural arrangements (Tarrow, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, the ability of individuals to develop interpretations of situations allows 
for individual differences in activity and action as situations can be interpreted 
differently (Sending, 2002). For example, different neighbourhood activists and the 
people that they represent will have similar and different housing grievances and 
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concerns, and different interpretations of the effectiveness or not of central 
government and council policies devised to deal with them. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognise and understand the history of collective tenant action 
against poor housing conditions and unscrupulous landlords. In particular, how 
purposive, goal-oriented elements of collective action are reflected in various inter-
organizational alliances and coalition networks (Diani and Bison, 2004). At the 
same time, single-issue organizations and entrepreneurs can create and 
manipulate grievances and concerns (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Scope exists to 
develop the conceptual potential in neo-institutional theory for recognizing that 
actors do not limit themselves to reacting to exogenous events in institutional 
fields, but proactively produce possibilities for collective action to shape those 
fields (Hensmans, 2003). 
 
The next sub-section provides a detailed account of some of the different types of 
power that can underpin institutional activities and actions. The aim is to 
understand how those activities and actions might empower (or not) different 
organizations and individuals. 
 
Power and collaboration 
 
Sometimes powerful institutions are able to mobilize the bias and prejudices in a 
system in ways that help to shape the activities and actions of organizations and 
individuals (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). In recent years, different central 
government departments have put much effort into promoting the common sense 
idea that partnership-working and collaboration is generally a ‘good thing’. In 
particular, central government has been promoting certain types of instrumental 
collaboration that fit with established ideas concerning the value of self-help and 
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collective action to change the way that council-owned housing is managed and 
improve local services (see chapter 1, section 1.1). The problem that arises 
concerns who has gained or lost power as policymakers have become more 
obsessed with partnership-working (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, p. 331). Little is 
known about the extent to which Best Value and Tenant Participation Compact 
partnerships have or have not empowered TARAs and helped them to effectively 
articulate their own priorities for action to improve an area and local services. It is 
possible to observe the use of institutional power by studying an institution’s 
actions or the development of its rules. These activities help shape the 
environment in which organizations and individuals operate. Individual and 
organizational adherence to various well-established traditions, customs, and 
norms (for example, the value attached to types of knowledge or acceptable 
behaviour) also give institutions a more subtle power. 
 
However, it seems somewhat artificial and unsatisfactory to think about power only 
in elitist or pluralist terms. Instead, it is possible to think about the existence of an 
elite group or groups of institutions, organizations, and individuals in situations 
where there is also a substantial amount of shared power. In such situations, it is 
plausible to think about the different dimensions of power that might help to ensure 
issues enter or are kept off different agendas, cause or prevent conflict, and 
underpin decision-making or non-decision-making processes. 
 
A three-dimensional view 
 
Foucault (1978) suggests the modern state is not something that has developed 
above individuals and without regard to them, rather it is a sophisticated structure 
designed to facilitate their eventual integration. He claims that in the modern 
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context the issue of ‘governmentality’ concerns the way that the state can maintain 
control and order through the institutionalised promulgation of certain views and 
ideas. A powerful group of institutions are involved in the creation of a 
sophisticated state structure designed to facilitate the integration of organizations 
and individuals into a particular type of society. This state structure comprises a 
dominant culture and set of core values that influence and shape organizations’ 
and individuals’ activities and actions. At the same time, the exercise of state 
power occurs in observable and unobservable ways. These different 
manifestations of power help to influence or determine how people view or 
imagine things, and the way that their interests and concerns are recognised (or 
not). 
 
Lukes (1974) devised a three-dimensional view of power. First, institutions in 
particular and sometimes organizations or individuals can succeed in preventing 
potential issues from entering into the political arena (p. 21). Second, this shaping 
of the political arena sometimes occurs in the absence of observable conflict. 
However, latent conflict can remain that comprises a contradiction between the 
interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude (p. 
22). Third, an assumption exists that suggests that if people have no grievances 
then they have no interests that the use of power can harm. Nevertheless, a 
process of non decision-making may occur in situations where people do not have 
grievances because their views and preferences conform to established practice 
and they cannot imagine any alternative to the situation they are in (p. 24). 
Organizations and individuals are able to make decisions but only in an 
institutional context where powerful pressures emerge and shape their thinking 
and activities in ways that mean they do not always align with their real interests or 
preferred choices. What type of institutionalized processes shape the views of 
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organizations and individuals (including those involved in collaboration)? Lukes 
says: 
 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things either 
because they can see or imagine no alternative to it or because 
they see it as natural and unchangeable or because they value it 
as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes, 1974, p. 24) 
 
It is also possible to exercise power through dominant forms of knowledge. Such 
knowledge permeates the development of social relationships and underpins the 
socializing effects of the everyday social encounters that individuals experience 
(Foucault, 1982). How do dominant forms of knowledge impact on opportunities 
for instrumental and ideological collaboration, and the way that public and 
community-based organizations are involved in collaboration?  This question will 
be addressed in chapters five through seven. 
 
The next sub-section considers the interconnectedness of institutions, power, and 
collaboration. It also examines the implications of mandated collaboration for 
public and community-based organizations that are compelled to work together 
and are trying to find ways to solve housing and neighbourhood problems. 
 
Power and governance 
 
Institutions are involved in creating the national political opportunity structures that 
determine the value and purpose of different organizations (Harrison and Reeve, 
2002). Meanwhile, legislation and regulation stimulates or suppresses different 
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types of collective activity at the neighbourhood level (Jenkins, 1995). An in-depth 
understanding of the institutional environment and the role of political opportunity 
structures is missing from theory on collaboration and collaborative advantage. 
More particularly, the way that legislation and ‘moulding’ systems in the form of 
regulations and guidance help to shape organizations’ and individuals’ behaviour 
(March and Olsen, 1998). 
 
On the one hand, institutions will find ways to accommodate popular demands and 
make compromises to maintain general support for their policies (Gramsci, 1971). 
On the other hand, power becomes embedded within the contextual ‘rules-of-the-
game’ that both enable and constrain organizational action (Clegg, 1975), the 
different negotiations undertaken to decide on which problems to tackle (Lawrence 
et al., 1999), and how conflict in collaboration is recognized and dealt with 
(Axelrod, 1997). In turn, institutions will sometimes reinterpret the ‘rules-of-the-
game’ to try to ensure that they maintain their power and control over important 
policymaking agendas (Saunders, 1979). Institutions are often involved in the 
development of a particular language that promotes and protects core institutional 
values and beliefs (Ng, 2001). A well developed political or technical language can 
help to shape people’s views and actions. Ultimately, collaboration and 
empowerment are not neutral terms because the meanings assigned to them are, 
in part, a product of the exercise of power that structures a particular discourse or 
language (Atkinson, 1999). The meanings assigned to different collaborative 
phenomena will reflect the wider discursive context that enables or constrains the 
development of different types of thinking and collaboration. Stakeholders need to 
occupy some legitimate position within the larger discursive arena and only a 
limited number of subject positions are perceived as meaningful and legitimate 
(Hardy et al., 2005). 
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Different institutional pressures will impact on organizations and the way that they 
are structured and function. There will be varying levels of competition or 
collaboration between organizations (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Best Value, 
introduced in 1999, was one example of a performance management regime that 
included a range of performance indicators and league tables. Sometimes they 
have promoted competition between councils (for extra central government 
assistance and scarce resources) and sometimes they have promoted 
collaboration between councils and other relevant organizations (to tackle complex 
social problems and improve services). Ultimately, central government is able to 
reward or punish councils depending on Best Value inspection outcomes. Councils 
need to ensure services provided at the local level are competitive. They also 
need to work with different stakeholders to ensure those services are appropriate 
and delivered effectively. 
 
Sometimes public sector organizations will need to respond to contradictory or 
competing demands coming from external sources that either facilitate or hamper 
attempts to get involved in innovative collaborative activities (Diamond, 2006). 
Under one set of circumstances, organizations and individuals may make choices 
that are very different from the choices that they would make under another set of 
circumstances (Immergut, 1998). However, if the objective is to gain the trust of 
local communities then the circumstances need to provide space for difference 
and diversity within partnerships to ensure local problems and priorities are 
addressed (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). 
 
The review of the literature on collaboration, institutions, and power provided the 
ideas and concepts used to construct a theoretical framework. This framework 
emphasises the interconnectedness of institutions and power at the macro-level, 
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organizational activities and actions at the meso-level, and the activities and 
actions of individuals at the micro-level. The aim is to help with the development of 
theory on collaborative advantage through a more in-depth consideration of the 
way that institutions and power can shape the political and social environment 
within which collaboration is located and must operate. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework and research questions 
 
Little is known about the way that central government mandated collaboration and 
its housing, Best Value, and tenant participation policies have changed TARA and 
council relations. It is also unclear what opportunities exist for the types of 
instrumental and ideological collaboration described by Huxham (1996). Examples 
of this include the type of instrumental collaboration that leads to improved 
neighbourhood management and local services, and the type of ideological 
collaboration that allows TARAs to challenge and change dominant or established 
values and ways of working (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Mandated collaboration: possible opportunities and outcomes 
 
 
Instrumental collaboration 
 
TARA and council involvement in 
housing, Best Value, and Tenant 
Participation Compact discussions 
and decision-making to improve 
neighbourhoods and local 
services 
 
Ideological collaboration 
 
TARA and council involvement in 
discussions and decision-making 
that changes policies and official 
views on neighbourhood and 
service improvement at the local 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
Central government  
mandated collaboration 
 
Housing and Best Value 
policies and the Tenant 
Participation Compact 
Outcomes 
 
Implementing central 
government policies at the 
local level  
Achieving some practical 
output or outcome 
 
Outcomes 
 
Influencing decisions about 
policy and its development 
and implementation 
Challenging established 
cultures, values, and norms  
Changing institutions 
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At the macro-level of analysis, the focus is on institutions and power, 
‘organizational isomorphism’ (organizations becoming more like each other), and 
the institutionalization of TARAs. The key concept from DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) theory on ‘organizational isomorphism’, used to examine and analyse 
TARA and council collaboration, is the coercive pressure coming from institutions 
and organizations that can cause other organizations in a field to become more 
like each other (see the start of section 2.2). At the meso-level of analysis, the 
focus is on organizations and different types of collaboration, and at the micro-
level of analysis, the focus is on the activities and actions of individuals in 
collaborating organizations. The key concepts from theory on collaboration used to 
examine and analyse TARA and council collaboration are Huxham’s (1996) views 
on instrumental and ideological collaboration and Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) 
exposition of collaborative advantage and collaborative inertia (see section 2.1). 
The key concepts from theory on power used to examine and analyse institutional 
activities and actions, TARA and council collaboration, and the role of individuals 
in collaborating organizations are drawn from Lukes (1974) and include his 
thoughts on control over agendas, the avoidance of conflict, and non-decision-
making (see section 2.2). 
 
The main research question, that was set out in the introduction to chapter one, 
emerged from an interest in the relationship that exists between policymaking and 
policy-implementation processes and collaborations involving organizations at the 
local level. It is: 
 
How have New Labour housing, Best Value, and Tenant 
Participation Compact policies changed the political environment 
and TARA and council collaboration? 
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A number of sub-questions emerge from a consideration of how institutional theory 
and theory on power can help to explain developments in TARA and council 
collaboration and collaborative outputs and outcomes at the local level. The sub 
questions are: 
 
• cultures, values and beliefs (whose are dominant and why) 
• power (how has it shifted away or not from central government and 
councils to TARAs) 
• control over important resources (including funds, information, and 
expertise) 
• the extent of top-down and bottom-up influence over collaboration 
• opportunities for different types of collaboration (and the legitimizing of 
central government and council actions, or the empowerment of TARAs 
that have more control over their own and their area’s destiny) 
• stakeholder tensions and conflict (over power, resources, and the purpose 
of collaboration) 
• collaboration and the inclusion or exclusion of different TARAs and 
activists. 
 
As this creates potentially too broad an approach to take to examine and analyse 
TARA and council collaboration, the main research question is enlarged with the 
development of some overarching sub-questions that address it and the sub 
questions that emerged from the discussion of theory outlined in this chapter. The 
first set of overarching sub-questions emerged from the literature on power and a 
gap in knowledge regarding the way different dimensions of power that operate at 
the institutional level impact on collaboration at the local level. 
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First overarching set of sub-questions 
 
 
To what extent is TARA independence and integrity affected by the power and 
control that they have over important resources in collaboration and its purpose? 
 
To what extent is TARA empowerment in collaboration dependent on the ability 
that they have to influence agenda-setting and decision-making processes? 
 
 
The first question deals with TARA control over important resources in 
collaboration and stakeholder tensions and conflict (over power, resources, and 
the purpose of collaboration), The second question deals with the extent of top-
down and bottom-up influence over agenda-setting and decision-making 
processes.  Both questions deal with the issue of cultures, values and beliefs 
(whose are dominant and why) and power (how has it shifted away or not from 
central government and councils to TARAs). 
 
The second overarching set of sub-questions emerged from the literature on 
institutional theory and a gap in knowledge regarding central government and its 
role in facilitating or constraining opportunities for different types of collaboration at 
the local level. 
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Second overarching set of sub-questions 
 
 
Has mandated TARA and council collaboration affected opportunities for 
activists to be involved in instrumental collaboration to improve neighbourhoods 
and services? 
 
Has mandated TARA and council collaboration affected opportunities for 
activists to be involved in ideological collaboration that enables them to 
challenge national housing policies? 
 
 
Both questions deal with opportunities for different types of collaboration (and the 
legitimizing of central government and council actions, or the empowerment of 
TARAs that have more control over their own and their area’s destiny) and 
collaboration and the inclusion or exclusion of different TARAs and activists. 
 
This chapter has set out the theory on collaboration, institutions, and power that 
comprise the theoretical framework used in the examination and analysis of TARA 
and council relations and collaboration. The aim is to use theory on institutions and 
power to show how the institutional and political environment within which 
collaboration is located will impact on who can collaborate, how they collaborate, 
and decisions about the purpose and goals of collaboration. The focus is on 
situations where a history of often tense and difficult relations exists between 
public and community-based organizations that are obliged to collaborate but have 
very different cultures and types of power. Little is known about how TARA and 
council collaboration has developed since the introduction of the Best Value 
regime and the Tenant Participation Compact. The research findings obtained 
through meeting and getting to know tenants activists, councillors, and council 
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officers in one locality involved in collaboration analysed in chapters five through 
seven show how the theory of collaborative advantage can be developed using 
aspects of theory on institutions and theory on power. The result is a theory of 
collaborative advantage that is better able to explain how different organizations 
emerge and develop (or not) and are able to participate (or not) in collaboration. 
 
Chapter three sets out in detail the research methodology and methods used to 
examine and analyse TARA and council collaboration in a case study area, and 
address the research questions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Research Design 
This chapter explains the reasons for adopting a qualitative research strategy and 
choosing a research design which following Bryman (2004) is a longitudinal single 
case study to examine and analyse TARA and council collaboration in Sheffield. 
The chapter begins with an outline of the research orientation adopted, and the 
researcher’s values and experiences that influenced the formulation of the main 
research question. Next, my reasons for choosing to undertake a case study in 
Sheffield to examine TARA and council collaboration are set out, and a modified 
grounded research approach and the role of the reflexive researcher are 
described. Then concerns about construct validity (the extent to which the research 
methods used provide data that helps to explain collaboration) and external validity 
or generalizability (the extent to which findings or effects can be applied to other 
organizations and people in other places at other times) are considered. Later 
sections of the chapter focus on research methods and data analysis. The final 
section of the chapter deals with ethical issues. 
 
3.1 The research orientation 
 
I became interested in TARA and council collaboration when I was a borough 
councillor in Corby, which is a small former steel-making town in 
Northamptonshire. I was born and brought up in Corby in Northamptonshire. 
Corby is a small town with a population of approximately 50,000 and up until the 
early 1980s; steel making was the main industry in the town (National Census 
2001).  My experience of the reality of TARA and council collaboration was quite 
different from the views expressed in much of the central government literature on 
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collaboration at the local level (see chapter 1, section 1.1). TARA and council 
collaboration was much more complex and messy and involved more conflict over 
power, resources, and its purpose than was conveyed in much of the central 
government rhetoric on collaboration. 
 
In 1999, the introduction of the Best Value regime and the Tenant Participation 
Compact (explained in chapter 1, at the end of section 1.1) changed the 
environment within which TARAs and councils were located. TARAs were more 
involved in different housing and neighbourhood consultations, as well as 
decision-making processes, but there were also new tensions and difficulties. For 
example, I had observed various debates and disputes over the purpose of 
different central government rules and regulations governing the Best Value 
review process, and the compilation of the new Tenant Participation Compacts. 
 
My values and life experiences have influenced my views on the role of the 
researcher and the researched. They also influenced the development of my main 
research question on TARA and council collaboration, and the decision to use a 
type of ethnography that drew on ideas included in grounded theory to examine 
and analyse collaborative activities and actions. 
 
Researcher values and experiences 
 
My grandfather was a steelworker for more than fifty years and a staunch Labour 
Party supporter. I joined the Labour Party at the age of eighteen and was a 
borough councillor for eight years from 1995 to 2003. I attended many TARA 
meetings and met many activists and other tenants during my time as a councillor. 
In 2003, I resigned from the Labour Party in protest over the war in Iraq. I had 
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been a party member for twenty-two years. 
 
Researchers come to the research situation with their own experiences of life 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). My concern about the welfare of communities 
and community-based organizations, and experiences of TARA and council 
collaboration caused me to think about the extent to which there was TARA-
incorporation into council systems or TARA-empowerment through collaboration. 
To what extent was there TARA-incorporation to help implement national housing 
and neighbourhood management policies at the local level, or a transfer of power 
that enabled a TARA to effectively challenge and influence such policies? My 
interest in finding out how Best Value and tenant participation legislation had 
impacted on TARA and council relations and collaboration is reflected in the main 
research question and sub questions set out in chapters one and two. The 
overarching sub-questions emerged after a review of the different literatures on 
institutions and power, and the implications for TARA and council collaboration. 
 
A case study provided data on TARA and council collaboration in complex and 
constantly changing real life situations. The intention was to examine and analyse 
the data, and use it to explain how central government policies impacted on, or 
were perceived as impacting on, the opportunities that existed for different types of 
TARA and council collaboration (see chapter 2, section 2.1). In particular, the 
intention was to explore the opportunities for instrumental collaboration to improve 
an area and local services and the ideological collaboration that entails 
challenging established values and ways of working. 
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The case study 
 
The decision to undertake a single case study was, in part, a pragmatic one. I had 
limited time to spend in the field collecting data and then analysing it. In addition, I 
had limited finances to cover the travel, accommodation, and subsistence costs 
that would be incurred undertaking a number of case studies in different parts of 
England. The single case study also provided an opportunity to collect rich data on 
collaboration within the timescales set for the completion of a PhD. It would have 
been very time consuming to conduct a whole series of meetings and negotiations 
with council and TARA gatekeepers in different places in order to set up multiple 
case studies and obtain access to a range of activists, councillors, and council 
officers. 
 
In the summer of 2002, I had meetings with the directors of a housing association 
in Birmingham, and a housing and tenant participation consultancy based in 
Wolverhampton. The charitable housing association called Optima Community 
Association came into being in June 1999 after a majority of tenants living on five 
inner city estates in Birmingham voted for a transfer of council-owned housing. 
The company called Partners in Change started operating in 1988 and provides 
consultancy services in housing, children’s services, neighbourhoods, and 
engaging communities. In particular, the company provides research, evaluation, 
and policy advice on housing management and development matters, and the 
promotion of resident involvement and empowerment.14 The two directors 
provided information about their organizations involvement in work with tenants 
and identified potential case study opportunities. I eventually chose to undertake a 
case study in Sheffield after considering specific information provided by Partners 
in Change who had been working with TARAs in the city. 
                                                          
14
 Partners in Change, at: www.partners-in-change.co.uk/index.php?cmd=page&cat=1 
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Sheffield is important in terms of understanding the impact of central government 
policies on TARA and council collaboration. The city had a history of often difficult 
tenant and landlord relations, tension between the council and an umbrella 
organization called START representing a majority of the city’s TARAs, and 
conflict over the future of council-owned housing. In late summer 2002, I had initial 
telephone conversations with START and council representatives, and requested 
meetings with key individuals at their offices or some other convenient location to 
discuss, in detail, my interest in TARA and council collaboration, and my proposed 
research. I had meetings with the council’s tenant participation manager at 
Sheffield town hall and a START board member at its offices in shop premises in 
the city centre, to talk about my research and the possibility of studying TARA and 
council collaboration in the city (see appendices 2,3,4 and 5). These discussions 
highlighted tensions between the council and activists over the autonomy of 
START and TARAs, and pressure to implement unpopular national housing and 
neighbourhood improvement policies at the local level. Meanwhile, a coalition of 
TARAs called Unity, opposed to the transfer of council-owned housing to RSLs 
and challenging the legitimacy of START, had folded in 2001. Sheffield City 
Council and START decided to endorse the research, which improved my chances 
of obtaining useful data on TARA and council collaboration. 
 
At the same time, it is possible to have an interest in the detail of a single case and 
produce findings or concepts used to confirm or modify existing theory (Barzelay, 
1993; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Lijphart, 1971). This is particularly likely in situations where 
the researcher is able to explore a wide range of phenomena such as the different 
benefits and tensions associated with collaboration at the local level. Stake (1994) 
has described the ‘intrinsic’ case study (where the case itself is of interest) and the 
‘instrumental’ case study (where case study research improves understanding of 
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some phenomenon or phenomena). A single case study provided much data on 
little researched TARA and council collaboration in a real life situation. The focus 
was on how TARA and council collaboration was working in Sheffield after the 
introduction of the Best Value regime and the Tenants Participation Compact in 
1999 (see main research question set out in the introduction to chapter one). At 
the same time, the aim was to address the overarching sub questions that 
emerged from a consideration of how institutional theory and theory on power 
might help to explain collaborative phenomena (see chapter 2, section 2.3). These 
phenomena included how organizations and individuals responded to institutional 
pressures to act in certain ways and how differences in stakeholder power 
mattered or not in influencing or determining how collaboration developed at the 
local level. In Sheffield, it was possible to consider how central government was 
involved in shaping collaboration and examine the extent to which genuine 
collaboration and the achievement of collaborative advantage is possible when 
large differences in power exist between the organizations involved. In brief 
collaborative advantage is concerned with organizations achieving something 
through collaboration that they would not have been able to achieve working on 
their own (see chapter 2, section 2.1). 
 
Choosing somewhere where there are likely to be many surprising as well as 
ordinary examples of various phenomena can be very edifying (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the case of TARA and council collaboration it might help to make more explicit 
some of the tensions and difficulties associated with setting up and managing 
collaborative relations between organizations with very different cultures and 
values and where large differences in power exist between them. Sheffield had 
many similar housing problems to a number of other cities and towns in England. 
They included a backlog of housing repairs to deal with, and a lack of available 
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funds to undertake necessary repairs and modernization work. In some parts of 
the city a large number of tenants had purchased their homes from the council. 
There had also been much regeneration activity under different European and 
central government funded schemes to refurbish or demolish council-owned 
housing in different parts of the city. However, there was also much tenant activity 
in the city and the council reported there were eighty-four TARAs, representing 
approximately 87% of tenants, operating in 2001 (Sheffield City Council 2001). 
Furthermore, a majority of tenants were opposed to the idea of selling off or 
transferring council-owned housing to RSLs and there had been much protest 
against what they perceived to be the privatisation of social housing. The situation 
in Sheffield was dynamic and volatile with the potential for much continuing conflict 
over the purpose and management of TARA and council collaboration to deal with 
housing matters and improve local services (see chapter 4, section 4.3). 
 
TARA and council collaboration in Sheffield was ‘messy’ because it consisted of 
relations between organizations with very different cultures, values, and ways of 
operating. A ‘messy’ research situation is often best suited to a case study 
approach to data collection and analysis, in situations where it is difficult to identify 
all of the different factors that might impact on activities and events (Robson, 
1993). TARAs and councils operate in a fragmented housing environment where 
central government and other organizations (housing associations, development 
companies, and building firms) have an interest in housing matters and are 
involved in trying to influence decisions about the future of council-owned housing. 
When I received ethical approval for the case study from Sheffield City Council, 
START, and my supervisors, a commitment was made to provide feedback on 
research findings in the form of a summary report. A number of short one- or two-
day visits to the city, over a period of nine months between the autumn of 2002 
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and late summer 2003, facilitated the arrangement and conduct of interviews (with 
TARA activists, councillors, council officers, and others with an interest in housing 
and neighbourhood matters). I was also able to attend various START and council 
meetings and events. 
 
The choice of individuals to interview reflected a desire to talk with high-profile 
TARA activists, councillors, and council officers involved in influencing the shape 
and development of TARA and council collaboration. Fontana and Frey (1994, p. 
361) say, “Interviewing is one of the most common and most powerful ways we 
use to understand our fellow human beings.” I attended different meetings and 
events where housing or neighbourhood matters were being discussed. 
Sometimes a meeting or event clashed with other important interview or data 
collection and analysis work. Nevertheless, I was able to attend twelve important 
meetings or events and visit the offices of START and different TARAs. 
 
The next sub-section sets out the reasons for choosing an ethnographic research 
approach to collect and analyse case study data on TARA and council 
collaboration. It shows how I was influenced by ideas and concepts developed in 
the grounded theory approach to research. 
 
Ethnography and grounded theory 
 
I adopted a qualitative, ethnographic research approach because the intention was 
to obtain people’s different perspectives on collaboration, and then understand the 
role of the institution and power in influencing or determining how organizations 
and individuals work together to achieve organizational and collaborative 
objectives (see Denzin, 1997; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Van Maanen, 
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1988). I was not interested in trying to discover statistically reliable relationships 
between different items of data or generalizable laws that would predict precisely 
the behaviour of organizations and individuals in a given collaborative context. 
Researchers often devote much time to research that seeks to discover universal 
explanations for phenomena in social settings (Gephart, 2004). My aim was to 
collect data using interviews, a questionnaire survey, observations, and secondary 
data in a real life situation to obtain insights into individuals’ perceptions and 
interpretations of collaborative phenomena. 
 
It may not be easy (or even possible) to obtain insights on complex or ‘messy’ 
phenomena using quantitative research methods that provide a simple snapshot of 
activities and events or produce de-contextualised statistical descriptions of 
different phenomena. An alternative is to focus on individuals and find out more 
about how they interpret their surroundings (Suddaby, 2006), understand the 
environment within which they are located, and create their own realities (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980). In turn, it may be possible to enhance or develop theory by 
considering the contrast between everyday realities (what is actually going on) and 
people’s interpretations of those everyday realities (Suddaby, 2006). Theory on 
collaboration might be improved by examining the role of institutions in policy 
formulation and ensuring it is implemented effectively at the local level and how 
local stakeholders interpret and respond to different institutional demands to 
organize and work in certain ways. Sometimes a higher level of abstraction (higher 
than the data itself) can be identified (Martin and Turner, 1986). 
 
Although I did not adopt wholesale a grounded theory approach (see Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) I did use certain key aspects of it to develop a systematic set of 
data collection and analysis procedures. Nevertheless, my use of institutional 
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theory and theory on power in the development of overarching research sub-
questions went against the pure grounded theory principle of entering the field 
without strong adherence to any specific theory or theories. However, the use of 
data coding and categorization procedures similar to those associated with the 
grounded theory approach helped to ensure there was a rigorous process of data 
collection and analysis. In particular, the process of data analysis was made more 
rigorous through the careful comparison of data and the search for similarities and 
differences that underpinned the identification of emergent patterns and concepts. 
The aim was to investigate TARA activist, councillor, and council officer 
experiences and constructions of collaboration to establish links between extant 
theory on collaborative advantage, the grounded data collected, and the ideas and 
concepts that emerged when the data was analysed. 
 
It is possible to use qualitative and quantitative research methods separately or in 
an integrated way to answer particular research questions (Brewerton and 
Millward, 2001; Robson, 1993). I did not want to simply abandon the use of 
quantitative techniques but felt a qualitative approach that involved reflecting on 
people’s interpretations of events to explain collaborative phenomena would be 
the most insightful way to address my research questions. However, a small 
quantitative aspect of the research comprised sorting different items of data into 
data categories and families as well as the minimal use of the Atlas/ti computer 
software package for qualitative data analysis, to produce basic data code and 
category frequency counts. Overall, the quantitative aspects of the data analysis 
were rudimentary because the intention was to obtain peoples views on 
collaboration and analyse them to understand their interpretation of events rather 
than compile frequency counts of particular activities and actions or look for 
statistically valid correlations in data. The use of Atlas/ti was limited because it was 
  - 89 -  
not useful in terms of helping to unravel the deeper relationships and meanings in 
the data collected on collaboration. It did not provide the type of tools that would 
facilitate the in-depth analysis of people’s views on collaboration and how they 
formed and changed. 
 
I adopted the principles of the reflexive researcher to try to avoid undue bias in 
data collection and analysis that might arise because of my sympathies for the 
TARA and its work. 
 
The reflexive researcher  
 
I had some sympathy for TARA action to protect tenants’ rights and ensure there 
was a future for council-owned housing. However, the reflexive researcher must 
carefully consider the researcher role and researcher impact on the research 
situation and the researched. The researcher should think about how the values 
and assumptions that they bring to the research situation will impact on data 
collection and analysis (Bell, 1998). It is not possible to conduct unbiased research 
(see Phillips and Pugh, 2001) and “Qualitative data analysis can be viewed as a 
personal activity that is elusive and difficult to document” (Coffey, 1999, p. 137). 
The reflexive researcher keeps a research journal and attempts to understand how 
different understandings of the researcher, the research, and the researched 
emerge as the research progresses (Riley et al., 2003). They must set out their 
interests and motives for wanting to undertake a particular piece of research. The 
aim is to use interpretative and imaginative aspects of their research to explain 
phenomena and make explicit their own feelings about the research. Meanwhile, 
the researcher can use different theoretical and intellectual strategies to challenge 
their own assumptions concerning research methodology and methods (Marcus, 
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1994). In particular, the quality of qualitative research can be improved if the 
researcher thinks about their role, values, beliefs and biases, and how they impact 
on data collection and analysis (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
I kept a detailed research journal, updated on a daily basis, between October 2001 
and June 2005. The journal includes a description of the work done to find a 
suitable case study location and get access to key gatekeepers in the tenants and 
residents movement, and the city council in Sheffield and other relevant 
organizations. As the research progressed, I kept a journal on the time spent 
arranging and completing interviews and attending meetings and events, views on 
the development and management of the research, and different experiences, 
successes and failures. These notes helped me to think about and sometimes 
change aspects of the research process. I decided, for example, to interrupt less 
often during interview sessions, make better use of probing questions to seek 
clarification on issues, and take special care to avoid using academic or technical 
language that people might misconstrue or not understand. 
 
I tried to be open and honest about how my values, beliefs, and life experiences 
influenced my views on TARA and council relations and collaboration. My 
sympathy for the TARA and its work sometimes made it difficult to understand the 
actions of the council or council officers. It was necessary to address a tendency 
to view the TARA as obviously ‘oppressed’ and the council as the obvious 
‘oppressor’. The diligent noting down of my thoughts and feelings in a research 
journal helped me to think about the council’s position and its need to comply with 
central government policies at the local level. I also considered how TARA activist, 
councillor, and council officer views of me as an outsider coming to Sheffield from 
a university to study TARA and council collaboration might impact on the data 
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collection process. 
 
My journal notes also helped in discussions with my supervisors and reflection on 
the progress of my research, researcher bias, and ethical issues. These 
discussions were useful during data analysis and the writing-up of research 
findings (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Research journal extract 
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The next sub-section focuses on the validity and generalizability of the research 
findings. 
 
Validity and generalizability 
 
An ethnographic research approach and the collection of grounded data increased 
the ecological validity of the research because there were many opportunities to 
get to know people and experience events in real life situations. The ecological 
validity of research is improved where it reflects the configuration and temporal 
arrangement of elements in a context (Campbell, 1986). Ecological validity is high 
where it is possible to gain a high level of access to the knowledge and meanings 
of those involved in particular activities (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Moreover, 
Norman (1970) suggests it is possible to generalise from a few or even a single 
case study if the data collected captures the interactions and characteristics of the 
phenomena under examination, because there are frequently likely to be similar 
findings that will arise in other similar situations at different times. 
 
The activist, councillor, and council officer behaviours observed and recorded 
reflect what was actually happening in real life situations in Sheffield. Improving 
the ecological validity of research (carrying out investigations in real life rather than 
artificial situations) can also improve the external validity of the research. On my 
regular trips to Sheffield I was able to establish a rapport with key individuals, 
attend different meetings and events, and join in TARA activities (including a 
coach trip to the Houses of Parliament to protest against the privatisation of 
council-owned housing). The findings obtained from in-depth research undertaken 
in real life situations can improve understanding of organizations’ and individuals’ 
activities and action and help to explain similar actions and activities in other real 
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life situations. The external validity of research findings refers to the extent to 
which elements of the research might apply in other similar situations that will arise 
at different times in different places.  The research on TARA and council 
collaboration in Sheffield produced findings that help to explain collaborative 
phenomena in the city and help to show how institutions and power might 
influence or determine other organizations’ and individuals’ actions and activities.  
In particular, the research findings highlight some of the tensions and conflict that 
can arise over control over important resources and agenda setting in 
collaboration that involves large and more formalized public sector organizations 
and small and less formalized voluntary or community-based organizations. 
 
The modern language of validity and generalizability appeared first in the field of 
quantitative social science research (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Often pressure is 
exerted on the qualitative researcher (from quantitative researchers) to disclose 
facts about themselves and their research that indicate a commitment to ‘objective’ 
methods that will supposedly improve the validity of their research (Seale, 1999). 
In turn, these objective methods will help to improve the generalizability of 
research findings and their utility in terms of the extent to which they measure 
reality, produce statistical prognoses, and confirm or contradict existing research 
findings. However, my interest was in theoretical not statistical generalisations. 
Such theoretical generalisations obtained from the identification of patterns or 
concepts in my research data would help to explain collaborative phenomena and 
contribute to the development of the existing theory of collaborative advantage. 
 
Qualitative research can be quite complex because “There is the difficulty of 
dealing with the considerable amount of data which is generated during the course 
of research and the problem of the generalizability of the findings” (Hussey and 
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Hussey, 1997, p. 71). Data triangulation comprised the use of multiple methods 
(interview, questionnaire survey, observation, and secondary data collection) to 
compile a comprehensive account of collaborative phenomena and individuals’ 
experiences of collaboration. This form of data triangulation was enhanced by the 
collection of different types of data at different times (Stake, 1995) and the 
checking of information obtained from one source with information obtained from 
other sources (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). The large amount of different 
types of data collected were compared and contrasted, and slowly relations and 
patterns began to emerge. The thoroughness of the process of comparing and 
contrasting different types of data is a valuable part of the qualitative research 
process in complex real life situations (Diesing, 1972; Stake, 1995) because it 
helps to reveal not only commonplace but more subtle and easily overlooked 
relationships and patterns in the data. The research findings helped to make 
explicit different people’s perspectives on reality rather than reality itself (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985) and their validity was established through a process of checking, 
questioning, and theorizing rather than trying to establish a rule-based 
correspondence between findings and the ‘real world’ (Kvale, 1989). 
 
A focus on transparency or honesty about how data was collected and analysed 
helped to ensure research planning procedures and decisions affecting how 
research findings were interpreted could be easily scrutinized. This transparency 
helped to improve the trustworthiness of the research or judgements about how 
well findings capture what was actually happening in collaboration in Sheffield.  At 
the same time, the triangulation or comparing of research data obtained from 
different sources and reporting back information on observations to those 
observed to obtain their comments on emerging views and ideas (respondent 
validation) helped to confirm or refute different individuals’ accounts of 
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collaborative events. These are all alternative ways of assessing the validity of 
qualitative research (see Bryman 2004).  A grounded theory approach also 
facilitated a process of data categorization through the comparison of data items 
and a search for items that did not fit with emerging ideas or concepts and might 
mean thoughts or theories needed to be modified. 
 
The research methods comprised semi-structured interviews, observation of 
meetings and events, a questionnaire survey, and the collection of secondary data 
(minutes, papers, and documents). The aim was to obtain a wide range of views 
and experiences of collaboration from TARA activists, councillors, council officers, 
and other relevant individuals with an interest in housing or tenant participation 
matters. 
 
3.2 The research methods 
 
Early preparatory work helped me gain an appreciation of Sheffield, and TARA 
and council relations in the city. I began by collecting archive and contemporary 
material on the council and TARAs (various minutes, newspaper cuttings, and 
papers) obtained from web-based searches and visits to Sheffield City Council, the 
offices of START, and Sheffield Central Library. I was also able to establish 
contacts with some key individuals in the City Council and the tenants and 
residents movement that helped me gain access to other potential interviewees 
and various meetings and events. These individuals became the lynchpins in an 
embryonic network of contacts and through a snowballing process, where an 
interviewee provides contact details for other potential interviewees, my network of 
contacts gradually expanded. 
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Nine themes that influenced the design of my semi-structured interview schedule 
emerged during pilot investigations of TARA and council relations and 
collaboration. The themes were the product of a combination of my thoughts on 
TARA and council collaboration; ideas that arose during my reading of various 
theories on institutions, power, and collaboration texts; and issues that emerged 
during preliminary conversations with activists, councillors, and council officers. 
The emerging themes were on the political opportunity structure, strategies to 
influence, history and context, power and authority, control over resources, the 
purpose of collaboration, instrumental collaboration, ideological collaboration, and 
governance issues (see Table 3 and appendix 6). 
 
Table 3: Semi-structured interview schedule themes and the focus of questions 
 
 
Emerging themes 
 
 
The focus of interview questions 
Political opportunity structure The political environment and opportunities for participation in 
different types of collaboration 
Strategies to influence The different strategies that organizations and individuals use 
to try to influence other organizations and individuals 
History and context  The history of tenant and landlord relations and the impact of 
very different TARA and council cultures and values on 
relationships 
Power and authority The different types of power and authority that institutions, 
organizations, and individuals have and use in collaboration 
Control over resources The control that institutions, organizations and individuals 
have over different resources, their allocation, and use; 
different resource dependencies; and the control or 
management of collaboration 
Purpose of collaboration The aims and objectives of collaboration, the contribution of 
different stakeholders, agenda setting, the conduct of 
meetings, and how conflict is recognized and dealt with 
Instrumental collaboration The collaborative opportunities that exist to manage or 
improve housing, neighbourhoods, and local services 
Ideological collaboration The collaborative opportunities that exist to challenge 
particular policies, values, and established ways of working 
Governance The traditions, customs, norms and rules that influence or 
determine the form that collaboration takes (political, social 
and bureaucratic systems; institutions, organizations and 
formal and informal structures and processes; the best value 
regime and the tenant participation compact; and the different 
roles of TARA activists, councillors and council officers in 
collaboration) 
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Understanding history and context involves finding out how the wider political and 
social environment within which tenants and landlords are located has impacted 
on tenant and landlord relations. Changing political opportunity structures will have 
helped to create or eliminate different types of tenant and landlord conflict over 
poor housing conditions, or partnership and collaborative working to improve 
housing and people’s quality of life. How much power and authority different 
organizations and individuals have in collaboration will depend, in part, on three 
important things. First is the control that organizations and individuals have over 
important resources (funds, information, and expertise). Second is the status and 
position of organizations and individuals in a system or network of relations. Third 
is the effect of various dominant or established relationship rules, norms, and 
customs on people’s thinking about what it is possible to achieve through 
collaboration. 
 
The themes that emerged during pilot interview sessions provided ideas about 
how a semi-structured interview schedule (see appendix 7) that helped ensure 
discussions with relevant individuals were focused on pertinent housing matters. In 
addition, a small number of TARA representatives returned a short questionnaire 
survey sent out to TARAs affiliated to START. The information that these 
representatives provided about their experiences of collaboration provided useful 
additional material, used in the cross-checking of other experiences of 
collaboration obtained from a wider range of activists, councillors, and council 
officers. 
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The questionnaire survey 
 
The START office sent out a questionnaire survey (only START board members 
had access to a confidential list of affiliated TARA contact details) to 350 activists 
in different TARAs across the city (see appendix 8).15 The purpose of the survey 
was to obtain additional views on TARA and council relations and collaboration 
from a wider sample of TARA activists than could be achieved through interviews 
alone in the time available to complete the fieldwork part of the research. The 
START board examined the questionnaire and objected to one question that 
asked activists to indicate whether their TARA had affiliated to START and, if it 
had not, to explain why.16 Some board members felt this question might elicit a 
critical response from some activists regarding START and its work that would not 
be helpful at a time when it was trying to build organizational capacity and its 
reputation. The questionnaires sent out had the offending question blacked out. 
However, the question was still legible on some questionnaires and some activists 
answered it. Other activists complained about the appearance of a blacked out 
question on the questionnaire. 
 
A postage-paid envelope, addressed to the Open University Business School in 
Milton Keynes, was included with each questionnaire, which was designed to take 
approximately twenty minutes to complete. Forty-nine activists (TARA committee 
members) returned a completed or partially completed questionnaire (equal to a 
return rate of 14%). They comprised twenty female and twenty-one male 
respondents (and eight respondents who did not disclose their sex – see Table 4). 
 
                                                          
15
 When the questionnaire survey was sent out to TARA representatives, the council estimated 
there were approximately seventy-five TARAs operating in Sheffield and approximately 50% of 
TARAs were affiliated to START. 
16
 I attended a meeting on 28 July 2003 with START board members to discuss the questionnaire 
survey that would be sent to TARA representatives and the problem with a question on TARA 
affiliation to START. 
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Table 4: The questionnaire survey (N=350) 
 
 
Questionnaire returns 
 
 
No 
 
% 
Female 20 40.8 
Male 21 42.8 
Undisclosed 8 16.4 
Total 49 100 
 
It is difficult, without further research, to comment on the relatively low response 
rate to the questionnaire. However, it may, in part, have been because activists 
were fatigued by the number of council and other surveys they were receiving or 
uncertain about the purpose of the survey at a time when START was in dispute 
with the council over its role and funding. The low response rate meant it was 
necessary to interpret with caution the findings obtained from the questionnaire 
survey data. For example, only disgruntled activists may have completed and 
returned the questionnaire. Nevertheless, the data obtained provided useful 
information about TARA and activist relations with the council, and conflict over 
START and its role. 
 
Researchers need to decide how they are going to collect research data and what 
data they are going to collect (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). I used the semi-
structured interview to collect the majority of my data on TARA and council 
collaboration. I decided to undertake a number of interviews partly because it 
meant I was able to meet face-to-face with activists, councillors, and council 
officers, and establish a rapport with interviewees that helped me to obtain 
information on collaboration. It was also possible to observe the disposition and 
behaviour of interviewees, which provided additional evidence regarding their 
experiences of collaboration. 
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The semi-structured interview 
 
I developed a semi-structured interview schedule with questions designed to 
obtain data comprised of different people’s views and experiences of collaboration 
(see appendix 3). However, it is often useful to impose as little structure as 
possible on the interview situation where predetermined responses are not sought 
(Saville-Troike, 2003). I used the interview schedule as an aide-memoire to 
stimulate interviewer and interviewee discussions rather than an inflexible set of 
questions asked in strict order and designed to facilitate an interrogative style of 
questioning. Nevertheless, I felt it was necessary to have sufficient structure (with 
occasional prompting or probing questions) to keep discussions focused on TARA 
and council collaboration, without preventing interviewees from telling their own 
stories, as far as possible. 
 
I completed forty-two interview sessions with forty-seven interviewees (twenty-nine 
men and eighteen women). A few interview sessions involved more than one 
interviewee (see Table 5). I changed most interviewee names (except where the 
information provided by an individual already existed in published form in the 
public domain) to help to maintain a degree of anonymity at the wider level.  
However, it would be possible for some individuals at the local level and other 
diligent persons carrying out their own research to establish the real names of 
interviewees.  The risk of damage to individuals if their real identities were 
discovered was reduced by the timescales involved in producing the final report on 
research findings which meant many interviewees had changed their jobs on the 
council or roles in the tenants and residents movement. 
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Table 5: Interviewees 
 
 
Interviewees 
 
 
M 
 
F 
 
Tot 
TARA activists 14 9 23 
Council officers 6 4 10 
Councillors 4 4 8 
Consultants 1 1 2 
Academics 2 0 2 
Civil servants 1 0 1 
Tenant Participation Advisory Service 1 0 1 
Total 29 18 47 
 
The TARA activists interviewed were mainly past or present START board 
members (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: TARA activists interviewed 
 
 
TARA Activists 
 
Name Position Interviewed 
Patricia START board member and chair of Jordanthorpe TARA  9 January 2003 
Edmond START vice chair and chair of Basegreen and District TARA 5 May 2003 
Wendy Treasurer of Batemoor TARA 6 May 2003 
Delia Chair of START (from March 2003 onwards) and chair of 
Batemoor TARA 
6 May 2003 
George Company secretary, Wisewood Estate Management Board 23 May 2003 
William START board member and chair of Westfield TARA 4 June 2003 
Colin START board member and Hackenthorpe TARA 4 June 2003 
Danny START board member and secretary of Foxhill TARA 5 June 2003 
Norman START board member, chair of Shiregreen TARA, and 
Shiregreen TMO steering group member 
19 June 2003 
Stewart 
and 
Arthur 
Stewart – START board member and Gleadless Valley TARA; 
Arthur – chair of Gleadless Valley TARA 
19 June 2003 
Paul and 
Claire 
Paul – START board member, chair of the North Sheffield Action 
Group, and Shirecliffe TARA member; Claire – North Sheffield 
Action Group and Shirecliffe TARA 
20 June 2003 
Gillian Past START board member and chair of Leverton TA 11 July 2003 
Ellie and 
Frank 
Ellie – past START board member and past chair of Westfield 
Halfway TARA; Frank – Westfield halfway TARA 
11 July 2003 
Gerald Past START board member and chair of Arbourthorne and 
District TARA 
25 July 2003 
Helen 
and 
David 
Helen – START board member and chair of Firshill TARA; David 
– secretary Firshill TARA 
25 July 2003 
Jonathon, 
Martha 
and Kitty 
Jonathon, chair of START (from December 2002 to march 2003) 
and chair of Hackenthorpe TARA; Martha and Kitty – 
Hackenthorpe TARA 
3 June 2003 
Michael START board member and Greenhill Bradway Tenants and 
Community Association 
5 August 2003 
Florence Past START board member and chair of Longley Hall Farm 
TARA 
5 August 2003 
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They included most of the key players in the tenants and residents movement in 
Sheffield. For example, Jonathon was the activist-elected chair of START at its 
AGM held in December 2002. He was also the chair of the Hackenthorpe TARA 
and had been a prominent activist involved in setting up the TARA coalition called 
Unity that had opposed what the group perceived to be the privatisation of council-
owned housing. Delia was the chair of Batemoor TARA and became the chair of 
START in 2003 after Jonathon’s resignation. Edmond was the vice chair of START 
and chair of the Basegreen and District TARA. Paul was a START board member 
and a member of Shirecliffe TARA. He was also the chair of the North Sheffield 
Action Group that was campaigning to stop the demolition of council-owned 
housing in the north of the city.17 
 
I interviewed a number of leading councillors, who were mainly members of the 
controlling Labour group on the Council (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Councillors interviewed 
  
 
Councillors 
 
Name Position Interviewed 
Tom Liberal Democrat – deputy leader of the opposition and 
shadow spokesperson for housing 
10 April 2003 
Arnold Labour – past cabinet member for housing and direct services 3 March 2003 
Victor Labour – cabinet member for health and social services 9 April 2003 
Roger Labour – cabinet member for neighbourhoods 9 May 2003 
Christine Labour – cabinet advisor on finance and performance 8 May 2003 
Marjorie Labour – cabinet advisor on neighbourhood regeneration 6 May 2003 
Naomi Labour – cabinet member for education 6 May 2003 
Rosalind Labour – leader of the majority party 4 August 2003 
 
                                                          
17
 The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines an activist as someone who works 
hard undertaking practical tasks to achieve social or political change (see: 
http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/activist). The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines 
activism as the use of vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change (see: 
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/activism?view=uk). For the purposes of this study activists 
comprised a small number of citizens heavily involved in TARA and collaborative activities. These 
activists were the main players in terms of representing the views of tenants and residents and 
most were or had been START board members. They had special relations with councillors and 
council officers interested in housing and neighbourhood matters and participated in consultations 
and campaigns to influence decision making processes. Indeed, citizens can be engaged in 
discussions and involved in direct action (Young I M 2001) exercising power but interested in 
helping others with goals and interests of their own (Levine P and Nierras R M 2007). 
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For example, Rosalind was the leader of the council’s controlling Labour group. 
Roger was the Labour councillor and cabinet member responsible for the 
neighbourhoods’ portfolio that included housing matters and replaced the old 
housing committee. Marjorie was a Labour councillor and the cabinet advisor on 
neighbourhood regeneration, and Tom was the Liberal Democrat deputy leader of 
the opposition and shadow spokesperson on housing. 
 
I interviewed a number of council officers with responsibility for housing and tenant 
participation matters (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Council officers interviewed 
 
 
Council officers 
 
Name Position Interviewed 
Alison Tenant participation officer 18 July 2002 
Simon Head of housing – operations 4 March 2003 
Caroline Tenant participation manager 20 January 2003 
Philip Senior housing officer, tenant liaison, Southey Green area 
housing office 
3 March 2003 
Diane Acting area manager, Burngreave area 23 May 2003 
Dominic Senior housing officer, tenant liaison, Burngreave area 20 June 2003 
Robin Senior housing officer, anti-social behaviour and tenancy 
management, Crystal Peaks area housing office 
17 July 2003 
Robert Housing manager, Manor, Castle and Woodthorpe Area 17 July 2003 
Edward Housing manager, Central area 18 July 2003 
Linda Executive director, neighbourhoods 04 August 2003 
 
For example, Linda was the council’s executive director of neighbourhoods, with 
responsibility for strategic housing matters and Simon was the head of housing 
(operations) responsible for day-to-day housing management matters. Caroline 
was the council’s tenant participation manager and Alison, the council’s tenant 
participation officer, worked with START and TARAs to enhance council and 
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tenant relations. 
 
I interviewed a range of other people with an interest in housing and 
neighbourhood matters. For example, James Gorringe was a senior civil servant 
with the Tenant Participation Branch at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM). Ian Cole is Professor of Housing Studies and Director of the Centre for 
Regional, Economic and Social Research (CRESR) at Sheffield Hallam University. 
Phil Morgan is the chief executive of the Tenant Participation Advisory Service 
(TPAS), a central government funded national tenant participation organization 
working to promote tenant empowerment  (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Other interviewees∗ 
 
 
Others 
 
Name Position Interviewed 
Barry Partners in Change – community consultant 16 December 2002 
Professor Ian Cole* Sheffield Hallam University 7 February 2003 
James Gorringe* Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, tenant 
participation branch 
13 November 2003 
Rob Furbey* Sheffield Hallam University 17 December 2002 
Denise Aldbourne Associates – associate consultant 4 November 2003 
Phil Morgan* Chief executive, Tenant Participation Advisory 
Service 
7 August 2003 
 
TARA activist interviewees provided a rich and extensive account of the 
development of tenants and residents movement organizations and their relations 
with the council. A smaller number of interviewees were key councillors, council 
officers, and other people with an interest in housing and neighbourhood matters. 
Some of these interviewees were also important players in the development or 
                                                          
∗
 Interviewees real names 
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implementation of housing and tenant participation policies. 
 
The reality experienced by people is often quite different for different people 
(Stake, 1995). For example, it is likely TARA activists, councillors, and council 
officers will have some similar but also some very different views on collaboration. 
In turn, people’s similar or different interpretations of activities and events can be 
used to understand the processes by which they come to describe or explain the 
world in which they live (Gergen and Gergen, 2003) and help to determine what is 
going on in a particular situation (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The descriptions that 
START board members provided of their experiences of collaboration would help 
to show how consensus or conflict over housing policies could develop within and 
between TARAs as well as between TARAs and the council. At the same time, the 
extent to which a given form of understanding prevails or is sustained across time 
will, in part, depend on the vicissitudes of different social processes, including 
rhetoric, communications, negotiations, and conflict (Gergen and Gergen, 2003). 
 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000, p. 261) say, “What the subject says depends upon 
various ideas about the interviewer and the interview context at more or less 
unconscious levels.” Interview sessions took place in locations and at times 
convenient for interviewees. I arranged to meet interviewees in their own homes, 
at their workplaces, and in various pubs, cafes and public spaces. Sometimes it 
took many weeks or even months to arrange an interview session. Usually an 
interview session would take approximately one hour to complete. However, a 
small number of interview sessions took less than thirty minutes or up to two hours 
to complete. A small, portable, dictation machine was used to tape interview 
sessions. The dictation machine had no protruding microphone and was 
positioned as unobtrusively as possible on a convenient table or flat surface 
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between the interviewee and myself. Nobody refused permission to tape an 
interview session. However, on some occasions, there were problems with 
background noise (including customers in a café and the use of a pneumatic drill 
in the street) that made the taping of an interview difficult. 
 
I was a researcher and a stranger from a university only able to establish 
rudimentary relationships with interviewees. Nevertheless, I believe smart but 
casual attire, a friendly and relaxed disposition, ice-breaking comments about my 
background, and avoiding the use of overly academic or technical language 
helped me to build rapport with interviewees.18 I tried, as far as possible, to let 
interviewees tell their own story about collaboration and used the interview 
schedule to steer them in a particular direction if the conversation drifted too far 
into an area not relevant to the research. Occasionally, I expressed my own views 
on collaboration during an interview session (often inadvertently) and interviewees 
said their views on collaboration were similar or different to mine. My interviewing 
skills improved over time as more interviews were completed. I learned to listen 
more to what interviewees had to say, interrupt less often, and make fewer 
references to my own views on collaboration that might result in skewed 
interviewee responses to questions. 
 
Most interview sessions were straightforward and progressed without any 
significant problems. At the end of the interview session, an interviewee or 
interviewees could comment further on particular issues or the research. I thanked 
interviewees for their help and the contribution that they had made to the research 
then switched the dictation machine off. Some interviewees continued to talk about 
                                                          
18
 I comment extensively on my efforts to make interviewees feel comfortable and relaxed in my 
research journal. 
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TARA and council collaboration with the dictation machine switched off. I later 
made notes on what they had said in my research journal. These journal notes 
helped to improve knowledge of TARA and council collaboration but they do not 
appear as quotes anywhere in this thesis. Unexpected incidents included 
forgetting to switch on the dictation machine, selecting the wrong recording 
settings, and placing the machine too far away from the interviewee or 
interviewees to record properly.19 On a few occasions, early on in the research, an 
interviewee did not turn up at an arranged interview location because they had 
forgotten about the date and time of the interview session. Contacting interviewees 
close to the time of their interview session to remind them about it became a 
routine part of day-to-day research activity. 
 
It was not possible to arrange interviews with two key individuals. The first chair of 
START said, during a short telephone conversation, that she felt too upset by 
recent events surrounding her exit from the organization to talk about TARA and 
council collaboration. This statement was significant because she had been 
accused of working too closely with senior Liberal Democrat councillors who had 
wanted to transfer all council-owned housing to an RSL rather than representing 
the interests of all tenants in Sheffield. The office manager at START also said 
that she did not want to be interviewed. She was in a vulnerable position because 
her terms of employment were insecure and she was trying to adjust to working 
with a new START chair and board. Information gleaned from various minutes, 
papers, newspaper cuttings, and conversations with different activists, councillors, 
and council officers helped to fill in some of the gaps in knowledge about these 
individuals and their work. 
                                                          
19
 My research journal contains detailed accounts of instances where there were problems with 
interview sessions and interviewees. 
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The observation of TARA activist, councillor, and council officer behaviour at 
different meetings and events was the next most important source of research 
data on TARA and council collaboration after the semi-structured interview. 
 
Observation of interactions 
 
I observed many hours of activist, councillor, and council officer interactions and 
behaviour (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Meetings and events attended 
 
 
Meeting or event  
 
 
Purpose 
 
Date 
South Yorkshire Pathfinder: Housing 
Development and Management Strategy 
Dealing with housing problems in 
areas of weak demand 
Autumn 2002 
 
Sheffield City Council: City Wide Forum 
Housing Revenue Account (HRA) 
and the Housing Development 
Programme 
 
28 January 2003 
Defend Council Housing, national lobby of 
Parliament 
Prevent the selling off or transfer 
of council-owned housing to other 
landlords 
29 January 2003 
START Board General Business 6 February 2003 
Sheffield City Council, Cabinet General Business 9 April 2003 
Sheffield City Council: Service Standards 
(Housing and Direct Services and Development, 
Environment, and Leisure) scrutiny board 
General Business 10 April 2003 
 
Sheffield City Council: City Wide Forum 
START’s problems, planned 
Extraordinary General Meeting, 
and articles and memoranda of 
incorporation 
 
8 May 2003 
START Extraordinary General Meeting Constitution and articles and 
memoranda of incorporation 
22 May 2003 
 
Sheffield City Council: managers 
Sheffield First Partnership and the 
Sheffield City Strategy 2002-2005 
 
23 May 2003 
START inauguration  First meeting of a revitalized 
START 
22 July 2003 
 
Sheffield City Council: City Wide Forum 
Neighbourhood commissions and 
the future of council-owned 
housing 
24 July 2003 
START Board The ‘Arms Length Management 
Organisation’ (ALMO) 
1 October 2003 
Sheffield City Council: Special City Wide Forum Neighbourhood commissions and 
the future of council housing 
8 October 2003 
START and TARA offices Informal conversations Various 
 
I attended START board meetings – including an Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
and an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) convened to decide the 
organization’s future –, council cabinet and scrutiny committee meetings, and 
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council-convened citywide forum meetings (where TARA representatives and 
council officers gathered to discuss various housing and neighbourhood matters). 
It is important to be flexible and able to change plans when new and interesting 
opportunities arise (Saville-Troike, 2003). I received an invitation with two days’ 
notice, for example, to travel on a coach with activists to a national lobby of 
Parliament, organised by Defend Council Housing to protest against housing stock 
transfers to RSLs, and meet the Labour MPs for Sheffield Clive Betts and Richard 
Caborn. There were also instances when it was not possible to attend a particular 
meeting or event. My intention, for example, to attend a particular START AGM 
had to be cancelled a day before it was due to take place because the START 
board decided attendance would be by invitation only and my name was not on 
the list of invitees. 
 
I made copious notes in a small notebook that described the individuals who 
attended meetings, where they sat, and how they behaved. The council’s cabinet 
and scrutiny committee meetings, for example, often took place in ornately 
decorated rooms in the imposing Victorian city hall. At these meetings, people 
would sit around large, well-polished, wooden tables with a chairperson at one 
end. Council officers would often gather in small groups and were inclined to 
behave in ways that reflected their particular professional status and training. They 
frequently spent much time trying to ensure individuals complied with council 
policies and procedures governing the conduct of businesslike meetings. START 
and TARA meetings, in comparison to council meetings, were usually much less 
formal affairs. 
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The next sub-section focuses on the secondary data (minutes, papers, reports, 
and newspaper cuttings) that provided a useful source of historical and 
background information on tenant and landlord relations and collaboration in 
addition to interview and observation data. 
 
Secondary data 
 
I used secondary data obtained from various minutes, papers, reports, and 
newspaper cuttings to help build up a detailed picture of Sheffield, its long and 
prestigious industrial heritage, the people who live in the city, and tenant and 
landlord relations. Much web-based searching and a number of visits to the offices 
of the council and START, and the central library in Sheffield facilitated the 
collection of secondary data. I trawled through old council minutes, newspaper 
cuttings, and other archive material. In addition, there were also various 
documents on housing and tenant participation matters obtained from academics, 
TPAS, and other organizations with an interest in housing and tenant participation 
matters. It took much time and patience to sort through all of the secondary data 
collected and identify the interesting and most relevant material. Some of this 
material was used in chapter four, which provides a detailed contextualised 
description of Sheffield, and tenant and landlord relations in the city. 
 
The next section describes the analysis. It entailed the systematic coding and 
categorization of data to discover patterns and concepts that would help to explain 
collaborative phenomena and perhaps contribute to the development of a modified 
theory of collaborative advantage. 
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3.3 The data analysis 
 
It is possible to produce “A theoretical account that facilitates a discussion of the 
general features of the topic under study and is firmly based or grounded in the 
data collected” (Martin and Turner, 1986, p. 142). I wanted to examine and 
analyse the research data collected on START and council relations and 
collaboration, and make some of the complex detail concerning the process of 
collaboration more explicit. The first stage of the data analysis was the 
transcription of the taped interview sessions with activists, councillors, council 
officers, and relevant others. 
 
Transcription of interviews 
 
The data analysis started with the transcription of forty-two taped interview 
sessions. Transcription was a way to get intimately involved with the detail of what 
different people were saying about START and council relations, and TARA and 
council collaboration. I used a transcribing machine to listen to taped interview 
sessions and word processing software to transform them into text files stored on 
a computer. Each taped interview session took between six and eight hours to 
transcribe. In total, it took around 300 hours to transcribe all of the taped interview 
sessions. 
 
I was constantly involved in arranging or conducting interview sessions and 
attending meetings and events while transcribing completed interviews and 
thinking about what interviewees were saying about housing issues and 
collaboration. Sometimes it was difficult to transcribe parts of taped interview 
sessions because there had been problems with the dictation machine (not being 
set up correctly) or there had been too much background noise (in pubs, cafes, 
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and other public spaces). It was often necessary to rewind and replay sections of 
tape many times over to understand what an interviewee was saying. Occasionally 
a section of tape would have to be passed over and marked with question marks 
in the word-processed text. 
 
The next part of the data analysis involved data coding which was the start of an 
iterative process of data sorting to reveal patterns and concepts in the data. 
 
Data coding and categories 
 
The manual coding of data comprised the annotation of printed interview 
transcripts, observation, questionnaire survey, and secondary data as well as 
research journal entries using different coloured highlighter pens (see figure 7). 
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Figure 7: A section of coded and annotated transcript 
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I was comfortable with manual coding and it helped me to get very close to the 
research data. Interview transcript and other types of data were coded (given a 
relevant title or description) and a pair of scissors used to cut them into separate 
labelled pieces of data, which were grouped together into a number of data 
categories containing items of data with the same or a similar code (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Identifying data codes and categories 
 
The arrangement and re-arrangement (comparing and contrasting) of coded items 
of data into data categories facilitated the identification of tentative links between 
the different items of data.20 Ideas and concepts that are components of 
institutional theory and theory on power influenced my thoughts about emerging 
data categories. Some items of data with the same code appear in more than one 
data category. For example, codes on transparency and accountability appear in a 
number of data categories whilst codes on the introduction an implementation tend 
to be concentrated in the data category on the tenant participation compact. I 
eventually identified twenty-four data categories in total. The data categories cover 
a range of themes that include power and influence, control over important 
resources, the impact of legislation on collaboration, negotiations and strategy, 
values and beliefs, conformity and conflict, and the issue of TARA 
institutionalization. These data categories are set out in more detail in the next 
                                                          
20
 My research journal contains notes on the process of thinking about research data and the 
coding and categorisation of data. 
 
 
Print-outs of interview 
and other data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview transcript and 
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Coded data is sorted into 
data categories 
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section on data families. 
 
I experimented with computer-assisted qualitative data analysis using ATLAS/ti 
software that allows the researcher to electronically code and  manipulate text in 
documents. However, computer programmes used to analyse qualitative data can 
distance the researcher from their data (Barry, 1998) and encourage the 
oversimplified or mechanistic analysis of data (Coffey, 1999). The software 
created a separation from the raw text that was discomforting for me. It was only 
used to produce some rudimentary tables that show the frequency counts for 
certain words and phrases (see appendix 9). 
 
Sometimes there is an overemphasis on the coding of data at the expense of both 
interpretation (Suddaby, 2006) and the adoption of a flexible approach that helps 
to ensure against missing interesting or surprising relationships in the data (Locke, 
1996). Insights into START and council relations, and TARA and council 
collaboration increased in number as the different data categories took shape.21 
However, I tried not to get too embroiled in coding at the expense of reflecting on 
the research data, and emerging patterns and concepts. In turn, I adopted an 
approach to data analysis that involved reflecting on the researcher role and 
researcher bias in the interpretation of research findings (see page 79). 
 
The next part of the data analysis involved comparing and contrasting data 
categories and then combining related data categories to form a smaller number of 
data families. 
 
                                                          
21
 My research journal contains notes on my reflections on the research and relations between 
different data categories. 
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Data families 
  
Different data categories were compared and contrasted to ascertain how they 
were similar or different from each other, and then grouped into a smaller number 
of data families (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Identifying data families 
 
The qualitative researcher does not have a problem with a lack of data, rather how 
to distinguish between or manipulate it (Wolcott, 1990). I began to fit the pieces of 
the data puzzle together by relating categories and developing them in terms of 
their properties and dimensions (see figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10:Coded sections of transcripts sorted into a data family and associated 
categories. 
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Twenty-four data 
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Compare and 
contrast 
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The four data categories in figure 10 are: power, influence and control; authority 
and legitimacy; negotiation and collaborative strategies; and networking that 
comprise the data family on power and negotiation. 
 
The comparing and contrasting of data categories to discover data families was 
similar to the process of ‘axial coding’ described by Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
and Strauss and Corbin (1990). I identified nine data families with no data 
category allocated to more than one data family. The different data categories and 
families are set out in Figure 9. 
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Figure 11: Data families and associated data categories 
 
 
Tenant Participation Compact 
Structure and agency 
Process 
Timescales 
Standardization and institutionalization 
Power, influence and control 
Authority and legitimacy 
Negotiation and collaborative strategies 
Networking 
Tenant and resident activists 
Leadership 
Argument and consensus 
Difference and diversity 
Uncertainty and change 
Government 
Local authority 
Tenants and residents associations 
Recognition policy, constitutions, and agendas 
Representativeness and accountability 
Monitoring and performance 
History and context 
Culture 
Data categories 
Activists and leadership 
Institutions and organizations 
Values and beliefs 
Resources 
Tenant Participation Compact 
Structure and process 
Power and negotiation 
Conformity and conflict 
Contracts and measurement 
Culture and values 
Data families 
Resources and access 
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The different data families and the focus of the themes that they cover are listed in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Data families and the focus of the themes they cover 
 
 
Data families and themes 
 
Resources (who has control over important funds, information, and expertise) 
The Tenant Participation Compact (its purpose and implementation) 
Structure and process (collaborative arrangements and how collaboration is managed) 
Power and negotiations (who has power and how it impacts on deliberations in 
collaboration) 
TARA activists and leadership (the role of the activist in representing tenants) 
Conformity and conflict (the pressure to conform and dealing with conflict) 
Institutions and organizations (the role of institutions and TARA autonomy or 
incorporation) 
Contracts and measurement (rules and regulations and the monitoring and evaluation 
of performance) 
Culture and values (different institutional and organizational cultures and values and on 
collaboration at the local level) 
 
An element of discovery is involved in data analysis as the researcher moves from 
the definition of data categories to thinking about patterns in the data (Martin and 
Turner, 1986) and tries to explain why things are the way that they are or appear 
to be (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The in-depth identification of relationships, 
patterns, and concepts involved the linking of ideas that emerged from the data 
analysis with institutional theory and theory on power (see figure 12). 
   
 
Macro-level 
structures and process 
Central government and 
enabling and 
constraining political 
opportunity structures 
 
Figure 12: Emerging connections between theory and concepts from the research data 
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My research findings and their implications for collaboration underpin the analysis 
of TARA and council collaboration provided in chapters five through seven. 
 
Various ethical issues that the qualitative researcher has to contend with appear at 
various points in this chapter. The next section considers some of the more 
important ethical issues in more detail. 
 
3.4 Ethical Issues 
 
The role of the researcher should be an ethical and honest choice that fits with 
their feelings about research (Stake, 1995). I wanted to carry out research that 
helped to answer my research questions and respected the people involved in or 
affected by the research and its findings. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 288) say: 
 
We must consider the rightness or wrongness of our actions as 
qualitative researchers in relation to the people whose lives we 
are studying, to our colleagues, and to those who sponsor our 
work. 
 
Preliminary discussions with key gatekeepers included details about the purpose 
of the research and agreements about arrangements concerning the conduction of 
interviews and the reporting of research findings. There are risks involved in 
research for participants since they may be divulging sensitive information about 
themselves and others, and ultimately have little control over how that information 
is used (Stake, 1995). Shortly after the key gatekeepers had endorsed the 
research, the first potential interviewees were contacted, informed about the 
purpose of the research, and asked whether they were willing to be interviewed. 
They were told interview tapes would remain confidential and the property of the 
researcher. The interview tapes and transcripts would not be passed on to any 
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third party without the permission of the interviewee. It was possible to preserve a 
degree of anonymity because I stressed the quotations used in any report of the 
research findings would not be attributed to actual individuals (all the names used 
would be pseudonyms). However, individuals with an awareness of the research 
setting who read a report of the research findings might be able to identify some of 
the individuals from the quotations used. 
 
It is likely that research conducted carefully and thoughtfully using a reasonable 
set of standards that help to prevent sloppy data collection and analysis will 
improve the integrity and quality of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
adoption of an ethnographic and grounded research approach that comprised 
systematic procedures for the collection and analysis of data helped to ensure a 
robust process of data collection and analysis. In addition, I was sensitive to 
people’s feelings and took care to avoid breaches of confidentiality that might 
seriously damage trusting relations. The fact that key TARA activists, councillors, 
and council officers knew about my research helped to counter the problem of 
deception associated with some forms of research involving observation of people 
and activities.  
 
However, there can be stakeholder tensions and conflicts that are deep rooted and 
more complex than is often apparent to the researcher working in a location for 
short periods. Some sensitive issues needed to be handled with care, including 
the unexpected crisis that developed within START and in its relations with the city 
council, which resulted in its eventual demise. Being researched can create 
anxiety and individuals may be harmed in situations where they have made 
disparaging remarks about powerful others (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). 
Such anxiety and potential for harm to individuals increases in a crisis where there 
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is much anger and lots of recriminatory behaviour. I avoided taking sides on issues 
although this was sometimes difficult and I sometimes failed to remain entirely 
neutral. I also thought carefully about what interview material to include in the 
thesis to try to ensure individuals were not harmed. 
 
The case study location was not anonymised because of the perceived difficulties 
involved in writing about it in a way that would preserve its identity. Anyone with a 
basic knowledge of Sheffield’s history or geography was bound to recognise the 
descriptions of different events and places in the thesis. I also thought a powerful 
rendition of the research process and findings would depend, in part, on people 
reading the thesis and understanding Sheffield, its history, and the people who live 
there. Ultimately, it is important not to create bad feelings amongst stakeholders, 
which would mean future research in an area is jeopardised. Research that is 
found objectionable by the people studied may cause them to refuse access to 
researchers in the future (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). I tried to build rapport 
with individuals, respect their values and beliefs, and allow them to comment on 
the research, its purpose, and findings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how I became interested in TARA and council 
collaboration and the impact of the New Labour government’s Best Value and 
Tenant Participation Compact policies on TARA and council relations. In particular, 
it was my experiences of TARA and council relations during the time that I was a 
borough councillor, and how they differed from the rhetoric on collaboration 
coming from central government, that underpinned my desire to undertake 
research to study TARA and council collaboration in a real life situation. I decided 
to focus on investigating collaboration in a single case study location. This 
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decision reflected the limited time that was available to spend in the field collecting 
data and a desire to collect rich data on collaboration in a real life situation. 
Sheffield provided an opportunity to research relations between START, an 
umbrella organization representing a majority of the city’s TARAs, and the city 
council. I was able to obtain data on TARA and council collaboration at a difficult 
time not long after Labour had taken back control of the council from the Liberal 
Democrats and abandoned plans for the Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer of 
all council owned housing to a Registered Social Landlord (see chapter 1, section 
1.1). Meanwhile, there was tension and conflict over the role of START and its 
future within the organization itself, and within and between different TARAs. 
 
I used an ethnographic and grounded theory approach to study START and 
council relations and collaboration close up in a real life situation. I was able to 
contact key stakeholders on my visits to Sheffield and get them to elaborate on 
their feelings about START and experiences of collaboration. The use of semi-
structured interviews and the observation of meetings and activities enabled me to 
obtain information on the views and feelings of a range of key activists, councillors, 
council officers, and others with an interest in housing and tenant participation 
mattersThen, during the process of data coding and categorisation, different 
patterns and concepts began to emerge. At the same time, being a reflexive 
researcher and keeping a detailed research journal proved invaluable in terms of 
thinking about the progress of the research and modifying my research approach 
in light of experience and lessons learned. 
 
Chapter four sets out the context of the research by providing information about 
the city of Sheffield, the city council, and START and local TARAs. Chapters five 
through seven set out the research findings and analysis, and the implications for 
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theory on collaboration. Chapters five through seven present the analysis and 
findings of the research. Chapter five examines and analyses the role of START in 
representing TARAs in Sheffield and collaboration.  Chapter six examines and 
analyses the extent to which there was TARA incorporation (to fit with council 
systems and ways of working) or empowerment (with influence over strategic as 
well as day-to-day housing management matters) in collaboration.  Chapter seven 
examines and analyses the onset and development of disorder and crisis in 
START and council relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 127 -  
CHRONOLOGY 
 
Date Event 
1967 (Autumn) Rent strikes in Sheffield with tenants protesting against increased rents 
that they viewed to be unfair 
1980 (October) The Housing Act 1980 and the introduction of right to buy legislation 
1997 (May) The New Labour government is elected 
1999 
 
 
 
 
May 
 
 
 
June 
 
July 
Report published on the state of the tenants’ movement in Sheffield by 
council-contracted housing and tenant participation consultants 
  
The tenants and residents association (TARA) coalition called Unity is 
formed 
 
The Liberal Democrats take control of Sheffield City Council and propose 
a Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer (LSVST) of all council-owned 
housing to a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) 
 
The National Framework for Tenant Participation Compacts is published 
 
The Local Government Act 1999 and the introduction of the Best Value 
regime 
2000 (May) 
 
 
 
July 
 
 
July 
 
 
October 
 
 
 
November 
 
 
October 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together (START) is recognised by the 
council as the umbrella organization representing a majority of the city’s 
TARAs 
 
The Local Government Act 2000 and the introduction of arrangements 
with respect to council executives, including elected mayors 
 
TARA activists challenge a report on the state of housing in Sheffield 
produced by council-contracted housing consultants 
 
A report appears in the Socialist Worker about the North Sheffield Action 
Group and its protests against the demolition of council-owned housing in 
the north of Sheffield 
 
The Best Value inspection outcomes for Sheffield City Council’s housing 
maintenance service is published 
 
The chair of Unity reaffirms a commitment to fight the privatisation of 
council-owned housing 
2001 (July) 
 
 
Autumn 
A TARA recognition policy is a component of the revised citywide Tenant 
and Resident Participation Compact for Sheffield  
 
The TARA coalition Unity disbanded 
2002 (May) Labour takes back control of Sheffield City Council 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
History and Context Matters 
This chapter demonstrates the importance of history and context when seeking to 
understand the contemporary activities and actions of organizations and 
individuals. In the case of TARA and council collaboration this means 
understanding how activists knowledge of past tenant protest and collective action 
to obtain improved housing conditions has shaped their views on collaboration in 
the 2000s. In chapter one, in the introduction, the main research question was: 
 
How have New Labour housing, Best Value, and Tenant 
Participation Compact policies changed the local political 
environment and TARA and council collaboration? 
 
In chapter three, (section 3.1), the reasons for choosing Sheffield as the case 
study location in which to study the effects of these policies on TARA and council 
collaboration were set out. Briefly: in Sheffield, TARA and council collaboration 
seemed to be different, in lots of ways, to the collaboration described in the central 
government rhetoric on collaborative working. The political situation in the city in 
the early 2000s was tense. Labour had taken back control of the council at the 
local elections held in May 2002 and had abandoned the previous Liberal 
Democrat administration’s plans for LSVST. However this chapter shows that 
there was still much tenant and council conflict over the future of council-owned 
housing. Activists that were aware of the history of often difficult tenant and 
lanslord relations in the city had different views on the role of any umbrella 
organization that might be recognised by the council as representing a majority of 
the city’s TARAs at a citywide level. The principal factors that made Sheffield an 
important place in which to study TARA and council collaboration were: 
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• a long history of frequently difficult tenant and landlord relations 
• a well-established and dynamic tenants and residents movement 
• a long tradition of municipal service provision 
• a large amount of council-owned housing remaining in the city 
• the emergence of different groups claiming to represent the views of 
tenants at a citywide level 
• the council’s controversial TARA funding and recognition policies. 
 
An examination of tenant and landlord relations and mistrust that existed in 
Sheffield will help to make explicit the tension and conflict over housing futures 
that has helped to shape tenant views on contemporary housing and tenant 
participation policies. The evidence of contemporary tension and conflict over 
housing futures was obtained during the fieldwork part of my research in 2002 and 
2003. The different views of activists, councillors, and council officers obtained and 
their implications for collaboration are examined and analysed in the remaining 
chapters. Initial pilot work that comprised visits to Sheffield and discussions with 
the council’s tenant participation officers highlighted a number of other contextual 
factors that also made Sheffield an interesting place in which to study TARA and 
council collaboration. They included:  
 
• the ongoing tenant mistrust of the council after the abandonment of plans 
for a Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer (LSVST) 
• tenant protest against regeneration works that involved the demolition of 
council-owned housing 
• tension in relations between START and the council over the future of 
council owned housing 
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• activists angry at the council’s treatment of Unity and the circumstances 
surrounding its eventual demise 
 
It is possible to have an interest in the detail of a single case and produce findings 
or concepts used to confirm or modify existing theory (Barzelay, 1993; Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Lijphart, 1971). Collecting data on TARA and council collaboration in a case 
study location where a crisis in START and council relations was developing 
proved to be invaluable. It meant there was heightened conflict over institutional 
and organizational power, values and beliefs that provided special insights into the 
complexity of the context within which TARA and council collaboration is located. 
Sheffield was an important place from a theoretical point of view because: 
 
• TARA and council collaboration was frequently conflictual 
• There were issues over TARA inclusion or exclusion in collaboration 
• There were large inequalities of power between the council and TARAs 
• The council and TARAs had very different cultures and values 
• There was TARA and council conflict over the council’s implementation of a 
TARA-recognition policy and its control over the use of important resources 
including a tenants’ levy 
• There was much political manoeuvring to find a solution to the city’s 
housing problems 
 
The aim was to elaborate on and refine theory on collaboration and collaborative 
advantage using ideas and concepts developed by institutional theory and theory 
on power. The case study goes on to show how institutional activities and actions 
can have an independent affect on collaborative activities and actions at the local 
level. Theory on collaborative advantage focuses on phenomena at the 
organizational level, but institutional rules and regulations can influence the way 
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that organizations emerge or develop, and the extent to which they are able to get 
involved in collaboration in the first place. More specifically, some aspects of an 
institution can take on an enduring quality and a separateness that can help to 
ensure a particular set of core values and beliefs about collaboration prevail. In 
turn, such a situation will have implications regarding the possible benefits and 
drawbacks of collaboration for organizations and the existence of different forms of 
stakeholder inclusion or exclusion. 
 
Chapter five starts with a description of the situation in Sheffield as I found it in the 
summer of 2002. Then the chapter examines and analyses the role of START and 
activists’ concerns about its relations with the council. Aspects of institutional 
theory help to show how central government policies and actions shaped the 
environment within which TARA and council collaboration in Sheffield was located. 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of ‘organizational isomorphism’ is the main 
institutional theory used to explain how organizations in a field can become more 
like each other as they adapt to cope with pressures in their environment. At the 
same time, stakeholders in collaboration can resist institutional pressure for 
conformity to institutional rules and regulations governing the purpose of 
collaboration. In Sheffield, there was TARA and activist protest against unpopular 
central government housing policies but central government was able to steer a 
course on housing strategy that helped to ensure it achieved its core policy 
objectives. 
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4.1 Sheffield and housing experiences 
 
Sheffield is a large industrial city founded on steelmaking and metal manufacture. 
In 2001, it had an estimated population of 513,233 individuals.22 The city has a 
long history of tenant protest and collective action against poor housing conditions 
and unscrupulous landlords. In the early part of the twentieth century, a well-
organized tenants movement in the city aligned itself with a wider Labour and 
trades union movement network to campaign for improved housing conditions and 
the construction of council-owned housing for rent. From the end of the First World 
War, in 1918, up until the early 1970s the city council was able to increase levels 
of municipal service provision, which included the building of council-owned 
housing. 
 
The New Labour government was elected in 1997 and its Local Government Act 
(1999) introduced the Best Value regime. Under the same Act, the Tenant 
Participation Compact was introduced in 
2000. Meanwhile, in Sheffield, the Liberal 
Democrats gained control of the council from 
Labour at local elections held in May 1999, 
only to lose it back to Labour at the next 
round of local elections held in May 2002. 
The two administrations adopted various 
similar and different approaches to try to 
solve the city’s complex housing problems. At 
the time the research was carried out there 
were approximately 63,000 council-owned houses in the city (down from a peak of 
                                                          
22
 See: Office for National Statistics (ONS), National Census Statistics for 2001, at: 
www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/ 
Picture 1: Sheffield and steelmaking 
(Photo: R. Dalziel) 
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around 93,000 properties in the early 1970s) and approximately 26.5% of 
households were renting from the council (compared to a national figure of 
13.2%).23 There had also been a loss of council-owned housing which was the 
result of right to buy purchases after 1980 and demolition works carried out under 
different regeneration programmes (see chapter 1, section 1.1). 
 
What people are told about past events by older family members and individuals in 
the community, as well as their own day-to-day experiences of living in a particular 
community or neighbourhood, will help to shape their views on issues and feelings 
about people that they meet. A corollary to this view is the extent to which tenants’ 
memories of difficult tenant and landlord relations continue to bind them together 
and are a driver for collective action to protect council-owned housing from 
privatisation in the 2000s. Moreover, there is the question of how historical events 
and precedents have impacted on the development of the conditions needed for 
successful collaboration. These conditions include strong stakeholder ties, trust in 
each other, the creation of shared aims and objectives, inclusiveness, and open 
communications (Hood et al., 1993; Kanter, 1994; Lasker et al., 2001; Hardy et al., 
2003; Huxham and Vangen, 2005; and Osborne et al., 2002). 
 
The next sub-section examines the significance of people’s joy at being able to 
move into new council houses with modern facilities, including inside bathrooms 
and toilets, and continuing tenant protest against high rents relative to household 
incomes in Sheffield in the 1960s. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 See: Office for National Statistics (ONS), National Census Statistics for 2001, at: 
www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/ 
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‘The luxury of a bathroom’ and rent strikes in the 1960s 
 
Many tenants in Sheffield had been involved in protests against poor housing 
conditions and demonstrated a strong commitment to good quality public housing 
in the 1960s (Baldock, 1971, 1982). Memories of past tenants’ struggles live on 
today in Sheffield because tenants have knowledge of others’ bad housing 
experiences. For example, an activist recalled the problems she and her family 
had experienced trying to find private rented accommodation in the 1930s. In a 
report that appeared in the Sheffield Star newspaper, on 30 May 2000, she 
described the benefits of having access to a new council house in the 1960s and 
“The luxury of having two bedrooms, a kitchen, and best of all a bathroom”. 
Meanwhile, Danny, the secretary of Foxhill TARA, because of the memories that 
he had of his parents’ experiences of living in slum conditions and moving into a 
council house in the 1960s, expressed a strong feeling of attachment to council 
housing. When interviewed he said: 
 
My parents lived in a council house, which they shared with my 
grandmother. [They] grew up in what was basically a slum [that 
has] since been demolished […] [eventually] they moved into a 
council house and were bloody glad of it. 
 
There had been a massive expansion of council-house building after the end of 
the Second World War in 1945 but there was still much tenant protest, against 
high council rents relative to household incomes, for example. In Sheffield, there 
were rent strikes organized by tenants protesting against increased rents as late 
as 1967–8. Tenants, with the help of candidates that supported their cause, even 
managed to unseat an incumbent Labour-controlled council at local elections in 
the city (although none of the tenant-sponsored candidates were actually 
elected)(see Baldock, 1982). Professor Ian Cole, a Sheffield-based academic with 
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an interest in council housing, says: 
 
Tenants were influential in changing control over the council […] 
for the first time in sixty years or something. That set in train a 
degree of suspicion between the […] local Labour party and 
tenants’ groups, and people have long memories.24 
 
Baldock (1971) found tensions within the tenants movement, and tensions in 
relations between the council and the tenants movement in Sheffield that had 
been observable some thirty years earlier. He highlighted issues concerning 
tenant activists and their different interests, the views and interests of tenants in 
general, and the attitudes and approaches to relations adopted by councillors and 
officers despite the emergence of supposedly less hierarchical local government 
structures and new tenant participation initiatives. In the 2000s, to what extent 
were the same tenant and landlord issues still relevant? What happened to 
START and council relations, and TARA and council collaboration after the 
introduction of the Best Value regime and the Tenant Participation Compact 
described in chapter 1 (section 1.1)?  These questions are addressed in later 
chapters. 
  
The next sub-section focuses on Sheffield in the 1980s and the impact of steel 
manufacturing plant closures and right to buy legislation that allowed tenants to 
purchase their homes from the council. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Professor Ian Cole, specialist in housing studies and Director of the Centre for Regional 
Economic and Social Research (CRESR), Sheffield Hallam University. 
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Steel works closures and right to buy legislation in the early 1980s 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government introduced right to buy legislation in 
1980, which gave tenants the right to purchase their homes from the council (see 
chapter 1, section 1.1). In Sheffield, many tenants who could afford to purchase 
their homes from the council did so under the right to buy legislation (as did 
tenants in many other cities and towns in the United Kingdom). By 2001, the 
number of houses purchased from the council by tenants or demolished as part of 
different urban regeneration programmes totalled around 30,000 in Sheffield 
(Sheffield City Council 2001). Often the more desirable council houses were 
purchased in an area, leaving an increased concentration of houses in need of 
substantial repairs or modernization. 
 
Meanwhile, there were numerous steel and other metal-manufacturing industry 
sell-offs and closures throughout the 1980s (the Conservatives eventually 
privatized British Steel, a publicly owned company, in 1988). Steel and other metal 
manufacturing industry consolidations led to high levels of unemployment and 
much deprivation in different parts of the United Kingdom, including Sheffield. A 
significant number of tenants in the city that were unemployed or on low incomes 
were left living in houses that they could not afford to purchase from the council. 
 
Stock transfer and the TARA coalition called Unity in the late 1990s 
 
On 1 May 1999, control of Sheffield City Council passed from Labour to the Liberal 
Democrats. The Liberal Democrats considered the problem of rundown council-
owned housing and decided to plan for Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer 
(LSVST) to a Registered Social Landlord (RSL). An RSL is a not-for-profit housing 
association that has more freedom than the council does to raise extra finances for 
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housing repairs and maintenance from banks and other investors (see chapter 1, 
section 1.1). The New Labour government had placed a duty of Best Value on 
councils to deliver services to clear standards of cost and quality by the most 
economic, efficient, and effective means available (see chapter 1, section 1.1). 
LSVST was one way to help solve a substantial part of the city’s housing problems 
but there was a considerable amount of tenant opposition to it.  A TARA coalition 
called Unity was set up in 1999 to try to stop what some tenants perceived to be 
the privatisation of council-owned housing. 
 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats contracted a firm of housing and tenant 
participation consultants, called Partners in Change, to undertake a review of the 
tenants movement in the city. There was evidence of activists concerns about the 
role of any umbrella organization that might be set up to represent the views of 
TARAs at a citywide level. Edmond, START’s vice chair, George, a home owner 
and company secretary of the Wisewood Estate Management Board (WEMB) and 
Paul, START board member and chair of the North Sheffield Action Group 
respectively said: 
 
In Sheffield we used to have a Federation, a Tenants Federation, 
which was very strong, very independent, and it grew in the 
eighties. 
 
You are talking about setting up an organization that can go into 
that negotiation [council] chamber and have the power, the 
influence, the knowledge, the authority to be able to say I am 
sorry I am afraid you are wrong there […] that is the way to build 
its [the umbrella organization’s] independence […] as a separate 
force not beholden to the local authority. 
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My experience of working with other groups […] like community 
groups […] has been fine […] but you find the closer that you get, 
the closer that the groups are to the council, the more the council 
pulls the strings. 
 
A group of prominent activists felt the reason for bringing the consultants in was to 
manipulate tenant views and actions to ensure there was an umbrella organization 
operating that would do what the council wanted. The consultants concluded there 
should be some type of umbrella organization representing TARAs at a citywide 
level. A majority of the fifty-seven TARAs that the consultants had contacted felt it 
was important to have an umbrella organization representing their interests. Such 
an umbrella organization should be involved in negotiations with the council to 
decide on the formulation of strategic housing policy impacting on all TARAs and 
tenants in the city (Partners in Change 1999).25 Norman, the chair of Shiregreen 
TARA, when he was commenting on the council’s reaction to the setting up of 
Unity, said: 
 
[An activist] and his colleagues […] tried to set an independent 
tenants movement up and it got very dirty. They tried to set Unity 
up and […] they [the council] went hammer and tongs against it 
and it got very dirty […] It was a stronger movement […] and the 
ones at the top were a lot stronger […] not scared to say we want 
this, the tenants want that. 
 
Unity established relations with the national campaigning organization Defend 
Council Housing, which was trying to stop the selling off and transfer of council-
owned housing to RSLs. However, Unity’s determination to stop the transfer of 
council-owned housing to an RSL and its forthright campaigning style did not fit 
with central government plans for the separation of housing strategy and 
                                                          
25
 Fifty-seven TARAs were approached for views on housing and tenants’ movement matters out of 
a total of eighty-four TARAs. 
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management functions at the local level, or the council’s views on TARA and 
council collaboration to improve neighbourhoods. At the same time, it is likely 
councillors and council officers in Sheffield were reluctant to think about retaining 
the status quo when there were large housing debts and a backlog of repairs to 
deal with. The council needed to obtain extra monies for housing repairs and 
would have had difficulty working with Unity because it was only prepared to 
consider ways to help solve the city’s housing problems that fitted with the three 
central government approved options for the management of council-owned 
housing in the future. 
 
START, housing consultants, and Best Value in the 2000s 
 
Sheffield City Council contracted a firm of housing consultants to review the state 
of housing in the city but some high-profile activists feared there was simply a 
central government and council plan to find evidence to support the case for 
LSVST. Jonathon, START chair and former member of Unity, Dan another START 
board member, and David the secretary of Firshill TARA said: 
 
You have got the people that did this study, […] Chapman Hendy 
that did this study on selling the houses off, now they were 
something to do with government, they are a government body. 
 
I realised that one of the things the council was doing, in cahoots 
with the government in actual fact, […] they both seemed to be 
trying to abolish council housing, to get rid of it, to give another 
word privatise it. 
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We met with government inspectors from Whitehall and the 
Treasury, in October 2001, […] and they did a survey and the 
head civil servant sat down there and he said ‘you have no 
chance at all of getting one star never mind two stars for 
Sheffield [city council’s housing management service] the only 
option you have is to go for full stock transfer. 
 
The council’s relations with START also began to become problematic not long 
after the council officially recognised it as the umbrella organization representing 
TARAs at a citywide level in 2000. Some influential activists felt START had had 
unfair help from the council to gain the TARA support it needed to be officially 
recognised, and was helping to obtain tenant support for LSVST.  Paul START 
board member and chair of the North Sheffield Action Group, and Michael another 
START board member said: 
 
[The] council more or less took over START and they were 
pulling the strings […] they set the agenda and all this began 
strangely enough, not strangely really, […] when the first hints of 
privatisation of council properties were on the horizon […] from 
Maggie Thatcher’s era carried on […] enthusiastically by Tony 
Blair. 
 
START has turned out to be a council controlled mechanism for 
imposing the central government agenda for stock transfer even 
though the government says that it is for the people to decide in 
the long term [what happens to council owned housing] we are 
not given the options. 
 
The development of trust between central government and organizations at the 
local level will depend in part on the effect of historical events on people’s views 
and opinions, and the openness (or not) of the contemporary institutional 
environment. In particular, this openness involves the way that different national 
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and local political opportunity structures are constructed. This will have 
implications for the creation or elimination of opportunities for inclusive dialogue, 
the serious consideration of different views and opinions on matters, and people’s 
ability to challenge or change established cultures, values, and ways of working. 
New Labour housing, Best Value, and tenant participation policies changed the 
configuration of opportunities for TARA and council collaboration. However, in 
some parts of Sheffield, a history of tenant and landlord relations that were often 
confrontational and volatile had caused a considerable amount of mistrust of each 
other’s values and activities. For example, there were activists who were wary of 
collaboration and there was wide variation in the likelihood that there would be 
TARA and council agreement on shared housing, and neighbourhood 
improvement aims and objectives. 
 
On the 8 February 2000, the chair of Unity had told a Sheffield Star newspaper 
reporter that she represented the views of more than 20,000 tenants opposed to 
LSVST. She reaffirmed a Unity commitment to stop what it perceived to be the 
privatisation of council-owned housing in Sheffield. Unity “would not support the 
transfer of homes or rubber stamp any council decision to do this and it was 
formally declaring war on the council.” Another activist on the 30 May 2000 told a 
Sheffield Star newspaper reporter that council officers “Did not seem willing to add 
tenants’ views to the council’s plans [for council-owned housing]”. Meanwhile, 
activists challenged the role of Chapman Hendy, the firm of housing consultants 
contracted by the council to review the state of housing in the city. Some activists 
felt that the council and the consultants (who were no longer working in the city 
during the fieldwork part of this thesis) had focused on the need to work to a 
central government agenda and had not represented the interests of all TARAs 
and tenants. These activists challenged the consultants’ recommendations 
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concerning the future management of council-owned housing. The Sheffield Star 
newspaper reported on activists’ mistrust of the consultants saying: 
 
Consultants called in to advise on the future of the city’s 66,000 
council homes have been accused of ‘scare mongering’ by 
tenants’ leaders. Representatives are angry at the way a report, 
sent to all tenants, suggests rents would have to go up to £84.00 
a week by 2001 to pay for repairs and modernization if they voted 
to keep the council as their landlord (7 July 2000). 
 
Jonathon, the chair of Hackenthorpe TARA, who had been a key member of Unity, 
criticised the way that the council had used the consultants to review the state of 
housing in the city. In particular, there was an issue concerning the way that a 
decision had been made about whether it would be possible or wise for tenants to 
keep the council as their landlord. When interviewed he said, “We have had that 
many different consultants in and they are all government bodies”. 
 
Also in 2000, TARAs and tenants who were members or supporters of the North 
Sheffield Action Group were protesting against council plans to demolish their 
homes. Some activists held roof-top demonstrations whilst others, at one stage, 
forcibly occupied the floor of the council chamber to voice their concerns about 
plans to demolish council-owned housing in the north of the city. Claire, one of the 
activists involved in this campaigning activity, said: 
 
I was stood there and I was telling them all [the councillors] they 
were all behaving like silly children, they all want their heads 
cracking together and things like that. [The] Lord Mayor stopped 
the proceedings for about twenty minutes […] [the] city solicitor 
[…] was trying to get me to go out and I said ‘No way. It is our 
council house, I am stopping here, I am going to tell you what I 
think about you’. 
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I did not ascertain exactly who it was that formed START or when it emerged. 
However, in 2000, the council recognized START as the umbrella organization 
representing a majority of the city’s TARAs. It did this when START obtained the 
backing of 50% plus one of the TARAs in Sheffield and by October 2001 it had 
obtained the support and affiliation of 57% of TARAs according to the council 
(Sheffield City Council 2001). The START board included a group of activists, 
under the leadership of its first chair Jean Gleadall, who took a pragmatic approach 
to building relations with the council. START moved into council-provided offices, 
let at a low rent, and received annual funding of approximately £100,000 from the 
council to cover operating costs. She was also willing to consider a range of 
housing management options including LSVST. START employed an office 
manager and the full board comprised twenty-two members (two from each of the 
city’s eleven housing areas). In addition, up to three TARA representatives from 
each affiliated TARA (depending on its size) were eligible to participate in the 
election of START officers at the START AGM. At any given time around 150 
tenants might be eligible to participate in the election of START officers according 
to the number of affiliated TARAs that had elected their full complement of 
representatives eligible to take part in the election process (START Standing 
Orders 2003). A tenant participation officer, on secondment from the council, 
worked half time with START, helping with management and administration tasks. 
 
Sheffield City Council needed to solve the city’s housing problems. A stock 
condition survey of council-owned housing in Sheffield estimated a repairs backlog 
of £473 million and 11,000 un-modernised pre-war homes, which at the current 
rate of investment would take twenty-three years to improve (Sheffield City Council 
2001). If START helped the council to implement Best Value and tenant 
participation policies effectively at the local level, the chances of finding ways to 
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solve the city’s housing problems in ways that were acceptable to central 
government might be improved. Under the Best Value regime, an assessment of 
the performance of council services takes place against central government 
defined Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs). Inspection reports, published 
by the Audit Commission, give each council a star rating based on its performance 
that can range from zero stars, for poor performance, to three stars, for excellent 
performance (see chapter 1, section 1.1). The Audit Commission works in 
partnership with, but operates independently from, a number of central 
government departments (ODPM 2006). Sheffield City Council needed to obtain at 
least two stars for its housing management and estates services Best Value 
review inspection, to be eligible to bid for extra central government monies set 
aside for housing repairs and modernisation, and submit an ALMO application. 
 
There are three central government approved options for the future management 
of council-owned housing. First, some type of PFI arrangement (that brings in 
investment from the private sector). Second, stock transfer, with the agreement of 
a majority of tenants, to an RSL (which obtains investment from banks and 
building societies related to its assets as well as rental income, and can receive 
central government grants made available for new social housing). Third, the 
creation of an ALMO that enables the council to retain ownership of its housing 
stock and devolve management functions to a board (of tenants, councillors, and 
other independent representatives) (see chapter 1, section 1.1). 
 
Some influential activists felt the council was too involved in START affairs and 
there were low levels of trust amongst a significant number of tenants over START 
and council relations. Two activists – Danny, a START board member and the 
secretary of Foxhill TARA, and Florence, a former START board member and the 
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chair of Longley Hall Farm TARA – recounted, respectively, relations between the 
first chair of START and some Liberal Democrat politicians in 2000. 
 
[The] chair of Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together was far 
too damned close to the […] councillor who was the [Liberal 
Democrat] housing bod [representative]. 
 
She [the chair of Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] 
would agree […] things with the councillors and when we had our 
meetings at the Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together offices 
[…] he [the Liberal Democrat cabinet member for housing] […] 
was sat in that back office […]. We were having our meeting, of 
course it can be heard. 
 
There were also activists concerned about top-down central government influence 
over START and TARA affairs obtained through the prescribed work that needed 
to be done to compile citywide and local tenant participation compacts. Central 
government’s National Framework for the Tenant Participation Compact set out 
how councils and TARAs should work together to produce a compact (see chapter 
1, section 1.1). The compact would show how different stakeholders would 
contribute to improving an area and local services (ODPM 1999). However, Paul, 
a START board member, Shirecliffe TARA member, and the chair of the North 
Sheffield Action Group, said: 
 
The government always trumpets, and the council, [that] it is all 
bottom-up this process [the compilation of compacts]. Not in any 
way whatsoever is it bottom-up it is top-down made to look like 
bottom-up. 
 
The context within which TARA and council collaboration was taking place 
became more complex after the introduction of the Best Value regime and the 
Tenant Participation Compact. The New Labour government wanted councils to 
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involve more tenants in discussions and decision-making on matters affecting 
them or the area in which they lived. In July 2001, Sheffield City Council 
introduced a TARA-recognition policy, which contained various organization 
standards that TARAs were required to meet and imposed a formal system of 
organization and work on previously informal and unincorporated TARAs (see 
chapter 1, section 1.2). The recognition policy helped the council to deal with the 
uncertainty involved in having to build closer relations with START and TARAs. It 
also helped the council to coordinate action to complete important housing service 
Best Value reviews, produce a citywide tenant participation compact, and meet 
central government’s Decent Homes Standard. Victor, a Labour councillor and 
cabinet member for health and social services, suggested the council’s TARA-
recognition policy simply contained some basic organizational standards: 
 
We [the council] have a recognition policy […] and it basically 
lays down a whole series of […] milestones, if you like, that 
people [tenants and residents associations] have to do during the 
year in terms of so many meetings, notification of meetings, 
setting an agenda […] keeping proper accounts. 
 
To be recognized, a TARA must have a viable membership, formal constitution 
(setting out its committee structures, procedures for the conduct of meetings, and 
how financial accountability will work), equal opportunities policy, and 
communications strategy (see chapter 1, section 1.2). It also needs to be 
financially sound and not affiliated to any political party or organization. 
 
However, the TARA-recognition policy was a source of considerable tension 
between the council and TARAs, as was the council’s controversial collection and 
distribution of tenants’ levy monies on behalf of TARAs. Frank, a former member 
of Halfway TARA, says: 
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Everything that they [the council] want to do it is much simpler if 
you have got twenty different organizations, and you want them 
to do something, it is a lot easier for you, a lot less of a task, if 
you get them all to do the same thing […] If you can get them to 
do that you are fulfilling the government’s objective and you are 
still in control. 
 
Essentially, the tenants’ levy is a small sum of money added to the rents of 
participating tenants (homeowners can opt into the scheme and pay a lump sum 
directly to their local TARA), to support the work of TARAs in Sheffield. A TARA 
had to sign up to the TARA-recognition policy in order to be eligible to receive a 
share of council and tenants’ levy monies, which was disputed by some TARAs. 
Meanwhile, in the autumn of 2001, Unity that claimed to have a membership of 
twenty-eight TARAs disbanded (Sheffield City Council 2001).  It had not been 
recognised by the council and had managed to gain only limited access to 
politicians, information, and funds. After the demise of Unity, some tenants’ 
housing concerns and grievances remained unaddressed, and its active members 
were still around, which meant there was much potential for conflict between them 
and the council over housing policy and the purpose of collaboration. In addition, a 
significant number of TARAs had not signed up to the recognition policy. 
 
In the spring of 2002, an updated citywide compact was produced that showed 
how different stakeholders would contribute to improving housing and 
neighbourhoods in different parts of the city. The updated compact helped to 
satisfy Best Value inspectors that there was an effective umbrella organization 
representing TARA views at a citywide level. At the same time, it was 
acknowledged that many of the best council owned houses had been sold off after 
the introduction of right to buy legislation and the council had been left with a 
greater concentration of houses that needed substantial repairs and modernization 
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(Audit Commission 2003). 
 
A single homogeneous group of tenants or activists with the same housing 
experiences and views on the future of council-owned housing did not exist in 
Sheffield. However, there had been strong tenant opposition to the Liberal–
Democrat-controlled council’s proposal to transfer council-owned housing to an 
RSL. Moreover, there was widespread tenant concern about the future of secure 
tenancies and rent levels under any new tenant and landlord arrangement that 
might arise. How different TARA and council differences of opinion on housing 
policy impacted on collaboration needs to be understood. It is also necessary to 
consider how disagreements over housing policy are located within a wider 
institutional and political context that will influence or determine how the council 
and TARAs work together (or not) on housing and neighbourhood matters. 
 
In chapter five, the political and collaborative environment in Sheffield, as I found it 
in the summer of 2002, will be set out. The chapter will show how the key players 
identified in chapter three (section 3.2) and their relationships with each other in a 
particular institutional context help to explain why things were the way they were in 
Sheffield. More specifically, the chapter focuses on the effects of pressure on the 
council and TARAs coming from central government in the form of legislation, and 
expectations regarding the role of collaboration and collaborative outcomes at the 
local level. The aim is to understand how these pressures helped to shape the 
council’s attempts to construct a type of TARA and council collaboration that would 
help it to solve its housing problems and meet central government’s Decent 
Homes Standard by the 2010 deadline that had been set. The reaction of TARAs 
and activists to what they perceived to be top-down imposed types of collaboration 
and invitations to be involved in implementing unpopular housing policies is also 
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considered in detail.  
 
The next section focuses on changed council structures and their impact on tenant 
and council relations, the consideration of housing matters by councillors and 
council officers, and TARA and council collaboration. Firstly, the loss of the old 
housing committee and how it altered tenants contact with councillors and council 
officers on a body solely dedicated to considering housing matters is explored. 
Secondly, the history of often conflctual tenant and landlord relations is examined 
to see how it affected tenants views on changed council structures and the 
implementation of the Best Value regime and the tenant participation compact. 
 
4.2 The cabinet system and the future of council housing 
 
In modern societies, formal organizational structures arise in highly 
institutionalized contexts. Organizations are often driven to incorporate the 
practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalised concepts of 
organizational work to increase their legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). Some 
of the issues that will arise in such situations will be about what power different 
organizations and individuals have, whose values and beliefs are important, and 
how different organizations and individuals are able (or not) to influence agendas 
and policymaking processes. Crucially, a changed institutional context might 
undermine the value placed on political representation at the neighbourhood level 
if there is reduced space in new structures for political debate (Davis and Geddes, 
2000). 
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The Local Government Act (2000) forced councils to change their organizational 
structures and the way that they worked (unless they represented a population of 
less than 80,000 people). All councils except those serving a population of less 
than 80,000 had to adopt a system of government and governance at the local 
level that included a cabinet and either a leader, elected mayor or council 
manager. 
 
Changed council structures 
  
In May 2000, Sheffield City Council decided to have a leader and cabinet, with 
councillors electing the leader and the leader selecting seven councillors to serve 
in the cabinet (Sheffield City Council 2002). Each cabinet member is responsible 
for a different portfolio comprised of various cross-cutting council functions and 
policymaking processes (see Figure 13). 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Sheffield City Council: the cabinet 
 
 
 
Cabinet 
Full council 
Streetscene 
Education and training 
Social services and 
health 
 
Finances and 
performance 
Development, 
environment and leisure 
Community safety 
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(including housing) 
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scrutiny 
Cabinet decisions referred straight 
to full council for ratification 
Policy development and 
cabinet decisions called in 
for review 
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 The cabinet member portfolios are: 
 
• finance and performance 
• development, environment and leisure 
• social services and health 
• education and training 
• neighbourhoods (including housing) 
• streetscene (including pavements and grounds maintenance) 
• and community safety 
 
A cabinet decision will often go directly to a meeting of the full council (to which all 
councillors are invited) where a vote (show of hands) determines whether that 
decision is accepted or rejected as council policy (illustrated by the thicker arrow in 
Figure 10). However, the cabinet, in reaching a decision, can draw on the findings 
of overview and scrutiny committee investigations, and councillors or the scrutiny 
committee can call in cabinet decisions for review (illustrated by the thinner arrows 
in Figure 10). The council’s overview and scrutiny committee consists of 
councillors from the different political parties on the council (the chair is usually an 
opposition party councillor). Central government guidance points out that the 
overview and scrutiny committee should adopt a non-partisan approach when 
conducting investigations (ODPM 2000). The overview and scrutiny committee can 
call on outside organizations and individuals to provide information about relevant 
policies or decisions that impact on people living in an area served by the council, 
or the delivery of local services. In the case of housing and neighbourhood 
matters, this could include TARA activists, tenants, relevant experts, and others 
with an interest in such matters (Local Government Act 2000). 
 
Picture 2: Sheffield town hall 
(Photo: R. Dalziel) 
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But, the traditional housing committee had been an important (although not 
perfect) direct channel of communication and influence for TARA activists that 
were in contact with the councillors and council officers that sat on or supported 
the work of the committee.  James Gorringe, a civil servant at the Tenant 
Participation Branch, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Phil Morgan, chief 
executive at the Tenant Participation Advisory Service and Tom, the Liberal 
Democrat Deputy Leader (of the opposition) and shadow spokesperson for 
housing in Sheffield, respectively said: 
 
“It may be the case that some tenants activists and tenants and 
residents associations feel that they are less able to approach 
the council or work with it following the ending of the dedicated 
housing department [committee] and its replacement with a 
cabinet system”. 
 
“We picked some tensions up from some [tenants and residents] 
federations, they in many cases had only just got someone on 
the housing committee”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The cabinet system is not good at individual working with 
individual tenants [and residents] associations […]. We had a 
housing committee and then there were […] housing sub-
committees and then that fed out to fifteen housing area 
committees […]. Some tenants [and residents] representatives 
sat on each of the housing sub-committees and well there was 
the housing advisory committee with one [tenants and residents] 
representative from each of the areas of the city with the chair of 
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[the council’s] housing [committee]. So there was a lot of input 
from [tenants and residents association] housing representatives” 
 
 Activists could quickly identify the councillors and council officers involved with 
housing matters and lobby them to support or oppose particular housing policies 
or initiatives. The new cabinet arrangements reduced TARA and activist access to 
councillors and officers specializing solely in housing matters. Tenants’ 
representatives had a right to attend and speak at meetings of the old housing 
committee, but could only attend and speak at cabinet meetings at the invitation of 
the chair (Sheffield City Council 2001a). This cut off important channels of 
communication. At the same time, the cabinet member for neighbourhoods has 
responsibility for a broad range of local services that include housing, demolition 
and regeneration projects, and one-stop-shop and neighbourhood office facilities. 
Less time is available for the cabinet member for neighbourhoods to spend on 
dealing with only housing matters. 
 
In turn, by 2001, a number of partnership or collaborative regeneration projects 
had been or were operating at a regional or local level in Sheffield. The 
connections between these different projects, and how TARAs and tenants were 
involved in project planning and implementation activities, needs to be considered. 
In particular, the intention was to discover how the different organizations involved 
in collaboration were involved in determining the levels of top-down and bottom-up 
inputs into the development of housing strategy. It might then be possible to 
determine the way that housing strategy helps to inform decisions about the merits 
of policies such as tenants’ right to buy their council homes from the council, stock 
transfer to RSLs, and the demolition of council-owned housing. 
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A plethora of partnerships 
 
Paradoxically, a tension sometimes exists between the formation of meta-
strategies at the institutional level to structure inter-organizational fields and 
relationships (Alexander, 1991) and the extent to which organizations and 
individuals are able to challenge orders and rules (Hirsch, 1997). There was much 
European and national government funded partnership working at the regional and 
city level to decide strategic neighbourhood improvement policies in Sheffield. 
However, the extent to which national, regional, and local action to improve 
neighbourhoods was jointly planned and implemented varied considerably. 
 
For example, in Sheffield in 2001, there was a joint European Union and United 
Kingdom funded Urban Regeneration Programme operating (the city was 
designated an Objective 1 area, which is the highest category of European 
support, in 1999). This programme provided funds to support the development of 
businesses and social enterprise and the economic turnaround of deprived 
communities. Meanwhile, the South Yorkshire Housing Renewal Pathfinder 
initiative was dealing with housing market weaknesses in the South Yorkshire 
area, and there had been a Yorkshire forward planning exercise, which had 
produced the South Yorkshire Sub-Regional Action Plan and Regional Planning 
Guidance. The sub-regional action plan included a section on housing needs, 
markets and affordability, and the regional planning guidance provided a regional 
framework for the provision of local authority development plans for housing and 
other local services. 
 
At the city level, different neighbourhood regeneration initiatives had been or were 
operating. They included the City Challenge Programme (1992) and the Single 
Regeneration Budget (1994) that the Conservatives had introduced and the New 
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Deal for Communities (1998) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (2000) that 
New Labour had introduced. At the same time, the Sheffield First Local Strategic 
Partnership (LSP) had been set up that comprised the council and various 
organizations with an interest in neighbourhood and local service matters. The 
LSP partnership was involved in producing a Citywide Strategy to help coordinate 
action to create a shared long-term vision for the city and build a strong economy, 
successful neighbourhoods, and inclusive and healthy communities. The Citywide 
Tenant Participation Compact contained information on how tenants could get 
involved in consultations on housing services, and the way that different 
stakeholders would help to ensure housing service and neighbourhood 
improvement objectives would be met. 
 
Council-convened Citywide Forum meetings that TARA representatives, 
councillors and officers attended provided an opportunity for discussions on 
housing and neighbourhood matters, and a chance to decide on priorities for 
action to improve neighbourhoods and local services. Some of the information the 
council obtained from Citywide Forum meetings was used to support the 
development of overarching Neighbourhood Planning Frameworks and Housing 
Investment Service Plans (HISPs). The overarching frameworks steered 
stakeholder activities towards finding ways to improve the living and working 
environment in an area through different land use, housing, transport, and leisure 
policies. At the same time, the council produced fifty-three separate HISPs 
describing housing management service plans and priorities for an area over a 
twelve-month period and ways to secure the investment needed for housing 
repairs and modernization (Sheffield City Council 2002a). 
 
At the May elections, in 2002, Labour took back control of the council and had to 
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deal with the same complex mix of variously connected and unconnected national, 
regional, and local housing strategies and problems that the Liberal Democrats 
had needed to grapple with. 
 
Strategy and tactics 
 
The New Labour government may have genuinely wanted more tenants involved 
in housing matters and influencing management processes and budgets through 
collaboration. However, it is useful to understand the different intended and 
unintended outputs and outcomes delivered by the complex partnership-working 
arrangements at the national, regional, and local level that were dealing with 
housing problems. In addition, there is an issue concerning the implementation of 
the New Labour tenant participation policies described in chapter one (section 1.1) 
and the extent to which they enable TARAs to influence different relevant housing 
strategies. An expansion of PFI, RSL, and ALMO activities occurred at the 
neighbourhood level, and new ways to influence housing discussions and 
decision-making emerged after the introduction of the Best Value regime and the 
Tenant Participation Compact. The impact of these developments on TARA and 
council collaboration, its capacity to influence different housing strategies, and 
TARA and activist inclusion and exclusion will be addressed in chapters five 
through seven. 
 
Barnes et al., (2002) have elaborated on how different institutional processes of 
exclusion can be environmental, discursive, and regulatory in nature. The 
environmental causes of exclusion can include institutional cultures and values 
that influence the design of collaborative structures and processes. In turn, these 
structures and processes will enable or constrain organizations’ and individuals’ 
involvement in housing discussions and decision-making to agree priorities for 
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action to improve local services. A discursive cause of exclusion may also consist 
of a dominant institutional language of collaboration that values some types of 
knowledge and experience over others, which means some organizations and 
individuals are disadvantaged in collaboration. Then there are the regulatory 
causes of exclusion that can include institutional rules and guidance that prescribe 
ways of working that some organizations and individuals are more able or willing 
to adopt than other organizations and individuals. A part of the New Labour 
political culture focuses on self-help through collaboration and the monitoring of 
collaborative activities using new forms of regulation and evaluation. This political 
culture will have helped to influence or determine councils’ decisions about what 
organizations and individuals they want to engage with and how they want to 
engage with them. This is an important point because it means that collaboration 
might not be successful even when organizations meet many of the criteria 
needed to ensure that it is (see chapter 2, section 2.1). 
 
Collaboration may not be successful because institutional pressures and 
constraints result in some organizations that should be involved being excluded 
early on or not even emerging in a particular political environment in the first place. 
Much theory on collaboration including the theory of collaborative advantage 
(Bruce et al., 1995; Eisenstadt et al., 2003; Foley and Mundschenk, 1997; Huxham 
and Vangen, 2005; Mattessich and Monsey, 1992; Nidamarthi et al., 2001; and 
Simonin, 1997) fails to adequately address the issue of institutional involvement in 
the creation of particular political opportunity structures. More specifically, theory 
of collaborative advantage fails to deal adequately with the circumstances within 
which organizations are able to emerge and develop (or not) at the expense of 
potential organizations that are not able to emerge at all. 
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Some of the essential components for the operation of a successful collaboration 
include having a broad-based membership, clear purpose, shared vision, open 
communications, and the buy-in of partners (Reilly, 2001). How will the history of 
tenant and landlord relations in Sheffield, and different central government housing 
and tenant participation policies combine to determine the success (or not) of 
TARA and council collaboration in the city? In particular, there is the way that 
these things affect the chances of collaboration at the local level producing the 
levels of inter-organizational co-operation needed to achieve the collaborative 
advantage that Huxham and Vangen (2005) have described. Here, collaborating 
organizations are able to achieve organizational objectives that they could not 
have achieved working on their own, as well as collaborative objectives. For the 
council and TARAs trying to work together in Sheffield, central government 
appeared, in different ways, to have both enabled and constrained the 
development of the environmental conditions needed to ensure collaboration is 
sustainable, as discussed in section 4.1. 
 
There may also be a mobilization of arguments so that some issues are effectively 
organized into debates and some issues are effectively organized out of debates 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The New Labour government’s focus on promoting 
just three approved options for the management of council-owned housing meant 
there were likely to be only limited opportunities for the council to consider other 
housing management options put forward by TARAs and activists (see chapter 1, 
section 1.1). In May 2002, Sheffield’s newly elected Labour-controlled council 
needed to obtain at least two stars (where no stars is poor and three stars is 
excellent performance) following the Best Value inspection of its housing 
management services (see chapter 1, section 1.1). The council needed this 
inspection outcome to be eligible to obtain extra central government monies for 
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housing repairs and modernisation works, and submit an ALMO bid. The council 
could not easily consider the merits of housing management options for council-
owned housing, other than the three preferred by central government. A failure to 
satisfy central government that there was appropriate and approved progress 
towards solving the city’s housing problems might result in reduced access to 
needed funds, and even central government intervention to take control of housing 
functions and services. 
 
It is not simply through laws that central government can achieve its aims, but a 
process of ‘governmentality’ or more general tactics of government (Foucault, 
1978). These more general tactics can include obtaining organizations’ and 
individuals’ support for government actions through recourse to core values, 
customs, and beliefs about acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. A New 
Labour language of collaboration founded on a perception of particular types of 
trusting and mutually beneficial relationships emerged after it was elected in 1997 
(Clarence and Painter, 1998). However, it was perfectly possible for this new 
language of collaboration to become a rather authoritarian project that imposes a 
given model of community on organizations and individuals (Calder, 2004). For 
example, the new Labour language of collaboration might serve to maintain a 
number of existing biases in the way that different types of knowledge and 
experience are viewed and valued in collaboration. 
It might be possible to obtain TARA and activist support for housing and tenant 
participation policies based on their involvement in central government approved 
forms of collaboration. This approved collaboration would enable a TARA to obtain 
access to important central government and council controlled resources that it 
might need to operate effectively. Nevertheless, the TARA might be involved in 
collaboration and decision-making processes, but lack the power and control over 
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agenda-setting and decision-making processes needed to ensure it is ‘genuinely’ 
empowered. By this, I mean the TARA is given the power to influence high-level 
housing strategy and policymaking, as well as comment on day-to-day housing 
and neighbourhood management matters if that is what it wants. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored tenant and landlord relations from the 1960s to 2002 in 
Sheffield (before the fieldwork part of the research for this thesis was carried out in 
2002 and 2003). The issues that emerge demonstrate how historical and 
institutional factors help to shape the relationships and expectations of the 
stakeholders involved in TARA and council collaboration. In Sheffield, a long 
history of frequently difficult tenant and landlord relations meant there were 
activists who had knowledge or experience of difficulties finding decent living 
accommodation before council-owned housing was widely available. Even after 
much council-house building, at the end of the Second World War, there were still 
many housing problems. These problems included dealing with the rent strikes in 
1967, the loss of council-owned housing following the introduction of right to buy 
legislation in 1980, the turmoil caused by the demolition of council housing, and 
finding ways to get tenants to consider the option of stock transfer to an RSL. 
 
 
Activists’ awareness of past struggles to obtain access to better quality housing 
influenced their views on the role of contemporary TARA and council collaboration. 
There was what Bhaskar (1983, p.83) has called ‘a binding of the present by the 
massive presence of the past’. On the one hand, there was pressure coming from 
a group of influential activists with a strong attachment to council-owned housing. 
On the other hand, there was pressure coming from councillors and council 
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officers who needed to find ways to solve the city’s housing problems and satisfy 
Best Value inspectors that appropriate action was being taken to address those 
problems. Much mistrust of central government and its commitment to council-
owned housing existed amongst activists who were struggling to influence housing 
policy through consultations on the future of council-owned housing. This 
culminated in the emergence of different groups claiming to represent the views of 
tenants at a citywide level. 
 
To what extent did the New Labour government’s housing and tenant participation 
policies, and Sheffield City Council’s actions to implement those policies help to 
remedy or exacerbate extant tenant concerns about the future of council-owned 
housing and different housing problems? The Local Government Act (1999) 
introduced the Best Value regime. In 2000, under provisions contained within the 
Act, the Tenant Participation Compact was introduced. After the introduction of the 
Local Government Act (2000), councils changed the way that they were structured 
to comply with the requirement to adopt and set up new executive arrangements. 
In Sheffield, traditional committees were replaced with a cabinet and leader model. 
However, the abandonment of the traditional housing committee resulted in a loss 
of tenant-representative access to councillors and council officers who were part of 
a committee dealing solely with housing matters. At the same time, the council’s 
controversial TARA-recognition policy and control over the tenants’ levy increased 
tension between the council and TARAs over the control of important resources. 
This tension was exacerbated by activists’ and tenants’ mistrust of housing 
consultants contracted by the council to review the state of the city’s housing. The 
TARA coalition called Unity emerged to fight what it perceived to be the 
privatisation of council-owned housing, but was not recognised by the council. 
Tenants had previously told consultants, contracted by the council to review the 
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tenants movement in the city, that any umbrella organization set up to represent 
the views of TARAs at a citywide level would need to be independent from the 
council. The council’s subsequent recognition of START as the umbrella 
organization representing a majority of the city’s TARAs was controversial. Some 
activists felt the council wanted to work with a compliant umbrella organization that 
would help it to implement national housing policies effectively at the local level. In 
turn, opportunities for tenants to challenge government housing policy or develop 
their own ideas on housing and neighbourhood management were limited. 
 
On the one hand, it is possible to observe the effects of pressure on councils and 
TARAs coming from central government to implement national housing and 
regeneration policies effectively at the local level. On the other hand, it is possible 
to observe the effects of pressure on central government and councils coming 
from TARAs and tenants. A number of influential activists, who knew about the 
historical struggles to obtain access to council-owned housing, wanted adequate 
opportunities to develop their own ideas and ways of working together to satisfy 
community needs through collaboration. There may be an institutionalization of 
organizations that occurs when there is a movement from voluntary association as 
a form of civic action to voluntary organizations as institutional forms (Tonkiss and 
Passey, 1999. In chapters five through seven, institutional theory and theory on 
power provide ideas and insights that help to explain how central government 
policies, and a particular history of tenant and landlord relations in an area, 
impacted on contemporary TARA and council collaboration. The aim was to see 
whether there was any TARA institutionalization and, if so, to what it extent it was 
problematic (or not). What evidence is there of TARA institutionalization that is 
problematic in terms of the contribution that TARAs make in different deliberations, 
and the outcomes of TARA and council collaboration? How do TARAs operate as, 
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first, independent organizations making a unique contribution to collaboration or, 
second, re-designed organizations that fit with central government and council-
prescribed ways of working? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHRONOLOGY 
 
 
Sheffield in the summer of 2002 
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At the May local elections Labour became the majority party presiding over a hung council. 
 
Liberal Democrat plans for the Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer (LSVST) of all council-
owned housing to a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) were abandoned. 
 
The council needed to obtain favourable housing management and estate services Best 
Value inspection outcomes to be eligible for a share of extra central government monies 
made available for housing repairs and modernisation works. 
 
Many tenants remained mistrustful of the council and some suggested a fourth option for the 
management of council-owned housing (in addition to the three central government approved 
options). 
 
The fallout from the demise of Unity remained problematic with some important TARA and 
tenant housing concerns and grievances not addressed effectively, and activists who had 
been aligned with Unity still present. 
 
Tension and conflict existed between some TARAs and activists, and the council over the 
way that the council recognised START as the umbrella organization representing a majority 
of the city’s TARAs. 
 
Tension and conflict existed amongst TARAs and activists over the role of START, and the 
council officer seconded to work with START on a part-time basis, as well as its relations with 
the council. 
 
START’s dependence on the council for funds and office space was problematic. 
 
The council was concerned about START, a falling TARA membership, and a failure to agree 
on a constitution and business plan. 
 
Changed council structures had impacted on TARA and council relations with the loss of the 
old housing committee that dealt solely with housing matters. 
 
TARA and council conflict existed over the council’s TARA-recognition policy, its purpose, 
and its implementation. A significant minority of TARAs had not signed up to the policy. 
 
TARA and council conflict existed over the council’s control over important resources, 
including the tenants’ levy (a small sum of money collected with the rents of participating 
tenants to support TARA activities).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Role of START 
This chapter uses ideas and concepts that are part of the institutional theory on 
organizational ‘isomorphism’ developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to 
examine and analyse TARA and council collaboration in Sheffield. First, the 
intention is to ascertain the extent to which New Labour policies have created a 
particular type of mandated collaboration. Second, the findings from this 
investigation will help to show what affect the national political environment has 
had on the type of TARA that has been able to get involved in mandated 
collaboration. Third, the task is to establish how central government has enabled 
or constrained the development of opportunities for TARA-involvement in different 
types of collaboration to improve neighbourhoods, or challenge dominant 
strategies and values. The focus is on addressing the second overarching set of 
research sub-questions identified in chapter two (section 2.3). The sub-question is: 
 
How has mandated collaboration affected opportunities for 
instrumental collaboration to improve neighbourhoods and 
services or ideological collaboration which results in challenges 
to central government thinking and policies? 
 
The chapter shows how a dominant central government language of collaboration 
helped to shape START and council relations, opportunities for involvement in 
different types of collaboration, and activists’ capacity to influence relevant 
agendas and decision-making processes at the local level. The involvement of 
START in the implementation of key components of national housing policy 
(including the separation of housing strategy and management functions, and 
solving housing debt and maintenance problems) is also considered in detail. 
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Then TARA and activist resistance to what they perceived to be the council’s 
inappropriate involvement in START affairs is explored. 
 
The chapter starts with a description of the situation as I found it in Sheffield at the 
outset of the fieldwork part of the research for this thesis in the late summer of 
2002. Comments made in early conversations with a director of the firm of housing 
and tenant participation consultants called Partners in Change help to inform this 
description. The comments ranged across issues that included the work that the 
consultants had conducted with tenants in the city, the role of the first chair of 
START, and the remit of the council’s tenant participation officer (seconded to 
work with START on a part-time basis). In addition, various newspaper cuttings, 
reports, and minutes collected on visits to the central library, city hall, and 
START’s offices in Sheffield provided information about the council and its 
relations with the tenants and residents movement in the city. The aim was to 
explore the political environment within which TARA and council collaboration in 
Sheffield was located. More specifically, the chapter focuses on some key tenant 
and landlord issues: 
 
• what happened to START and council relations after Labour took back 
control of the council from the Liberal Democrats in May 2002 and 
abandoned the idea of LSVST 
 
• how the council’s drive to get TARAs to sign up to its TARA-recognition 
policy impacted on TARA and council relations 
 
• what impact the council’s need to obtain good housing management and 
estate services Best Value inspection outcomes had on its relations with 
START, and TARA and council collaboration. 
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An in-depth examination of these issues provides insights that help to explain the 
beginning of a breakdown in START and council relations: 
 
• They show how pressure on the council coming from central government to 
find approved solutions to housing problems shaped council actions in 
collaboration. 
 
• They provide examples of TARA and activist resistance to what they 
perceived to be top-down imposed collaboration and the privatisation of 
council-owned housing. 
 
• They help to clarify the role of START, the purpose of collaboration, and 
who has power and control over important resources and agendas. 
 
Often a single or small number of quotes from one or more individuals constitute 
the evidence used to explain or justify a particular view on START or collaboration. 
These people’s views are central to the evidence because they were the key 
players involved in TARA and council discussions and collaboration in Sheffield. 
They comprised a small number of people with power or influence gained through 
representing tenants or their position on the council. 
 
5.1 The situation in Sheffield in the summer of 2002 
  
Labour had taken back control of Sheffield City Council, from the Liberal 
Democrats, at the May 2002 local elections. There had been widespread tenant 
opposition to the Liberal Democrats’ plans for LSVST and this had helped Labour 
to win the elections. However, the new Labour-controlled council needed to find 
new ways to solve the city’s housing problems when it kept its election promise 
and abandoned the plans for LSVST. The council still needed to deal with a 
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serious housing debt problem (see chapter 4, section 4.1) and meet the central 
government devised Decent Homes Standard by the 2010 deadline that had been 
set (see chapter 1, section 1.1). Meanwhile, the council did not have access to 
sufficient finances of its own to carry out needed housing repairs and 
modernisation works. 
 
At the same time, some activists felt it important that the council had not 
adequately addressed tenant grievances and concerns after Unity had folded. 
First, tenants were worried about the possibility of increased rents and changed 
conditions of tenure if there was a transfer of council-owned housing to an RSL. 
Second, tenants were uncertain about what would happen if they lost the ability to 
hold local councillors directly accountable for housing management and 
maintenance matters (see chapter 4, section 4.1). Meanwhile, much tension and 
conflict existed between activists on the START board and between START board 
and other TARA activists over the role of START, its relations with the council, and 
the activities and actions of the tenant participation officer seconded by the council 
to work with START on a part time basis. 
 
Tension and conflict over policy 
 
In 2000, Sheffield City Council had set up a new cabinet system of government at 
the local level (see chapter 4, section 4.2). It comprised a leader, elected by sitting 
councillors, responsible for selecting seven councillors to serve in the cabinet 
(each in charge of a portfolio, which includes different cross-cutting council 
functions and policymaking processes). Key individuals in the council, and the 
tenants and residents movement with an interest in housing matters were involved 
in a political and collaborative environment that had changed markedly since the 
introduction of these new local government structures: 
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• At the political party level, the powerful leader of the Labour-controlled 
council was working closely with her colleague who was the cabinet 
member for neighbourhoods (and responsible, amongst other things, for 
housing matters). 
 
• The council had created a number of new service directorates and senior 
management positions. From a housing perspective, the two most 
important managers were the new executive director of neighbourhoods 
(with overall responsibility for housing policy and management matters) and 
head of housing operations (responsible for the day-to-day functioning of 
housing services). 
 
• The first chair of START and the chair of Hackenthorpe TARA (a former 
high-profile member of Unity who was emerging as a strong challenger for 
the position of START chair) were key players in the tenants and residents 
movement. 
 
Other key activists included the vice chair of START, the chair of Westfield TARA, 
the secretary of Foxhill TARA, and the chair of the North Sheffield Action Group 
(that was campaigning to stop the demolition of council-owned housing in the 
north of the city) (see chapter 3, section 3.2). 
 
In 1999, the housing and tenant participation consultants called Partners in 
Change had estimated there were eighty-four TARAs (varying in size from those 
representing the tenants in a single tower block to others representing an area 
comprised of more than 3000 households) operating in the city. These TARAs 
were involved in different activities (ranging from the organization of social events 
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and outings to the coordination of campaigning and protest activity on housing 
matters). They were also subject to different degrees of formalization (but usually 
as a minimum had an elected chair and secretary and held regular meetings). 
Some TARAs that were concerned about the council’s TARA-recognition policy 
had not signed up to it: they could not (because of a lack of evidence of 
appropriate committee or meeting structures) or would not (because tenants 
opposed the council’s control over tenants’ levy monies and the stipulation that 
TARAs should have no more than £3,000 in the bank) (see chapter 4, section 4.2). 
 
It was a council requirement that at least 50% of the city’s TARAs plus one had to 
be members of START before it could be officially recognised. START had 
achieved this target in May 2000, but there were still a number of TARAs that had 
not affiliated to START. By late summer 2002, TARA membership of START had 
begun to fall, and some senior councillors and officers were becoming increasingly 
concerned about START, its internal problems, and the fact that it probably no 
longer represented a majority of the city’s TARAs. Linda, the council’s executive 
director for neighbourhoods, said: 
 
Instead of all the fighting and the ins and outs of who sits where 
on what and the rest of it, what the structure is, if [START] and 
the tenants movement could be more focused on saying what are 
the improvements it wants to see and holding the service to 
account to deliver to that I think that would be a big step change 
really. 
 
START had also failed to agree on a constitution and business plan and some 
prominent activists were involved in a campaign to challenge the authority of the 
first chair of START (who declined to be interviewed saying she was too upset by 
the wrangling to talk about her work with the organization). She had adopted a 
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pragmatic line on the issue of stock transfer and had been willing to consider its 
possible benefits. However, her past relations with Liberal Democrat councillors 
and the continuing involvement of the council in START affairs remained 
controversial matters for some influential TARAs and activists. One group of board 
members were supporting the first chair of START while another group of board 
members opposed her pragmatic approach. 
 
The council wanted to get tenants in different parts of the city to adopt central 
government approved housing management options that would help to solve the 
city’s housing debt and repair problems (see chapter 4, section 4.1). The Best 
Value inspection of the council’s housing management and estates services and 
the first citywide tenant participation compact had both recently been completed. 
The council was keen to obtain Best Value inspection outcomes that would mean 
it was eligible to receive extra central government monies made available for 
housing repairs and submit an application to set up an ALMO in the city. Rosalind, 
the leader of the Labour-controlled council, said: 
 
If they [tenants] vote for an arms length management 
organisation the structure that we are going to take forward will 
always have a tenants’ majority on the Board … No, it will not 
have a tenants’ majority but neither of the other two 
constituencies, councillors or private sector, will be able to 
outvote the tenants. I think that is it, so they will actually have a 
lot of power, so I do not know what the power is that they say 
they have not got. 
 
Meanwhile, the council’s tenant participation officers (a manager and her 
assistant) were working with START and TARAs to build trust in the council and 
collaborative working. However, some tension existed between the tenant 
participation officers and some of the council’s housing managers caused by their 
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different approaches to engagement with START and TARAs, and understanding 
of TARA culture and values, which is examined in more detail in chapter six 
(section 6.1). 
 
The next sub-section examines the openness (or not) of national and local political 
opportunity structures, and the different opportunities and challenges that can exist 
in terms of TARA and council collaboration. In particular, the sub-section shows 
how START became involved in new types of housing and neighbourhood 
discussions and decision-making processes after the introduction of the Best 
Value regime and the Tenant Participation Compact. The aim is to begin to explain 
why tenant and landlord relations and collaboration developed in the way that they 
did in Sheffield with the emergence of the TARA coalition Unity and the umbrella 
organization START.  
 
Involvement and connectedness 
 
New opportunities had emerged for TARA and tenant involvement in housing and 
neighbourhood matters when the New Labour government introduced the Best 
Value regime and the Tenant Participation Compact. Using Dorcey et al.’s (1994) 
notion of a spectrum of interaction it seemed this involvement could comprise 
different things at different times. The provision of information, consultations, 
question and answer sessions, attempts to reach a consensus on issues, problem-
solving, and longer-term engagement in policymaking processes. There were new 
ways that TARAs and tenants could receive information or be consulted through 
the Best Value review process and work done to compile compacts. They might 
also help to define issues and test ideas that would mean they were engaged in 
discussions and decision-making over the longer term to find solutions to complex 
housing and other neighbourhood problems. However, Rosalind, the leader of the 
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council, said: 
 
With the tenants and residents you have got very high 
expectations of them contributing as equal partners, it is a bit of 
an unreal sort of thing and yet it is very patronising to say, well, 
they are not equal partners because actually the council 
members and officers have got … years of experience and 
qualifications between them … the tenants and residents have 
got the interests of their communities at heart … what is 
overhanging debt … housing finance is complex at the best of 
times, so why would people expect to be … an equal partner, it is 
a bit unrealistic. 
 
START and TARA representatives attended council-convened Citywide Forum 
meetings held each month. At these meetings, councillors and council officers 
provided information and feedback on housing and neighbourhood matters. The 
council and tenant representatives were also involved in discussions and decision-
making to determine what action to take to solve housing and neighbourhood 
problems. The councillors representing an area raised neighbourhood matters at 
their respective Area Panel meetings (the city was divided into twelve areas) and 
at Area Housing meetings (that TARA representatives attended) (see Figure 14). 
 
 
 
Figure 14: START: its connections with organizations and groups (simplified) 
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At Area Housing meetings, tenant representatives were nominated to attend 
meetings of the council’s Housing Consultative Group, which was tasked with 
monitoring the performance of housing services across the city. The chairperson 
at these consultative group meetings was a TARA representative. At Area Panel 
meetings, local people were also involved in discussions to decide Area Action 
Strategies (priorities for action to improve an area) and influence the development 
of Housing Investment and Service Plans (HISPs) (fifty-three documents covering 
all the different parts of the city) (Sheffield City Council, 2001a). The council, 
through Area Panels, used the HISPs to produce Neighbourhood Planning 
Frameworks that set out actions to be undertaken to achieve different housing and 
neighbourhood improvement objectives (Sheffield City Council, 2002b). 
 
START and TARA representatives also attended a range of other council-
convened meetings. For example, there was the Best Value Review Working 
Group, the Future of Council Housing Group, the Anti-Social Behaviour Working 
Group, the Black and Minority Ethnic Consultative Group, and the Housing 
Disability Consultative Group (Sheffield City Council, 2003). Meanwhile, different 
neighbourhood regeneration activities, including those that were a component of 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) or Sheffield First Local Strategic Partnership 
(LSP) collaborative activities, brought together organizations and individuals who 
had an interest in housing and neighbourhood improvement matters. Roy Furbey, 
at the Centre for Regional, Economic and Social Research (CRESR), Sheffield 
Hallam University, said: 
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We [organizations and individuals at the local level] have got 
enough coming our way, we just cannot handle all of this … there 
is such a fragment going on everywhere and there are so many 
priorities and so many agendas and reflected in such a 
fragmented range of organizations and partnerships and 
partnerships of partnerships that there is not, perhaps, the clarity 
… there is too many things going on.  
 
It is the precise role of institutions in shaping the views and actions of the 
organizers or convenors of collaborations that is underplayed in much of the 
theory on collaboration and collaborative advantage. Decisions have to be made 
about who will be involved in collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2000a) and how 
it will address the concerns of organizations and individuals as well as a 
collaborative agenda (Huxham, 2003). However, the social forms that 
organizations and individuals confront can exist quite independently of whatever 
they might do because they possess their own profound institutional 
embeddedness (Giddens, 1985). That is, dominant or taken-for-granted aspects of 
culture and inter-organizational relations exist that are not easily changed or 
disturbed by the day-to-day activities and actions of organizations and individuals. 
For example, this could include the way that aspects of the role of START and its 
relations with Sheffield City Council were shaped by dominant institutionalised 
ways of working and beliefs about the value of consensus and the purpose or 
desirability of conflict in collaboration. In addition, how institutionally embedded 
social forms impact on the convenors of collaboration is not adequately dealt with 
by theory on collaborative advantage. They include the structures and processes 
determining who has power and control over important resources, thinking about 
appropriate or inappropriate behaviour, levels of organizational authority and 
legitimacy, and conceptualizations of representative and participatory democracy. 
These things will impact on the types of national and local funding regimes that 
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exist, the action that organizations and individuals can take to solve problems, the 
way that different types of knowledge and experience are valued or not, and 
debates about partnerhsip-working and the role of campaigning or protest activity. 
Moreover, much tension and conflict exists over the role and status of the 
councillor and the credibility of community representatives and their contribution to 
a partnership or collaborative venture. A question that arises concerns how these 
things impact on the views of the convenors of collaboration, the debate that 
occurs to define the purpose of collaboration, and the way decisions are made 
about who to involve (or not). 
 
The next section examines and analyses the impact of central government Best 
Value and tenant participation policies on Sheffield City Council’s relations with 
START, and views on TARA and council collaboration. It shows how various 
factors at the local level helped to create a unique environment within which 
collaboration was located, while various national pressures helped to shape 
council activities and actions designed to ensure central government policies were 
implemented effectively at the local level. 
 
5.2 Central government policy implementation and tenant 
participation at the local level 
 
Chapter two (section 2.2) provided a detailed description of the different 
environmental pressures on organizations (as described by DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) that can cause them to become more like each other. There are three 
pressures on organizations, which make them act in certain ways:  
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• first, the coercive pressure exerted by an organization or organizations on 
which it is dependent 
 
• second, the mimetic pressure causing it to imitate other organizations 
perceived to have been successful in obtaining the legitimacy or resources 
they need to function effectively 
 
• third, the normative pressure exerted by professionals or others who have 
an interest in its affairs.  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) say the coercive environmental pressure that 
underpins the process of ‘organizational isomorphism’ results from: 
 
[both] formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by 
other organizations upon which they are dependent and by 
cultural expectations in the society within which organizations 
function. 
 
How was Sheffield City Council impacted upon by coercive central government 
pressure (formal and informal) on councils to implement Best Value and Tenant 
Participation Compact policies effectively at the local level? More specifically, the 
research was concerned with the way that these pressures impacted on the action 
the council took to build relations with START. What was the extent of any 
‘organizational isomorphism’ resulting in TARAs becoming more like each other in 
order to comply with a council desire to work with a certain type of tenants’ 
organization? For example, the council might be especially keen to work with a 
tenants’ organization that would help it to effectively implement national housing 
policy and convince Best Value inspectors that TARA and council collaboration to 
improve neighbourhoods was working well. Was there TARA and activist  
  - 178 -  
resistance to coercive pressure and the possibility of ‘organizational 
isomorphism’? The aim is to assess the extent of TARA opposition to council 
pressure to sign up to its TARA-recognition policy and operate in ways that helped 
to improve the chances of getting access to extra central government funds made 
available for housing repairs and modernization. 
 
Some types of environmental pressure can encourage the development of 
hierarchical relations in collaboration when a more powerful organization takes 
control to ensure its organizational objectives are achieved (Davies, 2004). The 
New Labour government wanted more devolution of control over the housing 
management functions of councils to tenant management organisations (TMOs), 
arms length management organisations (ALMOs), and Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs). Indeed, in  2005, Keith Hill, the Minister for Housing, reiterated 
that, “At the estate and neighbourhood levels, local approaches to housing 
management in which tenants play a key role can help to sustain local 
communities and turn around deprived neighbourhoods” (ODPM, 2005). 
Meanwhile, ODPM guidance on stock transfer, ALMO, and PFI options to obtain 
investment monies for housing stipulates that tenants should be involved and 
empowered through the detailed development and implementation of the chosen 
option (ODPM, 2003). However, councils also needed to take action to ensure all 
of the housing in their area would meet central government’s Decent Homes 
Standard by the 2010 deadline. Sheffield City Council needed to carry out 
extensive housing repair and modernization works or face the prospect that central 
government, at best, would withdraw funding and, at worst, would intervene and 
take control of housing functions and services (see chapter 1, section 1.1). The 
council was motivated to want to manage collaboration to satisfy central 
government and its Best Value inspectors that it was taking appropriate action to 
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deal with housing problems in the city and meet the Decent Homes Standard. 
 
The next sub-section shows how the institutional environment and different local 
factors shaped START and council relations, activists’ views on the role of START, 
and the council’s reasons for wanting to work more closely with TARAs. 
 
‘Forming START out of necessity’ 
 
At a national level, a history exists of direct central government activity and action 
to manage social housing provision and even council estate social structures. The 
massive expansion of council-house building after the end of the Second World 
War improved many people’s living conditions. At the same time, people living on 
the new council estates were encouraged to take part in different central 
government devised or approved community activities. As Ravetz (2001, p. 145) 
says: 
 
From the model village and garden-city traditions came the tennis 
courts and bowling greens that were such a ubiquitous feature of 
estate plans, even if they failed to materialise, while the galas and 
crowning of ‘queens’ derived from ‘Merrie England’ and Arts & 
Crafts. How such elements were received by tenants depended on 
how far they identified with the tastes and values they represented. 
 
From the late 1970s through 2000s, there was a reduction in the extent of direct 
central government control over the types of social housing and neighbourhood 
services provided in an area. Instead, central government gave tenants new rights 
to be involved in housing and neighbourhood discussions and decision-making 
processes. However, central government was able to retain a substantial degree 
of control over the development of social housing policy and its implementation 
through Best Value and Tenant Participation Compact regulations and 
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performance-monitoring systems (see chapter 1, section 1.1). The Best Value 
regime has created new opportunities for TARA involvement in consultations to 
decide priorities for action to improve neighbourhoods. However, Best Value 
inspectors are able to award star ratings based on no stars (poor) to three stars 
(excellent) for performance in delivering services, and central government can 
intervene and take control of underperforming services. The Tenant Participation 
Compact was not introduced to prevent the development of different types of 
tenant activity. Nevertheless, central government and council devised standards 
for tenants’ groups might cause TARAs to operate in certain prescribed ways to 
meet the standards, and implement national housing and tenant participation 
polices at the local level. 
 
A shift had occurred in the way that central government went about formulating 
housing policy and promoting its implementation at the local level. It seemed to be 
a shift towards an approach to government and ‘governmentality’ described by 
Foucault (1978). In this view, government is not simply about state politics because 
it can include various institutionalised control mechanisms used to shape citizens’ 
views and get them to help with the implementation of national policies at the local 
level. Central government’s introduction of mandated TARA and council 
collaboration increased tenant involvement in housing matters, and constituted a 
new form of social control over ways of thinking about housing problems, aided by 
various rewards or sanctions for different types of performance in solving those 
problems. The manipulation of community representation often occurs in situations 
where their power to influence political decision-making is actually quite limited 
(Raco and Flint, 2001). For example, central government is in a strong position to 
shape collaboration through the institutional maintenance of policy and funding 
structures designed to facilitate organizations’ and individuals’ integration into a 
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particular type of society (see chapter 2, section 2.2). The Best Value regime and 
the Tenant Participation Compact provided opportunities for START to be more 
involved in relevant housing discussions and policymaking. However, in examining 
such initiatives it is possible to say that “[w]hile they may represent a new form of 
governing, ‘at a distance’, they can also be seen as perpetuating state power 
through new forms of technical and managerial control” (Taylor, 1997, p. 18). 
START was allowed to develop and become involved in a particular type of 
pragmatic and consensus-seeking collaboration. It was a type of collaboration that 
enabled START to obtain organizational legitimacy in the eyes of a council that 
needed to satisfy central government and its Best Value inspectors that it was 
taking appropriate steps to deal with the city’s housing problems. 
 
Central government policymaking helped to determine the focus of housing 
deliberations and decision-making in Sheffield. START was the umbrella 
organization recognised by the council as representing a majority of the city’s 
TARAs, but its dependence on the council for funds and other types of assistance 
was problematic (see chapter 4, section 4.1). It was mentioned, in chapter two 
(section 2.2), that more powerful stakeholders with control over important 
resources can become dominant, even overbearing, players: 
 
[in situations where] alternative resources are either not readily 
available or require effort to locate, that the stronger party to the 
transaction can coerce the weaker party to adopt its practices in 
order to accommodate the stronger party’s needs. 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 154) 
 
The city council had needed to think about the type of umbrella organization, 
representing TARA views, that it wanted to work with. Robert, a housing manager 
in the Manor Castle and Woodthorpe area of Sheffield, said: 
  - 182 -  
There was genuine commitment there [at city hall] … [amongst 
the housing and] other departments in the city council to have an 
umbrella organization, particularly as we were moving into the big 
picture of the future of council housing where […] stock transfer 
was on the table. 
 
There was much central government pressure on councils to involve more tenants 
in discussions and decision-making to solve their housing problems (see chapter 
1, section 1.1). This situation and the extent to 
which the first chair of START had been under 
council pressure to adopt a pragmatic approach 
in housing discussions and agree to consider 
LSVST in the face of much tenant opposition 
had troubled some prominent activists. Sheffield 
City Council had stood to benefit from working 
with an umbrella organization that would help to 
persuade tenants to support central government 
approved options for the management of 
council-owned housing in the future. Robin, a housing officer at the Crystal Peaks 
Housing Office, suggested it was a case of: 
 
forming Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together out of 
necessity, you are having Best Value and other things that have 
come in and I think that you have got the personnel involved in 
there [Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] who they [the 
council] could control to a point. 
 
Indeed, the council was involved in what, for some of its departments and officers, 
was a perfectly rational policy of relationship-building with START and TARAs that 
helped to ensure it was not disadvantaged in its dealings with central government. 
Picture 3: START office 
(Photo: R. Dalziel) 
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The council’s housing department was not likely to be motivated to be involved in 
supporting tenants’ and residents’ organizations that were too radical or did not 
understand the difficulties that it faced trying to determine how council-owned 
housing would be managed in the future. Instead, the council was more likely to be 
motivated to support an umbrella tenants’ and residents’ organization that it felt it 
understood and could easily work with. Caroline, the council’s tenant participation 
manager, says: 
 
What tends to happen is that we [the council] try and create mirrors 
of ourselves, if you like, with the tenants’ groups […] and set up 
[…] groups that tend to mirror how we as a council work in terms of 
the bureaucracy surrounding, and also the procedures 
surrounding, it [partnership-working]. 
 
From the outset, a problem for START was the different types of pressure on it to 
obtain the legitimacy in the eyes of the council that it needed to operate effectively, 
and the TARA support it needed to be viewed as a credible umbrella organization. 
TARAs and activists that, for historical reasons, were very mistrustful of the council 
and its reasons for wanting to work with an umbrella organization were bound to be 
difficult to win over (see chapter 4, section 4.1). William, a START board member 
and the chair of Westfield TARA, pointed out that the chair of Unity had feared the 
council would control START: 
 
[The leader of Unity] […] she was a fearsomely powerful character 
and she actually challenged the existence of Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together, the umbrella group, because she felt […] that 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together was going to be a 
council-led group. 
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Organizational structures arise in highly institutionalised contexts, and, to increase 
their legitimacy, organizations often have to incorporate practices and procedures 
defined by prevailing institutionalised views on the organization and its role (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991). An organization will often develop structures and ways of 
working that help to ensure that it is able to obtain the support of other 
organizations in an institutionalised field that it depends on for resources or its 
survival. In Sheffield, there had been council pressure on START and TARAs to 
work in ways that fitted with the council’s bureaucratic processes and its need to 
satisfy central government that it was involving more tenants in Best Value review 
and compact compilation work. However, a dominant logic for organizing in an 
organizational field can cause ‘organizational isomorphism’ where organizations in 
that field change and become more like each other (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). 
START and TARAs were obliged to take particular action to comply with the 
council’s TARA-recognition policy, and gain access to needed council and tenants’ 
levy monies (see chapter 4, section 4.1). 
 
The next sub-section examines and analyses the effects of what some prominent 
activists felt was the council’s unfair support for START. It was support that meant 
START was able to obtain the TARA membership it needed to gain official 
recognition as the umbrella organization representing a majority of the city’s 
TARAs. 
 
START: ‘The council was helping them’ 
  
The involvement process is unlikely to succeed in building trust amongst 
community partners in situations where central government devised or approved 
involvement frameworks and incentives fail to promote or sustain relationships 
between people in communities and public sector organizations (Maddock, 2002). 
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The New Labour government, in its own modernisation policies, seemed to want to 
ensure more tenants are involved in relevant partnerships and collaborations to 
determine what action to take to provide efficient and effective housing and 
neighbourhood services at the local level. The problem in Sheffield was the city 
council’s particular interpretation of central government involvement guidelines, 
the nature of its support for START before it was officially recognized, and the 
circumstances surrounding the introduction of its TARA-recognition policy. These 
matters impacted adversely on the way that some influential activists viewed 
START and its role in negotiations with the council. 
 
On 29 July 1999 a report appeared in the Sheffield Star newspaper on the work of 
the housing and tenant participation consultants, Partners in Change, contracted 
by the council and START to review the state of the tenants and residents 
movement in Sheffield, and the finding that there was much TARA and activist 
conflict over the role of START and its relations with the council (see chapter 4, 
section 4.1). On 11 May 2000, an activist had told a Sheffield Star newspaper 
reporter there was, “Too much involvement by Sheffield council in what should be 
essentially a tenants’ movement”. Edmond, the vice chair of START and the chair 
of Basegreen and District TARA, said activists remembered the way that the 
council had helped START. 
 
The council said we will recognize the first movement that gets 
50% plus one membership [of TARAs] […] Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together […] the council was helping them. 
 
It was the perceived unfairness in the way that the council had recognised START 
that caused some activists to feel it had been set up to be a council tool. Michael, 
another START board member and a member of Greenhill Bradway Tenants and 
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Community Association, felt that the council wanted an umbrella organization that 
it could manipulate and control. 
 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together, it was an acrimonious 
beginning as community groups were not given the opportunity to 
have their own say and there were also personal and political 
agendas […] [The] true intentions of the council were made 
known early on in their attempts to gain control of committees, to 
gerrymander decision-making groups. 
 
It was reported in the Sheffield Star newspaper on 29 July 1999 that TARA 
representatives had previously rejected the idea that the council should make a 
direct financial contribution to support the work of any umbrella organization at a 
meeting held in the city. Paul, a START board member, chair of the North 
Sheffield Action Group (that was campaigning to prevent the demolition of council-
owned housing), and Shirecliffe TARA member, said: 
 
The council decided that they would finance Sheffield Tenants 
and Residents Together […]. For me alarm bells would have 
started ringing straight away because it is obvious there is a 
conflict of interest. 
 
In 2002, a group of influential TARAs and activists (some of whom had supported 
Unity) remained mistrustful of the council and its motivations for wanting to work 
with START and TARAs. In chapter two (section 2.2) an aspect of institutional 
theory was examined that suggests organizations become more like each other in 
situations where: 
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Highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which 
individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint 
often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, 
and output.  
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.147) 
 
Sheffield City Council was constrained by an overarching central government 
policy framework for housing and tenant participation, and definition or structuring 
of the housing futures landscape. The council attempted to deal with uncertainty 
about the way to progress housing matters through the standardisation of aspects 
of its relations with START and TARAs, and getting these organizations to 
organize in similar ways and do similar things to try to solve the city’s housing 
problems. 
 
A process existed that enabled central government to maintain much control over 
the broad development of housing strategy and policy. The process included the 
centralisation of certain aspects of the regulation and monitoring of TARA and 
council activities and actions in collaboration. This happened at the same time as 
tenants were given some new rights to be involved in housing and neighbourhood 
matters. 
 
‘Decentralizing and centralizing tendencies’ 
 
Community-based organizations are prone to become agents of the state through 
participation in partnerships or collaboration where they simply help to implement 
national policies at the local level (Cooper and Hawtin, 1997). In Sheffield, START 
had been working with the council to consider the future of council-owned housing 
in the city. However, tenants could only easily consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of three central government approved housing management 
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options, which constrained discussions on council-owned housing. The 
decentralization of some types of power and control over resources or decision-
making processes can occur at the same time as the centralization of other types 
of power and control over the same resources and decision-making processes 
(Earles, 2002). For example, some influential activists were resentful of what they 
perceived to be unnecessary central government interference in TARA affairs 
despite having new opportunities to be involved in housing and neighbourhood 
matters. In addition, the history of frequently difficult tenant and landlord relations 
described in chapter four (section 4.1) meant these activists, including some 
START board members, were very mistrustful of central government and its 
housing policies. 
 
Ian Cole, professor of housing studies and director of the Centre for Regional, 
Economic and Social Research (CRESR) Sheffield Hallam University, when he 
was talking about the New Labour government’s approach to housing policy, said: 
 
There is centralizing and decentralizing […]. There is no 
conspiracy, […] I don’t think it is a kind of very clever plan, […] 
but in terms of the need to keep control, while sort of not wanting 
to keep control, it is kind of […] schizophrenic. 
 
However, Naomi, a Labour councillor and cabinet member for education, felt 
central government was saying to tenants, “You will have control over 
neighbourhoods, but only on the terms that we have set”. START was in an 
awkward position trying to represent TARAs opposed to the transfer of council-
owned housing to RSLs or the setting up of ALMOs, and work with a council that it 
depended on for funds and office space. Naomi went on to say: 
 
 
  - 189 -  
You are working to the agenda of a national government […], 
there are limits to what you can do locally […] and that is the 
reality. It is not always possible to do what you want because we 
do not work in a decentralized culture, we work in a centralized 
culture. 
 
The ties that exist between individuals are often context specific (Coleman, 1990). 
That is, the trust that exists between different individuals will often depend on their 
knowledge of each other’s actions in the past. In Sheffield, some activists’ bad past 
housing and partnership-working experiences meant they were mistrustful of the 
council and its reasons for wanting to work more closely with START and TARAs. 
A considerable amount of time is often needed to build the levels of trust that will 
encourage people to work together to develop their thinking on issues (Gray and 
Wood, 1991) and agree shared collaborative objectives (Fredericksen, 1996). 
Unfortunately, as Barry who worked for Partners in Change suggested:  
 
The timetable is set and the criteria […] for involvement or 
engagement or evaluating the outputs [of involvement or 
engagement] […] they don’t recognize any of the anomalies that 
might exist in terms of the way a community operates or even 
[…] the needs and aspirations of those communities. 
 
Philip, a senior housing officer responsible for tenant liaison matters at the Southey 
Green Area Housing Office, suggested a priority for the council was ensuring 
START and TARAs were aware of the political systems that they would need to 
recognize to work with the council. He said: “We all have to work within systems 
and we [the council] are just helping them [START and TARAs] know what the 
systems are and how they can work with us”. The extent to which the council 
needed to understand START and TARA culture and values was less obvious. 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrat deputy leader of the opposition, and shadow 
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spokesperson for housing, recognized there was a problem with central 
government housing policies. In particular, there are those policies that encourage 
councils to find solutions to housing problems acceptable to central government at 
the expense of providing adequate time for meaningful community involvement in 
problem solving activities. He said: 
  
We [the council] have to work with government […]. We will 
change our officer structures and have officers who are prepared 
to work with the government. [But] government should be 
allowing local authorities to choose the way to develop and 
should be allowing communities to develop at their own pace. 
 
Institutions can shape the wider political environment through the power and 
control that they have over the distribution and use of important resources in 
different organizational networks (Benson, 1975). Roger, a Labour councillor and 
cabinet member for housing and direct services, felt collaboration comprised the 
council and communities working together to improve an area and recognizing 
there are boundaries within which the council and communities have to work. He 
said, “I would bend over backwards to assist if a robust plan or idea came out of a 
community to enhance their area. They have got my support so long as it is within 
the constraints that we are tied to”. Sheffield City Council was fully aware of the 
way that the different central government approved options for the management of 
council-owned housing in the future would help to determine the amount of money 
that was available for housing repairs and modernization works. The way that 
resources are distributed in an organizational network will help to determine the 
boundaries within which it is possible to create the space to do different things 
(Bertilsson, 1984). Linda, the council’s executive director for neighbourhoods, 
remarked: 
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We [the council] are about saying well these are the only options 
that we have […]. As a tenant body you might want to go and 
campaign nationally to get a change, you may want to join with 
us politically [to try to get a change] … but equally we cannot just 
ignore that this is a national agenda and we have to deliver on it. 
 
The differences in the attitudes of the council and tenants associations towards 
housing policy that Baldock (1971) uncovered in Sheffield in the 1970s reflected 
the effects of different central government and council activities and actions. 
Tension and conflict emerged between the council and tenants associations that 
left a legacy of mistrust that is still observable in the 2000s. A history of often 
difficult TARA and council relations has helped to cause mistrust of each other’s 
values and beliefs, differences over the the best way to deal with housing 
problems, and disputes concerning the purpose of TARA and council 
collaboration. From 2000 onwards, the focus of TARA and council collaboration 
was very much on pragmatic deliberations to solve housing problems, without 
much time devoted to dealing with the effects of past events on contemporary 
tenant and landlord relations. 
 
The next section considers TARA and activist resistance to unpopular central 
government housing policies, the council’s recognition policy, and the tendency 
towards ‘organizational isomorphism’. In other words the institutionalization of 
TARAs through them becoming more like each other to comply with central 
government Best Value and tenant participation regulations and rules and a 
process of collaboration designed to get them to fit with the council’s bureaucratic 
systems. 
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5.3 Resistance to ‘organizational isomorphism’ 
 
A dominant language can help an institution to maintain its core values (Ng, 2001) 
and promote some types of knowledge at the expense of others (Barnes et al., 
2002). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a powerful New Labour language of 
collaboration emerged that encouraged councils to adopt new standards and 
criteria to evaluate collaborative activities and outputs (see chapter 1, section 1.1). 
Councils and tenants were encouraged to collaborate and find new ways to obtain 
the investment needed to repair and modernize council-owned housing. In 
addition, central government was promoting the separation of housing strategy 
and management functions. Councils needed to focus on finding ways to meet 
housing needs rather than the day-to-day management of housing stock. The 
emphasis was on different stakeholders with an interest in housing matters 
developing shared goals and reaching a consensus on what to do to solve housing 
and neighbourhood problems. 
 
At the same time, coercive central government pressure on councils to find 
acceptable ways to solve their housing problems increased their awareness of 
how different council activities and actions to solve those problems would be 
gauged by central government to be appropriate or not. A council could help to 
prevent the prospect of central government withholding access to funds made 
available for housing repairs and modernization works or intervention to take 
control of housing services by getting TARAs to operate in ways that facilitated the 
implementation of national housing policies effectively at the local level. Professor 
Ian Cole said: 
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Community partners are more often than not being invited into 
something where key decisions have already been taken. There is 
a question of them being enlisted rather than engaged very often. 
 
On the other hand, Sheffield’s TARAs could avoid the prospect of council 
sanctions or marginalization by signing up to the council’s TARA-recognition policy 
and helping with Best Value review and Tenant Participation Compact compilation 
work. An organization can help to ensure its own survival when it satisfies the 
demands of other organizations on whose support it depends (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Nevertheless, there was TARA and activist resistance and protest 
against unpopular central government housing policies and the council’s TARA 
funding and recognition arrangements.  
 
‘The council has got a damned cheek’ 
 
People seem to accumulate within themselves a history and sense of their position 
and status in the world in relation to others, and are aware of the function of their 
own actions in relation to the social order at 
large (Shotter, 1983). It is possible for people 
to reflect on how past events have impacted 
on their lives and their relations with different 
organizations and individuals. They can 
consider how past events will influence their 
response to the activities and actions of 
different organizations and individuals. 
Tenants from across Sheffield with knowledge 
or experience of poor housing conditions and 
aware of their own housing needs in comparison to others had rejected the 
findings of consultants that showed council-owned housing was unsustainable in 
Picture 4: Shiregreen TARA office 
(Photo: R. Dalziel) 
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the longer term (see chapter 4, section 4.1). 
 
The interpretation of situations allows for individual differences in action, as 
different individuals can interpret situations differently (Sending, 2002). Different 
individuals and groups of people can form their own views on what is happening 
around them. For example, a group of influential activists in Sheffield were deeply 
resentful of the council’s TARA-recognition policy and its control over the collection 
of the tenants’ levy and other funds distributed to START and TARAs to support 
their activities. Dominic, a senior housing officer responsible for tenant liaison in 
the Burngreave area of the city, suggested the council needed to know what was 
happening to tenants’ levy monies: 
  
They [tenants and residents associations] are financed through 
the tenants’ levy and so there is concern that they see that 
accounts are kept in order and that they have had them 
independently and properly audited. 
 
However, some activists interpreted the council’s calls for more TARA 
accountability for the way that they spent monies as unnecessary interference in 
their affairs and an attempt to control the way that they operated. Michael, a 
START board member and a member of Greenhill Bradway Tenants and 
Community Association, commented on the council’s funding of START and 
TARAs and said: 
 
[It is about] steering people towards their [the council’s] own 
agenda or shoe-horning […] tenants and residents associations 
and Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together, to quite a large 
extent, down their own lines. 
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The council’s TARA-recognition policy and its control over funds given to TARAs 
to support their activities was a source of much bad feeling between activists and 
the council. This bad feeling added to the already high levels of mistrust that 
existed between these activists and the council (see chapter 4, section 4.1). 
Danny, a START board member and secretary of Foxhill TARA, said: 
 
The council has got a damned cheek in putting limits on what 
tenants and residents associations are allowed to do with their 
money. In laying down to the tenants and residents associations 
rules which they have to conform to, otherwise they will not be 
recognized and will not get the tenants’ levy. 
 
Meanwhile, Frank, a former member of Westfield and Halfway TARA, pointed out: 
 
Sheffield council is saying […] that the tenants’ levy money is 
paid to the council, it is the council’s money and then they give it 
to the tenants and residents associations. They claim it is their 
money but that is stupid. 
 
People’s activities and actions are temporally embedded in a process of social 
engagement that is informed by past events but also oriented toward the future 
and a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). 
There may be opportunities for people to overcome the effects of bad past 
experiences through their own and collective activities that allow them to achieve 
personal and group objectives.. Different stakeholders also exist with whom 
organizations may strike favourable bargains and thereby start to exert more 
influence on the environment within which they are located (Astley, 1984). Some 
of Sheffield’s TARAs and activists had contacts with other TARAs in different parts 
of the United Kingdom, the umbrella body Tenants and Residents Organisations 
England (TAROE), the campaigning organization Defend Council Housing, trades 
unions, and politicians sympathetic to their cause. They used these contacts to 
  - 196 -  
obtain advice and support for action to challenge central government housing and 
neighbourhood-regeneration policies. 
 
The TARA coalition called Unity had been opposed to any transfer or selling-off of 
council-owned housing and was formed because a group of TARAs (Unity claimed 
there had been twenty-eight in total) had felt START was simply helping the 
council to promote an unpopular proposal for LSVST. A number of influential 
activists had remained mistrustful of the council after Unity folded and felt it was 
overly involved in START business. Some TARAs had supported a fourth housing 
management option. This option would have allowed the council to retain 
ownership of its housing stock, while tenants would have set up their own 
negotiations with the council to decide what extra power or control they wanted 
over housing and neighbourhood matters in the area where they lived. However, 
tenants had failed to get this fourth option onto relevant council agendas for 
discussion. 
 
Some changes in government housing policy, like the introduction of the ALMO, 
also occurred partly in response to tenant opposition to stock transfer. However, 
there was no major shift in the direction of the central government housing policy 
about separating housing strategy and management functions at the local level. 
Moreover, there was the effect of the coercive central government pressure on 
councils to achieve national housing improvement objectives that shaped the 
council’s views on the future of council-owned housing. In turn, those views 
caused the council to introduce a TARA-recognition policy and increase its control 
over the funding of START and TARAs. 
 
 
  - 197 -  
The next sub-section examines Sheffield City Council’s implementation of its 
TARA-recognition policy, TARA opposition to it, and how it was impacting on 
TARA and council relations in 2002. The TARA-recognition policy was based on 
central government devised recognition criteria. The criteria covered constitutions, 
equal opportunities, elections, financial records, the conduct of meetings, 
membership and communications with tenants, and means of showing how 
objectives were being met. 
 
‘We cannot sit by and let things pass’ 
 
The actions of professionals or powerful individuals can create a normative force 
for change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This force comprises certain individuals 
attempting to gain control over and formalize relations between themselves and 
others, as well as organizations in a field. Powerful central government civil 
servants and council staff in Sheffield set out the different criteria that START and 
TARAs needed to meet to be officially recognised. To some extent, housing 
officers and others in local government with an interest in housing matters needed 
to redefine the conditions and methods of their work, and obtain control over 
TARA and council collaboration to retain their powerful position in a network of 
organizations and relations. 
 
Simon, the council’s head of housing (operations), suggested the council’s 
intention was to have a TARA-recognition policy that helped to ensure they were 
independent but also representative and democratic organizations: 
 
Although we [the council] want them [tenants and residents 
associations] to be independent and do their own things, we 
cannot sit by and let things pass […] we have a role as a 
regulator. 
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Activists in forty-nine TARAs (out of eighty-four in total) returned my questionnaire, 
which showed that thirty-eight of them had signed up to the council’s TARA-
recognition policy (see chapter 3, section 3.2). These TARAs had established 
organizational structures and procedures that complied with National Framework 
for the Participation Compact guidance. They were eligible to receive a share of 
council and tenants’ levy monies, and could take part in housing and compact 
discussions and decision-making processes. 
 
However, the actions of professionals and other powerful individuals can 
sometimes produce unintended or unanticipated outcomes. For example, in 
Sheffield the attitude of some council officers to the implementation of the council’s 
TARA-recognition policy caused it to become a de facto de-recognition policy. 
James Gorringe, a senior civil servant with responsibility for tenant participation 
policy, when he was interviewed, stressed, “There can be a downside where local 
authorities have adopted formal de-recognition policies […] when it comes to 
involving tenants and residents associations”. The Chief Executive of the Tenant 
Participation Advisory Service (TPAS) felt that it was councils that had not been 
overly concerned with the development and implementation of TARA-recognition 
policies that had done better when it came to creating a more transparent and 
trusting culture of collaboration.26 He said: 
 
Some local authorities, they have genuinely regarded the 
modernization programme as […] an opening-up process and 
have that culture and have been completely open […] They are 
the ones that have not got hung up on issues around recognition. 
 
                                                          
26
 Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS), a government funded but independent 
organization set up to advise and assist tenants’ organizations. 
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Robin, the housing officer at the Crystal Peaks Housing Office, suggested the 
TARA-recognition policy was a source of considerable tension between the council 
and TARAs. He said, “[It is] a big sticking point because you are expecting people 
to act almost like a company”. The recognition policy was a top-down council-
imposed set of rules and regulations that applied to all TARAs regardless of their 
particular characteristics and aspirations. Jonathon, the START board member 
who was the chair of Hackenthorpe TARA and had been a prominent member of 
Unity, suggested the development of the recognition policy could have been a 
more inclusive process and the START board management group had too much 
influence over decisions made on behalf of the wider tenants and residents 
movement:27 
 
It [the recognition policy] is something that was done by Sheffield 
Tenants and Residents Together and done by the management 
board, done by a couple of people within Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together. 
 
Sally, the acting chair of the Martin and Oxford Street Tower Blocks Tenants 
Association, in an answer to a questionnaire survey question said: 
 
My grievance is that it [the recognition policy] was agreed and 
accepted by Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together and the 
council. Not every tenants and residents association was a 
member [of Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] at the 
time so they were not fully consulted on the contents until a later 
date, too late to voice an opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 START Board management group, a sub-group of the full START board comprised of the chair 
and a few other board members. 
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Despite a majority of the questionnaire respondents indicating that their TARA had 
signed up to the council’s recognition policy, it seemed there were still a significant 
minority of TARAs that had not signed up to it. Rosalind, the leader of the council, 
recognized there was a problem concerning TARA opposition to the recognition 
policy. She said: 
 
Many tenants and residents associations are in breach of this 
[recognition] policy […]. The housing managers are going to have 
to consider how serious are we about this because if they are 
saying everybody has got to conform to this, there is going to be 
an awful lot of eggs broken on the omelette trail. 
 
Ultimately, the council feared the consequences of failing to deliver on the 
implementation of central government housing policy at the local level. The 
recognition policy sometimes threatened TARA autonomy because it forced them 
to operate in ways that were not always relevant or useful. The comments made 
by some activists suggest the council’s approach to TARA recognition and funding 
showed an inadequate understanding of TARA culture and values. Adrian, a 
member of the Hanover Tenants Association, said, “We are not happy with the 
council’s recognition policy; it shows a lack of understanding of how voluntary 
groups work”. The smaller or more informal TARAs, for example, risked being 
overwhelmed by some of the more onerous requirements of the TARA-recognition 
policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The New Labour government seemed to genuinely want to increase TARA and 
tenant involvement in housing and neighbourhood matters. The government’s new 
language of modernisation led to changed council structures, local politics, and 
new opportunities for TARA and council collaboration to improve neighbourhoods 
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and local services. However, this chapter has shown how START and TARAs in 
Sheffield were involved in collaboration that occurred within a particular type of 
national and local political environment in the 2000s. This environment had some 
adverse, as well as beneficial, impacts on TARA and council relations and 
collaboration. 
 
In Sheffield, in the summer of 2002, the Labour-controlled council had abandoned 
LSVST but still had to face the problem of what to do about sub-standard council-
owned housing. A long history of tenant mistrust of private landlords and, latterly, 
the council had exacerbated tenant concerns about the way that Unity had folded 
and the loss of the traditional housing committee. Some tenants, unhappy with the 
three central government approved options for the management of council-owned 
housing, had proposed a fourth option that was not taken seriously. The council 
discounted the fourth option and continued to focus on the work that needed to be 
done to ensure good housing management and estate services Best Value 
inspection outcomes. A TARA-recognition policy was introduced as a way to help 
the council build relations with START and TARAs, meet central government 
tenant participation objectives, and decide the future of council-owned housing. 
But aspects of the recognition policy (such as the amount of money that TARAs 
should keep in the bank) were perceived by activists to be about telling TARAs 
what to do. A significant number of TARAs had not signed up to the recognition 
policy and there was much conflict over the council’s control over tenants’ levy 
monies, and the way that the council had recognized and was funding START. At 
the same time, tension existed within START over its relations with council, TARA 
membership was falling, and the council was becoming concerned about how 
representative it was. 
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In Sheffield, there was evidence of the ‘organizational isomorphism’ described by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). It consists of a process whereby organizations in a 
field become more like each other as they change to ensure that they have the 
legitimacy that is needed to successfully obtain resources or support from other 
organizations on which they depend. START and TARAs were doing some similar 
things (signing up to the council’s TARA-recognition policy, for example) to obtain 
access to council-controlled resources. However, TARA and activist resistance 
was mounted against unpopular central government housing policies and the 
council’s TARA-recognition policy which had started to cause the breakdown of 
relations between START and some TARAs, and the council. 
 
The next chapter examines and analyses in more detail the development of 
START and council relations in Sheffield. Organizations and individuals are not 
able to interact in an environment of their own choosing (Selznick, 1948) and they 
need to create space for debate within the boundaries of acceptable behaviour set 
by the state and its institutions to avoid punitive sanctions and possible 
marginalisation (Bertilsson, 1984). Key points from this chapter will be developed 
in the next chapter to help explain how institutions have an independent influence 
on the political environment and collaborative activity at the local level. The key 
points are: 
 
• How central government activities helped to determine what umbrella and 
other tenant organizations would be able to get involved in collaboration in 
first place. 
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• What impact a dominant central government language of collaboration had 
on opportunities for START and TARA involvement in different types of 
collaboration at the local level. 
 
• What are the implications for TARA and council collaboration of TARA de-
recognition. 
 
The chapter will show how continuing conflict over the role of START, the funding 
of tenants and residents movement organizations, the TARA-recognition policy, 
and opportunities to be involved in different types of collaboration caused a spiral 
of deteriorating relations between START and some prominent TARAs and 
activists, and the council. Mistrust of the council was increasing amongst activists 
who were disadvantaged in collaboration that did not allow them to challenge 
effectively housing and tenant participation policies. Theory on collaboration and 
collaborative advantage is a source of useful ideas and concepts that help to 
explain how organizations’ different capacities and capabilities will impact on their 
ability to work together. However, institutional theory is used to show how 
institutions that shape the environment within which organizations are located, 
influence or determine the shape of collaboration at the local level. 
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CHRONOLOGY 
 
Date Event 
2002 
September 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
 
 
October 
 
 
 
December 
Sheffield City Council’s Best Value Review of Housing Management. The key 
findings of this review are published. The summary conclusion was that 
overall tenants were receiving a good service and that where improvements 
were needed then plans were in place to address them. 
 
However, there was still the problem of the fourth housing management 
option proposed by some TARAs and activists that would allow the council to 
retain ownership of its housing stock. Meanwhile, tenants would hold 
discussions with the council to decide what extra control they wanted over 
the management of their homes and the area in which they lived. 
 
START appointed Partners in Change to provide advice on the constitution, 
policies and procedures. 
 
The first chair of START says she felt let down by the Labour-controlled 
council and its decision not to ballot tenants to assess what level of support 
there was for LSVST. 
 
START holds its AGM and some TARA activists allege that there was an 
improper ballot held to elect a new chair. Some TARAs and activists feel the 
council has too much control over START and TARA affairs 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Empowerment or Incorporation? 
This chapter examines and analyses the development of relations between the 
Labour-controlled council in Sheffield, elected in May 2002, and START. It covers 
the period of time between the publication of the council’s Housing Management 
Best Value review findings in September 2002 and the START Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) held in December 2002. This AGM marked a turning point for 
START in its uneasy relations with the council. At the meeting, a group of 
influential activists commented on the role of START, its involvement in the 
implementation of national housing policies at the local level, and how they felt it 
had been incorporated into council systems at the expense of representing the 
views of all TARAs and tenants. An important issue was the extent to which 
START was engaged or enlisted as a participant in collaboration. A member of this 
group of dissatisfied activists was elected the new chair of START. 
 
The New Labour government’s housing, Best Value, and Tenant Participation 
Compact policies had impacted on Sheffield City Council and helped to shape its 
actions to make TARAs more ‘businesslike’ and formal. It is the impact of these 
actions on the development of START and council relations, and TARA and 
council collaboration that are described and explained in this chapter. The 
discussion focuses on the continuing effects of the council’s TARA-recognition 
policy, and control over tenants levy’ and other funds on activists’ feelings about 
collaboration. In particular, activists’ views on the propensity of collaboration to 
enable or constrain the development of opportunities for different types of 
collaborative activity and action at the local level. Central government and council 
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pressure on TARAs to participate in certain types of collaboration is contrasted 
with TARA resistance to such pressure. The aim is to examine the extent to which 
START and TARAs were either simply helping to implement national housing and 
tenant participation policies, or empowered and able to challenge those policies. 
 
Sheffield City Council’s vision statement, set out in its corporate plan for 2002–
2005, says there was a desire to “Work in active partnership with the community to 
regenerate Sheffield and improve the quality of life for all its residents” (Sheffield 
City Council 2002). The community included START and TARAs, but there was 
still a need to deal with the central government demand that the way that council-
owned housing was managed had to change. The council’s own Housing 
Management Best Value review findings were published in September 2002. The 
main conclusion was tenants were receiving a good service. However, tenants that 
had proposed a fourth housing management option for council-owned housing 
were disappointed when it seemed it was not seriously considered by the council. 
Some council officers felt it was not appropriate to discuss the proposal in detail at 
council-convened housing meetings because it was not a central government 
approved housing management option. 
 
Differences in the organizational cultures and values of the council and TARAs are 
also examined to see how they impacted on different people’s reactions to central 
government policies. More specifically, people’s views on housing, Best Value, 
and tenant participation policies and thoughts on the purpose of collaboration and 
what should be done to solve housing problems at the local level. In October 2002, 
the first chair of START told a Sheffield Star newspaper reporter that she felt let 
down by the Labour-controlled council and its decision not to ballot tenants to 
assess what level of support there was for the Large Scale Voluntary Stock 
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Transfer (LSVST) of all council-owned housing to and RSL in a single transaction. 
At the same time, a number of influential activists were concerned about council 
pressure on START and TARAs to organize and operate in certain ways, which 
they felt was causing a serious diminution of START and TARA autonomy (see 
chapter 1, section 1.1). 
 
At the START AGM, held in December 2002, some TARA activists alleged that an 
improper ballot had been held to elect a new chair. It was also suggested the 
Labour-controlled council did not want to intervene to sort out problems in START 
because such action might jeopardise its chances of obtaining favourable Audit 
Commission Housing Management and Estate Services Best Value Inspection 
outcomes.  In the process of examining and analysing interorganizational relations 
and collaboration it is possible to use theory on collaboration and collaborative 
advantage to elicit ideas and concepts that help to explain the process of 
collaboration at the organizational level. However, issues regarding theory on 
collaborative advantage and its ability to explain the impact of institutional activities 
and actions on the environment within which collaboration occurs, and 
collaboration itself are also explored. Some of the weaknesses in the capacity of 
theory on collaborative advantage to relate what occurs at the organizational level 
with events that occur at the institutional level are highlighted. 
 
The chapter starts with the argument over top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
TARA and tenant involvement in collaboration at the city and neighbourhood level. 
This is followed with an exposition of the way that a new council faced with old 
tenant and landlord tensions tried to reduce uncertainty by getting START and 
TARAs to sign up to the council’s TARA-recognition policy. Then the discussion 
shifts to consider the way that the new council and START were working together, 
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different types of collaboration, and the extent of TARA empowerment. 
 
6.1 ‘Just helping the government’ 
 
Caroline, the council’s tenant participation manager, recognized there was much 
tension in TARA and council relations in Sheffield. A good deal of this tension was 
caused by the council’s need to implement central government housing policies 
effectively at the local level, and address tenant concerns about the future of 
council-owned housing. She said: 
 
We have got pressures within the council to meet deadlines and 
get things done but there is also awareness among tenant 
participation workers that we have got a duty to the tenants as 
well. 
 
The reasons why different organizations might want to collaborate are varied (see 
chapter 2, section 2.1). They can include a desire to gain control over an 
environment, learn from each other, manage conflict over contentious issues, and 
develop innovative solutions to problems. However, Huxham and Vangen (2000b, 
p. 773) describe the “Difficulties in negotiating joint purpose […] [and] in managing 
the accountability of the collaborative venture to each of the partner 
organizations”. Negotiations to determine how TARA and council collaboration 
would help to implement central government housing policies at the local level and 
address tenants’ housing concerns and grievances was difficult when progress on 
setting up collaborations had to be made quickly. The modernization of local 
government under New Labour had been happening at a very quick rate with little 
time for reflection (Maddock, 2002). Councils were obliged to implement the 
modernization agenda effectively and with alacrity at the local level. However, 
councils also need to establish an open and transparent collaboration supported 
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by all of the relevant stakeholders to improve their chances of working well 
(Chrislip and Larson, 1994). Getting a collaboration up and running quickly and 
ensuring that it is open and transparent is likely to be difficult to achieve. Sheffield 
City Council took action, in response to central government pressure, to quickly 
set up and formalize TARA and council collaboration. However, the council’s 
actions sometimes made it more difficult to establish honest and inclusive 
relations with TARAs and activists. For example, problems arose concerning the 
council’s actions to implement its TARA-recognition policy (and the issue of de 
facto TARA de-recognition), inappropriate demands placed on TARAs based on a 
poor understanding of TARA culture and values, and the provision of some types 
of support for START that undermined its independence. 
 
Audit Commission Housing Management and Estate Services Best Value 
Inspectors considered how Sheffield City Council’s consultative structures and 
involvement processes were enabling tenants to influence decisions about 
priorities for action to maintain or improve an area. The council was seeking to 
obtain a minimum award of a two-star rating for its housing management and 
estate services. It was this level of award that the council needed to obtain to be 
eligible to receive a share of extra central government monies made available for 
housing repairs and modernization works, and submit an ALMO bid (see chapter 
1, section 1.1). 
 
In September 2002, the council published the findings of its own Best Value 
Review of its Housing Management Service. The main finding was that, overall, 
tenants were receiving a good service. However, the review did highlight the need 
for greater consistency in service delivery across specific functions, such as 
tenancy support, rehousing and homelessness, and asylum seekers. An 
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implementation plan to address the recommendations of the review was in place 
with an expected completion date of April 2003 (Sheffield City Council 2002c). 
 
However, there were prominent activists with negative views on the way that the 
council had recognised START, and the relations that existed between its first 
chair (who declined to be interviewed) and a Liberal-Democrat-controlled council. 
Danny, a START board member and secretary of Foxhill TARA, and Florence, a 
former START board member and chair of Longley Hall Farm TARA, respectively 
said: 
 
“[The] chair of Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together was far 
too damned close to the […] councillor who was the [Liberal 
Democrat] housing bod [representative].” 
 
“She [START’s chair] would agree […] things with the councillors 
and when we had our meetings at the Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together offices […] [the Liberal Democrat cabinet 
member for housing] […] was sat in that back office […]. We were 
having our meeting, of course it can be heard.” 
 
Such views continued to impact on the levels of trust that these and other 
prominent activists had in the new Labour-controlled council and its reasons for 
wanting to work with START and TARAs. Edmond, the vice chair of START, 
believed the Labour-controlled council, like the previous Liberal-Democrat-
controlled council wanted to work with a compliant START to obtain favourable 
housing services Best Value inspection outcomes. He said: 
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It is not the way that Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together 
wants to move. It is the way that the council wants Sheffield 
Tenants and Residents Together to move and Sheffield Tenants 
and Residents Together has been perceived to be a tool for the 
council not a tool for the [TARA] membership. 
 
The legacy of the past often plays a significant part in shaping people’s present 
concerns and desires (Smith, 1998). In chapter four (section 4.1), the history of 
tenants’ bad housing experiences and mistrust of their landlords was described. 
Tenants’ interpretations of contemporary events are often based on a knowledge 
of past events and their own housing experiences, and this will help to determine 
their views on housing issues. Sometimes TARA activists’ and council officers’ 
negative expectations about each other’s behaviour in collaboration impacted 
adversely on discussions and building trust in the collaborative process. In such 
circumstances, the way was left open for the onset of the collaborative inertia that 
Huxham and Vangen (2004, 2005) have described (see chapter 2, section 2.1). In 
such a situation the development of a collaborative venture is slower than might be 
expected and its productivity is severely reduced. 
 
The ambivalence that often surrounds the trust that exists between organizations 
and individuals in community-based partnerships and the community at large 
serves to reveal the difficulties involved in the development of social capital in 
such circumstances (Purdue, 2001). Social capital comprises mutual 
understanding of each other’s cultures and values, and respect for each other’s 
views and different ways of working. Furthermore, social capital is about using this 
understanding and respect to increase civic engagement and the vitality of a 
community, where shared interests and objectives lead to collective action to 
tackle complex problems (Putnam, 1993). Unfortunately, some of the actions that 
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Sheffield City Council took to try to solve the city’s housing problems, in response 
to central government pressure, damaged its chances of building up stocks of 
social capital based on stakeholders’ understanding each other better through 
collaboration. 
 
The next sub-section shows how the new Labour-controlled council, like the 
previous Liberal-Democrat-controlled council in Sheffield, needed to focus on 
implementing central government housing policies at the local level. A tendency 
towards top-down-imposed central government demands on the council to 
improve its housing stock sometimes turned into top-down-imposed council 
demands on TARAs and tenants to co-operate to implement national housing 
policies at the local level. 
 
‘Top-down made to look bottom-up’ 
 
The first chair of START felt let down by the Labour-controlled council and its 
decision, in October 2002, not to ballot tenants to assess what level of support 
there was for LSVST. On 31 October 2002 she told a Sheffield Star newspaper 
reporter: 
 
We are totally confused. We do not know what the options are 
now for the future of council housing across Sheffield. The 
council needs to get its plans together and stick to them. Tenants 
feel they are in mid air. We are concerned for tenants and what 
they are going through. This confusion will not help them. 
 
New Labour government ministers had reached an agreement with the Labour-
controlled council in Sheffield to shelve plans for LSVST. But the council still 
needed to find a way to solve the city’s housing problems and activists remained 
concerned about TARA autonomy and integrity under any new housing 
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managemnent arrangements that might emerge (see Figure 15). 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The external pressures affecting the council 
 
Much of the central government literature on tenant participation promotes a 
consensual approach to collaboration that focuses on improving neighbourhoods 
and local services (see chapter 1, section 1.1). For example, under the Best Value 
regime, councils are obliged to work with different stakeholders to decide shared 
plans for the provision of local services, and the Tenant Participation Compact is 
supposed to include a strong focus on councils and tenants working together to 
achieve mutually desired neighbourhood-improvement objectives (DETR, 1999). 
In Sheffield, START and TARAs needed to sign up to the council’s TARA-
recognition policy, and become involved in Best Value review work and the 
compilation of compacts. They needed to do these things to obtain the 
organizational legitimacy, in the eyes of the council, that they needed to obtain 
access to council-controlled funds, including tenants’ levy monies (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: The external pressures affecting TARAs 
 
However, START and TARAs were themselves under pressure coming from 
tenants concerned about what was going to happen to council-owned housing. 
There were activists who felt unhappy about the way that council consultations 
were being undertaken to obtain tenant views on housing policy. They believed 
consultations were often superficial and designed to satisfy central government 
and its Best Value inspectors. Unfortunately, activists’ and tenants’ past 
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The government said that it wanted to devolve democracy to its 
lowest practicable level. What has actually happened in Sheffield 
is that we have seen top-down imposition […] consultation, 
therefore, has been a total sham. It has not been meaningful. 
 
The overarching political context within which TARA and council collaboration was 
located was influencing or determining which tenant views and opinions were 
perceived to be more valid or acceptable to central government than others at the 
local level. For example, Paul, START board member and chair of the North 
Sheffield Action Group, viewed the process of producing tenant participation 
compacts to be about conforming to a central government approved template for 
council and TARA collaboration. He said: 
 
The government always trumpets, and the council, [that] it is all 
bottom-up this process [the compilation of compacts]. Not in any 
way whatsoever is it bottom-up, it is top-down made to look like 
bottom-up. 
 
It is not easy to ascertain the precise extent to which tenant benefit was a principal 
objective or a corollary of collaboration. From a council perspective, collaboration 
that produced useful housing and neighbourhood improvement outcomes was 
desirable. This could be the instrumental type of collaboration that Huxham (2000) 
says involves achieving some practical output or outcome (see chapter 2, section 
2.1). For example, the collaboration that involves the production of a joint strategy 
or plan; more specific policy objectives in areas like crime reduction, education, 
and health; or the completion of a particular project to provide a facility or service. 
Theory on collaboration also shows how organizations can work together to 
achieve organizational objectives in uncertain environments (Gray and Wood, 
1991; Huxham, 1996). They can combine knowledge, skills, and resources to deal 
more effectively with shared problems and decide on shared goals. Sheffield City 
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Council and START were involved in collaboration, in part, to introduce order into a 
fragmented housing services marketplace, and debates about the future 
management and maintenance of council-owned housing. 
 
START benefited from the provision of council-owned office space at a low rent, 
approximately £100,000 of council funding each year, and ongoing support from a 
tenant participation officer, seconded to work with the organization. The council, 
unsurprisingly, expected START to contribute to the achievement of housing and 
local service improvement objectives that matched with central government plans 
for neighbourhoods. Caroline, the council’s tenant participation manager, says: 
 
I am sure […] we [the council] are guilty of putting pressure on 
them, Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together. We fund 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together […] and support them 
and in return […] we do expect them to deliver on a number of 
areas, particularly, areas that are important to government. 
 
However, START’s dependence on the council for office space and funds meant 
its autonomy was quite severely curtailed. Consequently, the extent to which it 
was possible for START to obtain the trust of TARAs and tenants wary of the 
council was less certain than it might have been. 
 
Theory on collaborative advantage does not provide a well developed explanation 
of the role of powerful institutions in influencing or determining what collaboration 
between organizations consists of at the local level. The way that the wider 
institutional environment, that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) elaborated on, can 
have a profound impact on organizations in a field and their relations with other 
organizations on whom they depend (see chapter 2, section 2.2). Sometimes an 
institutional environment can cause a process of homogenization or isomorphism 
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so that, “Organizational characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing 
compatability with environmental characteristics” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 
149). The achievement of collaborative advantage depends on organizations 
achieving things through collective-working that no single organization could have 
achieved working on their own (Huxham, 1993b; Lasker et al., 2001). However, it 
is how powerful institutions are involved in shaping the overarching environment 
within which the strategic purpose of collaboration is decided and collaborative 
advantage is defined that needs to be better emphasised. Much of what Sheffield 
City Counicl and START were trying to achieve through collaboration seemed to 
be the product of top-down central government imposed demands on them to 
achieve national housing and neighbourhood improvement objectives through 
mandated forms of collaboration. 
 
Having appropriate collaborative structures and processes (Huxham, 1993c) and 
organizations becoming engaged, learning about each other, and finding out how 
to collaborate (Kanter, 1994) are important if collaboration is to be successful. In 
Sheffield, some robust collaborative structures were in place, and START and 
TARAs were involved in much collaborative activity. However, broad-based 
involvement, a credible and open collaborative process, and building trust are also 
important conditions for successful collaboration (Chrislip and Larson, 1994). 
However, much disagrement existed between the council and activists over the 
purpose of collaboration and how it should be managed. Some prominent activists 
felt START was simply involved in responding to central government and council 
concerns about housing and neighbourhoods, rather than tenant concerns about 
housing and neighbourhoods. START was involved in much collaborative working, 
but central government prescribed organization and collaboration standards, the 
loss of the traditional housing committee, and fewer campaigning opportunities all 
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reduced the possibilities for the development of a genuinely bottom-up approach 
to policy formulation and problem-solving. 
 
The next sub-section shows how the election of a Labour-controlled council in 
Sheffield did not reduce activist concerns about the purpose and management of 
collaboration. 
 
A new council and old tensions 
 
Sheffield’s Labour-controlled council had abandoned Liberal Democrat plans for 
LSVST. However, START remained heavily involved in a range of council-
convened housing consultations and working groups. For example, tenants’ 
representatives from across the city continued to attend monthly meetings of the 
council convened Citywide Forum to obtain councillor and council officer feedback 
on housing and neighbourhood matters. Tenants’ representatives also continued 
to attend Area Housing Meetings where some were nominated to attend meetings 
of the council’s Housing Consultative Group, which was tasked with monitoring the 
performance of housing services across the city. The chairperson at these 
consultative group meetings was a TARA representative (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Council and START relations and involvement on different bodies 
(simplified) 
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Neighbourhood Planning Frameworks that set out actions to be undertaken to 
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Partnership (LSP) initiative collaborations, as well as the council’s Best Value 
Review Working Group, Future of Council Housing Group, Anti-Social Behaviour 
Working Group, Black and Minority Ethnic Consultative Group, and Housing 
Disability Consultative Group (Sheffield City Council 2003). 
 
What was unclear was the extent to which START and TARA campaigning values 
and political activities fitted with new central government approved types of 
collaboration. When the housing and tenant participation consultants Partners in 
Change reviewed the state of the tenants and residents movement in Sheffield in 
1999, they found that thirty-one of the fifty-
seven TARAs they contacted said they were 
campaigning organizations. They considered 
themselves to be organizations that were 
involved in activities like raising petitions or 
lobbying the council on different 
neighbourhood-based issues.28 For example, a 
number of TARAs were involved in a national 
lobby of Parliament against the privatization of 
council-owned housing in December 2002. It 
was uncertain where this type of tenant action 
fitted in a decision-making arena where the focus was on implementing national 
housing policies effectively at the local level. There seemed to be less space for 
campaigning activity in the new consultative and collaborative arrangements set 
up to improve neighbourhoods and decide the future of council-owned housing. A 
number of high-profile TARAs and activists were taking action to protest against 
                                                          
28
 The housing and tenant participation consultants called Partners in Change were contracted by 
the council in conjunction with START to review the tenants and residents movement in Sheffield (a 
report was published in 1999). 
Picture 5: Tenants’ lobbying 
Parliament (Photo: R. Dalziel) 
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central government housing policies outside of official council-convened 
consultations. Robin, the housing officer interviewed at the council’s Crystal Peaks 
Housing Office said: 
 
There is nervousness […] a lot of people feel that they have been 
used. This is going to take a long time to dispel […] there is still 
this idea of, well, we can comply with the government by wheeling 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together out. 
 
What seemed at times to be a rather dogmatic council approach to the 
implementation of its TARA-recognition policy was also not helping to engender 
trust among TARAs and activists. The recognition policy continued to be perceived 
by many TARAs and activists to be a top-down council-imposed initiative that was 
insensitive to TARA culture and ways of working. Caroline, the council’s tenant 
participation manager, was concerned about TARAs that could not meet the 
recognition criteria, but were doing good work in their respective areas: 
 
We get the feeling that there is going to be an awful lot [of tenants 
and residents associations] that are just not going to comply [with 
the recognition policy] […] But if you look at what they are doing 
in the community […] they are doing a really good job. 
 
There was a danger that in some instances the council’s TARA-recognition policy 
would become a de facto de-recognition policy if TARAs that would not or could not 
sign up to it found they were denied access to important council-controlled 
resources. In addition, some potentially very vibrant and innovative TARAs might 
be denied access to council-convened housing and neighbourhood consultations 
and collaboration. James Gorringe a senior civil servant, with responsibility for 
tenant participation policy, stressed: 
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There can be a downside where local authorities have adopted 
what are in effect formal de-recognition policies […] when it 
comes to involving tenants and residents associations. 
 
Philip, the housing officer responsible for tenant liaison at the council’s Southey 
Green Area Housing Office, said: 
 
If, at the end of the day, a tenants and residents association is not 
doing anything with regards to the […] recognition policy then the 
council can take the drastic step of withdrawing funding. So we 
will not actually give them anything and they would have to go it 
alone […]. We would not recognize them; they could not come to 
any council meetings that we hold. 
 
However, the Chief Executive of the Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS) 
said: 
 
Some local authorities, they have genuinely regarded the 
modernization programme as […] an opening-up process and 
have that culture and have been completely open […] They are 
the ones that have not got hung up on issues around recognition. 
29
 
 
The link between central government pressure on Sheffield City Council, the 
council’s TARA-recognition policy, and what it was that TARAs needed to do to 
obtain access to council-controlled funds is important. It seemed the form that the 
link between these different phenomena and matters took would have long-term 
repercussions for the development of TARA and council relations and 
collaboration in the city. 
 
                                                          
29
 In its literature the Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS) is described as a central 
government funded but independent organization set up to advise and assist tenants’ 
organizations. 
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Social movement organizations can be a metaphor for strategic actors operating in 
institutional fields (Hensmans, 2003), i.e., organizations and individuals that are 
able to influence and change the shape of institutional structures and ways of 
working. Different types of more open or closed political opportunity structures will 
help to create the opportunities or conditions that encourage organizations and 
individuals to become involved in consultations and collaboration, or more radical 
action that leads to changed policies or ways of working. However, in some 
circumstances, organizational change is a direct response to government mandate 
and even where the change appears superficial it may still alter power relations 
within and between organizations in significant ways (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Central government can, through legislation, alter national and local political 
opportunity structures through the mandated activities that organizations and 
individuals are involved in. Sometimes, changed political opportunity structures will 
limit the possibilities for strategic action at the local level (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 
1995), including the instrumental and ideological collaboration that Vangen and 
Huxham (2006) have described. The Best Value regime and the Tenant 
Participation Compact created new opportunities for TARA and council 
collaboration. They also established a series of new performance parameters 
linked to central government housing and neighbourhood improvement policy 
objectives. 
 
Theory on collaboration does describe how collaborative alliances can help 
organizations to cope with the turbulence and complexity of an environment (Gray 
and Wood, 1991). It shows how stakeholders who view a problem in different ways 
can explore similarities and differences in their thinking to find solutions that go 
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible. Yet again theory on 
collaboration and collaborative advantage does not provide an adequate analysis 
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of the institutional environment within which collaboration is located. In particular, 
the way that the institutional environment impacts on the distribution of power and 
resources among organizations, the type and purpose of collaborations that 
emerge at the local level, and how organizations and individuals are then able to 
influence the thinking and actions of institutions. 
 
The next sub-section focuses on the extent to which START and TARAs were 
expected to fit with council systems and bureaucratic ways of working. It provides 
insights on a complex ‘game’ of TARA and council collaboration. 
 
6.2 ‘Everything is easier if organizations all do the same thing’ 
 
Robert, a housing manager for the Manor, Castle and Woodthorpe areas in 
Sheffield, stressed START had a role in helping TARAs to understand their 
responsibilities as organizations. More specifically, the council expected START to 
be involved in persuading TARAs to sign up to the council’s TARA-recognition 
policy: 
 
I saw Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together as the ideal 
vehicle to support tenants and residents associations who were 
struggling in terms of the recognition policy, understanding the 
role, and understanding some of the responsibilities that go with 
being a tenants and residents association. 
 
But some TARAs and activists perceived START to be promoting a top-down 
council-imposed TARA-recognition policy. START was supporting a recognition 
policy that meant the council was able to interfere in TARA affairs and take control 
of TARA finances. William, START board member and chair of Westfield TARA, 
felt the council’s housing manager (operations) was committed to START, but 
wanted it to operate in ways that were acceptable to him. 
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I believe [the housing manager (operations)] is genuinely 
committed to having Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together, I 
really do […]. Well, I also think that he wants it to be in his image. 
He wants it to be the way that he envisaged it and that is not quite 
the way that we [activists] envisaged it. 
 
The council’s TARA-recognition policy sought, to some extent, to regularize TARA 
activities, and TARA and council collaboration. However, the policy sometimes 
seemed to attempt to achieve these objectives at the expense of gaining an in-
depth understanding of TARA culture and values. At the same time, some 
reduction in the levels of difference and diversity that existed amongst TARAs 
might have meant there was a reduced likelihood of unique TARA contributions 
being made to collaboration. In addition, there may have been a diminution in 
TARA capacity to think about housing and neighbourhood problems in genuinely 
different ways. Frank, the former member of Halfway TARA, says: 
 
Everything that they [the council] want to do, it is much simpler if 
you have got twenty different organizations, and you want them to 
do something, it is a lot easier for you, a lot less of a task, if you 
get them all to do the same thing […]. If you can get them to do 
that, you are fulfilling the government’s objectives and you are still 
in control. 
 
Often tenants are mustered and used to help implement central government’s 
housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies (Whittle, 2001). There are more 
tenant representatives on regeneration boards and committees, TMOs, and 
ALMOs than there used to be. However, the influence that these tenant 
representatives have over the development of housing strategy and the main thrust 
of housing policy remains unclear. In Sheffield, much tension and conflict existed 
between the council and a group of high-profile TARAs and activists that felt the 
council was attempting to incorporate START and TARAs into council systems and 
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ways of working. Indeed, it sometimes seemed the council predominantly wanted 
TARAs to understand what sorts of behaviour and activities central government 
and the council viewed as acceptable or unacceptable. However, where the 
“[s]ubstance of participation is dominated by bureaucratic rules and procedures, 
the sense that these are locations in which social change can be achieved may be 
lost” (Barnes et al., 2005, p. 4). It is likely the chances of building trust and genuine 
community-based collaborations will be reduced if a council is overly concerned 
about implementing national policies at the local level, and spends too much time 
on getting TARAs to operate in certain ways rather than getting to know them 
better. 
 
Drawing on Huxham’s (1996) work on collaboration, there seemed to be many 
more opportunities for instrumental rather than ideological collaboration (see 
chapter 2, section 2.1). Much opportunity existed for stakeholder involvement in 
instrumental collaboration that comprised striving to achieve some practical 
outcome with less opportunity for involvement in ideological collaboration that 
comprised challenging established policies or ways of working. The tension that 
exists between trust relations based on voluntarism, and linked to shared values 
and relations of confidence mediated by institutional and contractual forms 
(Tonkiss and Passey, 1999) is problematic. Some TARAs and activists in Sheffield 
seemed to be disadvantaged in collaboration that was based on signing up to a 
formal recognition policy, at the expense of different stakeholders getting to know 
each other and building trusting relations. In addition, some TARAs and high 
profile activists seemed to be disadvantaged in situations where collaboration did 
not provide adequate opportunities for them to campaign on housing issues and 
engage more in conflictual debate and deliberations. 
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The intention is to explore the extent to which START and TARAs were being 
enrolled into various council projects or empowered in ways that meant they were 
able to develop their own ideas on housing and neighbourhood management. 
There may not have been any grand central government plan to undermine the 
tenants’ movement, but there was a messy situation in which organizations with 
very different cultures and values were collaborating and trying to achieve 
organizational and collaborative objectives. 
 
Sheffield City Council is the more powerful stakeholder in TARA and council 
collaboration. Simon, the council’s head of housing (operations), felt the council’s 
relationship with the tenants movement was like “The relationship between parents 
and their adolescent children”. The same council officer, when he was talking 
about START and its board, proclaimed: 
 
In their own groups they [board members] are adopting one set of 
behaviours [then] they are expected to come to board meetings 
and pitch all their skills and experience and the rest of it onto the 
table and start collaborating and co-operating and those are not 
characteristics that they, most of them, would use in their own 
communities. 
 
Much of what is considered acceptable or unacceptable behaviour by 
organizations and individuals is institutionalised in society. Behaviour that does not 
fit with prevailing rules, customs, and sensitivities is likely to be viewed as 
dysfunctional or even dangerous. Sometimes, TARAs and activists will behave 
outrageously, but a lack of knowledge of TARA culture and activist ways of 
working was sometimes causing behaviour to be misinterpreted or misconstrued. 
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For example, at one START board meeting a board member got up from his chair, 
after a period of heated deliberations, and announced that he was resigning his 
position before leaving the meeting. Council officers, who were present at the 
meeting, insisted on the holding of elections to fill a supposedly vacant position on 
the board. However, the person who had appeared to resign from his position on 
the board subsequently met up with his fellow board members at a local pub and 
resolved his differences with them over a drink. Nevertheless, the council officers 
insisted on elections going ahead, to the annoyance of START board members 
who implied this sort of member behaviour at meetings was not uncommon and 
usually signalled a period of temporary frustration with the conduct of board 
business.30 
 
William, START board member and chair of Westfield TARA, felt that it was not 
simply the case that an overbearing council was causing problems in TARA and 
council relations and collaboration. Rather, the council, or parts of it, had not 
managed to make a complete break with the past and more traditional ways of 
working with TARAs and tenants: 
 
I don’t think there is any malice here […] [the council] have not 
grown out of [being] the paternalistic local authority of bygone 
years and […] they genuinely think that what they are doing is the 
best way forward. 
 
Other activists, including Paul, START board member and chair of the North 
Sheffield Action Group, and Lorraine, a member of Greenhill Bradway Tenants 
and Community Association, were not so benevolent towards the council.31 They 
                                                          
30
 This illustration of START and council relations is based on the observation of START board 
member and council officer behaviour at a START board meeting held in Sheffield city hall, which 
was recorded in my fieldwork journal. 
31
 Lorraine was a questionnaire survey respondent 
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suggested the council was using collaboration to manipulate START and TARAs, 
and said respectively: 
 
“They [the council] definitely do not want to give anyone a say, 
not even the tenants associations and not even Sheffield Tenants 
and Residents Together for that matter […]. They are going to 
push […] government policies through no matter what.” 
 
“This council does not understand partnership only control. We 
[TARA representatives] have yet to go to a meeting where the 
outcome has not already been decided in keeping with some 
bigger plan that we do not get to know about until it is too late.” 
 
It is possible to focus on the way that the different organizational cultures and 
languages of the stakeholders involved in collaboration can affect the sustainability 
of collaboration, and its outputs or outcomes (Barr and Huxham, 1996). What is 
missing from this type of analysis of the performance of collaboration is an in-
depth examination of the role of institutional power and influence in shaping or 
determining a dominant language of collaboration which helps to define what 
organizations that want to collaborate should look like. START and TARA actions 
were sometimes misunderstood and even labelled mischievous or rebellious 
because a dominant central government language of collaboration tended to value 
a consensus-seeking approach at the expense of recognising and dealing with 
conflict in collaboration. James Gorringe, the senior civil servant interviewed, who 
had responsibility for the development of tenant participation policies, said: 
 
Local authorities must think about how they plan for [the] delivery 
[of services] whilst tackling the tension created when 
organizations with different cultural bases are trying to work 
together. Sometimes they may be working in different directions 
on issues. 
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For example, Diamond (2002) has suggested it is important the language of 
collaboration is able to change to ensure professionals do not dominate in 
collaborative ventures involving voluntary and community-based organizations. 
Frequently, voluntary and community-based organizations need to have an in-
depth understanding of the different organizations and professionals that they 
depend on for support and often their survival. These organizations and 
professionals do not need to ensure that they devote the same amount of time to 
understanding the voluntary and community-based organizations that they work 
with and support. In Sheffield, there were instances where a traditional and 
somewhat aloof language of collaboration associated with an old style of 
professional housing officer, sometimes counteracted the actions of tenant 
participation officers working hard to improve council knowledge and 
understanding of TARA culture and values. The council’s tenant participation 
officers also wanted to change TARA and council relations so that the council had 
more understanding of TARA procedures and ways of working, rather than TARAs 
having to spend more and more time getting to know and understand council 
procedures and ways of working. 
 
The next sub-section considers the extent to which START was able to get 
different TARA and tenant housing concerns and grievances onto relevant council 
agendas. 
 
Was START a pragmatic or incorporated collaborator? 
 
Robin, the senior housing officer at the Crystal Peaks Housing Office, suggested 
that there had been longer term effects on collaboration.  These effects were 
associated with the relations that some Liberal Democrat councillors had with 
some START board members. He said: 
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[There were] tenants representatives whose vanity was appealed 
to and they felt that they were in positions of some power […]. 
[The] Liberals […] a lot of them pampered some of those people 
on the Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together Board. 
 
Stewart, START board member and Gleadless Valley TARA member, said, 
“Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together, they just rubber stamped it, whatever 
the council put up they just rubber stamped it”. Other activists, including Danny, 
START board member and secretary of Foxhill TARA, and Stewart, at Gleadless 
Valley, had been mistrustful of START and its relations with the council from the 
outset. They said respectively: 
 
“[There] was a General Meeting […] [a] motion from the floor that 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together will oppose stock 
transfer, which was carried unanimously or if not unanimously at 
least nem con […]. At some stage just after that the chair, being 
interviewed on television, said, Sheffield Tenants and Residents 
Together, its position on this is neutral. Now we kicked up hell 
about that but nothing whatsoever was ever done.” 
 
“The biggest part of the public was against stock transfer but 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together [[…] were not even 
bothered about it […]. They represented 63,000 tenants in 
Sheffield and they […] never fought against it.” 
 
These activists’ memories of START and its early relations with the council were 
still relatively fresh, and were helping to shape their contemporary views on the role 
of START and the purpose of TARA and council collaboration. All of these activists 
felt START remained too dependent on the council and was not able to represent 
all TARAs and tenants. Paul, START board member and chair of the North 
Sheffield Action Group, William, START board member and chair of Westfield 
TARA, and Michael, START board member and Greenhill Bradway Tenants and 
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Community Association member, respectively said: 
 
“I know for a certain fact it is not Sheffield Tenants and Residents 
Together policy that is spread to the tenants and residents 
associations, it is Sheffield City Council’s policy.” 
 
“[There is a] perception that […] Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together […] [is] a council organ and whether the 
reality is that […] or not, the perception is that.” 
 
“Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together itself has never been 
allowed to develop or make a difference and has always 
remained within council control.” 
 
Different organizing strategies will vary in their effectiveness depending on how 
prevailing political opportunity structures either facilitate or hamper access to 
politicians and political systems (Stevenson and Greenberg, 2000). On the one 
hand, it will sometimes be expedient to approach politicians directly on issues. On 
the other hand, it will sometimes be worthwhile making contact with other 
organizations and individuals that are sympathetic to your cause, to seek their 
support in lobbying politicians on issues. START’s pragmatic approach and 
willingness to consider the possible benefits of different housing managenent 
options had, for a long time, helped it to maintain reasonably cordial relations with 
both Liberal-Democrat and Labour-controlled administrations in Sheffield. START 
was able to gain council recognition, get access to council-controlled resources, 
and participate in various housing and neighbourhood consultations and decision-
making processes. However, the organizational autonomy that START lost 
reduced its capacity to represent all tenants and campaign on some housing 
issues. Paul, a START board member said “Sheffield Tenants and Residents 
Together, or whatever they want to call it, has got to be absolutely independent of 
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the council”. 
 
At the START AGM held in December 2002, a group of activists aligned with Jean 
the organization’s first chair alleged that an improper ballot had been held to elect a 
new chair. Jonathon, the new chair, was a START board member who had been 
involved in the setting up of Unity. He had the support of other START board 
members and activists who were unhappy with the way that the organization’s first 
chair was working with the council and felt that the council had too much control 
over START affairs. 
 
Huxham and Vangen (2000b) point out that stakeholder perceptions of each 
other’s role and position in a collaboration can vary in significant ways. In the US, 
Bockmeyer (2000) examined the US Empowerment Zone initiative, set up to 
regenerate disadvantaged inner-city areas. She found evidence of a culture of 
mistrust between City Hall and the community, which caused problems for 
collaborative working. In Sheffield, considerable mistrust existed between a group 
of prominent TARAs and activists and the council (or at least some important parts 
of the council). This mistrust was caused by a combination of historical 
disappointments with housing consultations, disquiet over the circumstances 
surrounding the demise of Unity, and concerns about the way that START had 
emerged and then built relations with the council. In turn, TARA and activist 
mistrust of the council increased as a result of council actions taken to set up 
TARA and council collaboration that would satisfy central government demands for 
neighbourhood regeneration. The council’s involvement in the emergence and 
development of START, its somewhat inflexible TARA-recognition policy, and the 
extent of its control over the collection and distribution of tenants’ levy monies to 
TARAs were also controversial. 
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It seems there were sometimes somewhat fumbled central government attempts to 
empower TARAs that were interpreted in quite prescriptive and controlling ways by 
the council at the local level. 
 
The council’s role in TARA and council collaboration is complicated because it sits 
between central government and TARAs. It has to deal with top-down pressure 
coming from central government to implement national housing and tenant 
participation policies, and bottom-up pressure coming from TARAs and tenants to 
deal with their housing concerns and grievances. Some of Sheffield’s activists had 
become disillusioned with collaboration. They felt they did not have enough power 
to determine their own vision for the future management of council-owned housing. 
 
There were instances where there was insufficient freedom of choice for tenants at 
the local level to permit the development of genuine neighbourhood-based 
solutions to housing problems. For example, tenants’ ability to decide their own 
vision for housing management in the future was constrained by the existence of 
only three central government approved housing management options. The 
housing and tenant participation specialist interviewed, employed by the 
consultancy called Partners in Change and working with tenants in Sheffield, said: 
 
The challenge, […] if this [New Labour] government is sincere, 
[…] is to actually [create] […] a process that takes local people 
from a point of perhaps having little influence and power to shape 
decision-making, to being the lead in decision-making. 
 
The council wanted to involve more tenants and residents in housing and 
neighbourhood improvement consultations and decision-making processes. Their 
backing for action to solve the city’s housing problems was needed. Meanwhile, 
much bottom-up TARA and tenant pressure was put on the council to protect 
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tenants’ rights and the future of council-owned housing. However, ultimately, there 
was no existing organization with sufficient power to challenge the roles and 
policies of central government and the council on behalf of tenants. The council 
was the dominant and most powerful stakeholder in TARA and council 
collaboration. Marjorie, a Labour councillor and cabinet advisor on 
neighbourhoods, said: 
 
The [Labour] group […] they have already gone to policy 
meetings, we have already had group debates on it [the policy] 
[…] we have already had officer discussions. So, we have 
already gone through a process where we feel that there may be 
some things that we have to do that we don’t like but that is the 
way that we have to go. Now we have to implement it [the policy] 
and how we tweak it […] that is where they [tenants and 
residents associations] play a major role. 
 
The implication is that TARAs and tenants are involved in consultations and 
decision-making that can result in some change in the way the housing and 
neighbourhood policies of central government or the council are implemented. 
However, TARAs and tenants have limited power or influence over the formulation 
of those housing and neighbourhood policies. This helps to explain why it was 
difficult for Sheffield’s TARAs and activists to get their own ideas about the future 
management of council-owned housing onto relevant council agendas. Simon, the 
council’s head of housing (operations), says: 
 
From my point of view, sitting in a lot of meetings that claim to be 
partnerships, you find […] the biggest organization, the lead 
organization, or the council in most cases dominates […]. It 
contributes this idea […] you have already made your mind up 
anyway so what is the point […]. Is it really […] about asking them 
[tenants] what do you think or is it just really about telling them 
what we [the council] think. 
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TARA and activist expectations in Sheffield were raised regarding what it was 
possible to achieve through collaboration with the council. Sometimes, these 
expectations were dashed because there was insufficient honesty about the 
purpose and aims of the collaboration. The Labour leader of the council said: 
 
In an effort to be democratic we are actually fudging things and 
making it more difficult for people and we all do it. We all say 
tenants’ choice but when you are honest the choice is a bit 
limited. 
 
Perhaps the council could have done more to tell TARAs about central government 
housing policy and the constraints it imposed on the possibilities for local action to 
protect council-owned housing. However, it could also have recognised the high 
levels of tenant support for the fourth housing management optIon, proposed by 
some TARAs and activists. The council could have lobbied central government 
more intensively on behalf of tenants to try to obtain approval for greater flexibility 
in interpreting and implementing national housing policies at the local level. 
 
In May 2002, when Labour took back control of Sheffield City council from the 
Liberal Democrats, plans for LSVST were dropped, but the council still had to find a 
solution to the city’s housing problems that was acceptable to central government. 
The council tended to promote instrumental collaboration to implement national 
housing policies at the expense of ensuring there were adequate opportunities for 
tenants to challenge these policies and generate genuine bottom-up solutions to 
housing problems. There were also some significant and unexpected council and 
TARA reactions to central government housing, Best Value and tenant participation 
policies that impacted adversely on TARA and council collaboration. For example, 
the council’s response to the dilemma of having to deal with conflicting top-down 
central government and bottom-up tenant demands for action to solve housing 
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problems was an attempt to create more orderly relations with START and TARAs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
However, some of the council’s actions to produce more orderly relations with 
START and TARAs increased tenant and activist mistrust of the council’s interest 
in collaboration. A history of often conflictual and mistrustful tenant and landlord 
relations combined with large differences in power between the council and TARAs 
strengthened a TARA resolve to avoid being directed or controlled by the council. 
Most TARAs wanted to protect their organizational autonomy and freedom to 
campaign on housing issues in their own way. The way that START had been 
recognized by the council as the umbrella organization representing a majority of 
the city’s TARAs, perceived by some activists as unfair, and the organization’s 
continuing dependence on the council for funds and office space remained 
problematic. A group of activists that included individuals who had been aligned 
with the TARA coalition called Unity were aggrieved at the way that it had 
collapsed.  These activists felt that the council continued to manipulate START to 
obtain its support for unpopular housing policies that would lead to the privatisation 
of council-owned housing. 
 
The way that the council was implementing its TARA-recognition policy risked 
turning it into a de facto de-recognition policy if TARAs that could not or would not 
sign up to it were marginalised and denied access to council-controlled resources, 
and council-convened housing and neighbourhood consultations. TARAs and 
activists were often mistrustful of the council’s reasons for enforcing the recognition 
policy because they felt that it was enabling the council to unnecessarily interfere in 
TARA affairs. In addition, the council’s control over tenants’ levy monies remained 
controversial because TARAs felt these monies rightfully belonged to them and 
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they should not have to meet council criteria to be eligible for a share of the monies 
collected. 
 
There was not much space or opportunity for TARAs and activists to effectively 
challenge national housing and neighbourhood regeneration policy. Instead 
tenants were expected to reach agreement on which central government approved 
housing management option for council-owned housing they preferred. There was 
no evidence that a fourth housing management option, proposed by some TARAs 
and activists, had been considered in any detail by the council. A spiral of 
increasing mistrust and worsening relations was developing between the council 
and a group of TARAs and START board members striving to ensure START 
gained some extra autonomy from the council and was able to represent all 
tenants. 
 
Chapter seven will examine and analyse the developing spiral of increasing 
mistrust and worsening relations between the council and some activists. The aim 
is to show how the mutual mistrust of each other’s roles and views, together with a 
changing central government policy environment and altered political opportunity 
structures, assisted in the development of a crisis in START and council relations 
that culminated in the council withdrawing funding for START. 
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CHRONOLOGY 
 
Date Event 
 
2003 
January 
 
 
 
February 
 
 
 
 
 
March 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 
 
 
May to July 
 
September 
 
START GM called to consider Memoranda and Articles of Association drafted 
by Partners in Change with the board, which were not adopted. 
 
Sheffield City Council decides to stop funding START. 
 
Sheffield City Council begins an investigation following allegations that funds 
have been improperly spent. 
 
Sheffield City Council sets up ten Neighbourhood Commissions to decide the 
future of council housing. 
 
The findings of the Audit Commission Best Value Inspection of Sheffield’s 
Housing Management and Estate Services are published and two stars are 
awarded. 
 
Sheffield City Council reminds START of the need to meet compliance issues 
by 30 June 2003 (subsequently extended to 31 July 2003). 
 
START EGM: A new constitution, Memoranda, and Articles of Association are 
agreed. 
 
Sheffield City Council takes charge of the administration of START finances. 
 
START is de-recognized by Sheffield City Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 240 -  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Disorder and Crisis 
In this chapter, institutional theory and theory on power provide insights that help 
to explain the spiral of worsening relations that developed between START and 
Sheffield City Council. The period of time covered begins in January 2003, when 
START considered adopting a new constitution, Memoranda, and Articles of 
Association (drafted with help from the housing and tenant participation 
consultants called Partners in Change) and ends with the council’s formal de-
recognition of START in September 2003. The chapter shows how some 
influential activists felt their efforts to rejuvenate START were undermined by 
council action taken to deal with START’s problems. START had a new chair who 
wanted to establish new relations between START and the council. However, the 
large inequalities of power and control over important resources and decision-
making processes that existed between START and the council remained 
problematic. 
 
Additionally, START’s ongoing dependence on the council for funds and low-cost 
office space meant its future was uncertain in a quickly changing national and local 
political environment: a political environment where new central government 
housing policies and priorities for neighbourhood improvement impacted on the 
council’s views on the role of START, and the purpose of TARA and council 
collaboration. Meanwhile, when the council gained two stars for its Housing 
Management and Estate Services functions, after a Best Value inspection, there 
was no longer so much need for START to help to satisfy central government 
inspectors that tenant participation was working well in the city. However, there 
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were activists who continued to challenge the extent to which START was 
beholden to the council and not able to act on its own to develop thinking on 
housing policy or find ways to resolve neighbourhood problems. All of these issues 
and problems contributed to the development of worsening relations between the 
council and START. The council was able to put considerable pressure on START 
to operate in certain prescribed ways. In January 2003, the council suspended its 
funding of START because it was concerned about levels of conflictual activity at 
board meetings and the slow progress made on agreeing on a new constitution 
and Memoranda matters. In February 2003, the council set up ten Neighbourhood 
Commissions to decide the future of council-owned housing in Sheffield. 
Eventually, START decided to adopt a new constitution and different Memoranda-
related items at an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) held in May 2003. 
However, in September 2003, the council decided to de-recognize START. This 
meant that there was no umbrella organization representing the views of member 
TARAs in discussions with the council at a city wide level.  At the same time, 
activists ability to campaign on housing issues was reduced when they were 
dispersed among a number of TARAs around the city. 
 
At the beginning of 2003, the START board seemed to be resolving some of its 
problems under a new chair. However, institutional theory illuminates the way that 
a changing national and local political environment impacted adversely on START 
and council relations. Central government views on the future of council-owned 
housing changed to accommodate a greater focus on small neighbourhood, rather 
than large area-based, solutions to housing problems. Meanwhile, in Sheffield, the 
city council’s position on housing futures changed and there was a shift toward 
more neighbourhood-based housing consultations, which meant START was 
considered less important to the council. Theory on power helps to show how 
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decisions about the design of housing consultations and the formulation of 
collaborative agendas were made. In Sheffield, START and TARAs often seemed 
to be involved in collaboration that helped to legitimize council action taken to 
implement central government housing and neighbourhood improvement policies 
at the local level. 
 
Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative advantage focuses on 
phenomena at the organizational level and provides some useful information on 
the reasons why collaboration is successful or not. However, theory on 
collaborative advantage would benefit from an in-depth analysis of key 
assumptions that the authors make about the nature of collaboration (see chapter 
2, section 2.1). First, they say that through combining skills and resources 
organizations can create synergy and collaboration that avoids some of the 
problems of working alone (that can include limited access to information, ideas, 
and a reduced capacity to innovate). What they do not address here is the way 
that the institutional environment helps shape stakeholder views on the skills and 
resources that are valued or not and how they are combined to achieve different 
objectives. Second, they suggest that organizations that create synergy are in a 
strong position to produce some type of collaborative advantage. However, 
institutional pressures might promote or cause the formation of certain types of 
favoured synergy and prescribed collaboration. Third, they point out the 
importance of agreeing clear aims or goals that fit with the purpose of 
collaboration. However, the role of institutions in determining what organizations 
emerge and thrive, and the shaping of values and beliefs is not well developed. 
Paradoxically, it seems new opportunities for TARA and council collaboration that 
emerged under Conservative and New Labour governments have sometimes 
made it more difficult for tenants to campaign or protest on some housing issues. 
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This chapter begins with an exposition of START’s protracted deliberations to 
decide on a way forward in terms of its organizational structures and the problem 
of deteriorating relations with the council. Then the focus shifts to consider the 
council’s response to allegations made by some START board members that 
START was not operating properly. A short time after these allegations were 
made, START failed to agree on a new constitution, Memoranda, and Articles of 
Association, and the council suspended its funding for START. The council’s 
reasons for setting up ten Neighbourhood Commissions to decide the future of 
council-owned housing in different parts of the city are examined. At the same 
time, the council was putting pressure on START to meet certain organizational 
standards. The chapter ends with an analysis of activists’ efforts to rejuvenate 
START and its eventual de-recognition by the council. 
 
7.1 The trouble with START 
 
In chapter six (section 6.1) the impact of central government pressure, and a long 
history of tenants’ mistrust of their landlords, on contemporary activists’ views on 
collaboration in Sheffield was highlighted. In particular, much tension existed 
between a group of START board members (including some who had been 
aligned with Unity) and the first chair of START, and her supporters, over her 
pragmatic relations with a Liberal-Democrat-controlled council. She had adopted 
such an approach, in part, to gain legitimacy for START, in the eyes of the council, 
which meant it was eligible to receive funding from the council to support its 
activities and attend council-convened housing meetings. However, activists who 
were mistrustful of START’s first chair and her relations with a Liberal-Democrat-
controlled council remained concerned about council control over important 
resources and interference in START affairs. 
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Meanwhile, some of the factors impacting on START and council relations 
included a changing national and local political environment, START’s 
dependence on the council for funds and office space, and variation in the 
opportunities available for activists to participate in different types of collaboration. 
The New Labour government was showing renewed interest in smaller 
neighbourhood-based housing management projects in addition to LSVST. 
START needed to satisfy the council that it was helping to solve the city’s housing 
problems in ways that satisfied central government to gain access to needed 
funds and accommodation, which meant it was not able to easily campaign on 
some housing issues. Some high-profile activists were dissatisfied because they 
could not get items onto relevant agendas that would enable them to discuss the 
way TARA and council collaboration was set up and worked. Instead, TARA and 
council collaboration focused mostly on matters such as ensuring the completion 
of housing repairs on time, keeping streets clean and tidy, and the progressing of 
discussions on housing management options approved by central government. In 
turn, how organizations are located in a particular national and local political 
environment will help to determine who has control over collaborative agendas 
and what is discussed or not in collaboration. START was located between the 
council and TARAs, and was set up to represent the city’s TARAs in negotiations 
with the council. However, START lacked independence and was viewed to be a 
tool of the council by a vociferous group of activists. START was not even able to 
collect TARA levy funds from tenants and allocate them to TARAs to support their 
activities. In addition, the council had control over agenda-setting in collaboration 
to the extent that it would not easily allow consideration of alternatives to central 
government housing policy setting out how council housing should be managed in 
the future. 
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The next sub-section considers some START board members’ complaints, made 
in 2002 to the council’s cabinet member responsible for housing matters, about 
the way that START was operating, and how these complaints impacted relations 
between START board members. The focus is on the circumstances surrounding 
events that occurred just prior to and during the START General Meeting (GM) 
held in January 2003, and the tension that existed between activists who had 
been aligned with START’s first chair and activists who were aligned with 
START’s new chair. 
 
‘There was no help from the Labour council’ 
 
Jonathon, the new START chair elected in December 2002, had to deal with 
increased levels of concern amongst a growing number of TARAs and activists 
about START activities and how they were helping tenants (or not). A group of 
activists, that included Jonathon before he was the chair of START, had asked the 
New-Labour-controlled council’s cabinet member responsible for housing matters 
to undertake an investigation into the way that START was operating in the spring 
of 2002. This group of activists was concerned about START’s ability to represent 
the interests of all tenants, its independence and capacity to campaign on housing 
issues, the way that meetings were conducted, and how financial matters 
including the spending of monies were decided and reported. For example, Helen, 
a START board member and chair of Firshill TARA, said: 
 
We [Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] were not having 
Annual General Meetings, we were not having General Meetings, 
we were not having nothing. I said […] the only time I see a 
financial statement […] I have seen one and that was at the 
Annual General Meeting in November 2001 and that was not 
signed it was just a drafted document, no signature, auditor’s 
signature, anything. 
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The activists that had approached the council to obtain help to address these 
matters felt it had not been helpful. Florence, a former START board member and 
chair of Longley Hall Farm TARA, commented on START’s problems and said: 
 
We [a group of activists] made an appointment [with the council’s 
cabinet member for housing] […]. He said, oh! I cannot do 
anything […]. What we tried to do it was to no avail. We got no 
satisfaction and I honestly think that there was no help from the 
Labour council. 
 
The cabinet member for housing failed to respond to activists’ concerns about 
START in the proactive way that they had wanted. This proactive approach would 
have included action to force START to change its ways of working, and become 
more accountable to all board members and tenants for its actions and the 
spending of council and tenants’ levy monies. Instead, the council continued to 
focus on obtaining START’s help to complete housing Best Value review and 
tenant participation compact work. The council’s cabinet member responsible for 
housing matters may also have been worried an investigation into START’s affairs 
would have damage its credibility and thus affected how Best Value inspectors, 
keen to establish the extent to which TARA and council relations were working 
well in Sheffield, viewed START. Meanwhile, many of the same activist concerns 
about the role of START that had been problematic when the Liberal Democrats 
were in control of the council (see chapter 4, section 4.1) remained problematic 
under the new Labour-controlled council. Somewhat ironically, considering the 
activist calls for council intervention to force START to change its ways of 
operating, there was still much activist concern about START’s independence from 
the council and the threat of incorporation into bureaucratic and overly formal 
council systems. 
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I attended a START GM, held in January 2003, where a decision was made not to 
adopt a new constitution and Articles of Association. The decision reflected 
activists’ concerns about what a move to a more formalised organizational set-up 
would mean for START in terms of a possible further or new type of loss of control 
over its affairs. In addition, there was still the thorny issue of how START would be 
funded in the future. George, a homeowner and company secretary of the 
Wisewood Estate Management Board (WEMB), suggested START must not be 
reliant on the council for monies to assist with its activities in the future. If START 
continued to depend on the council for funds, it would lack the independence and 
capacity it needed to develop its own ideas and work.  He said: 
 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together have said to the local 
authority we want money from you […] money for a building […] 
we want money to run our organization and employ officers […]. 
Well that is not going to work. 
 
Some prominent activists involved in START also felt that its dependence on the 
council for funds constrained its ability to campaign effectively on some housing 
issues (see chapter 5, section 5.2). These issues included campaigning against 
what these activists perceived to be the privatisation of council-owned housing 
and campaigning for the introduction of the fourth housing management option 
proposed by some TARAs. The so-called fourth option would have allowed the 
council to retain ownership of its housing stock while devolving management 
functions to a board consisting of tenants, councillors, and other community 
representatives. However, the council, because it had control over important 
resources, was in a strong position to manage its relations with START and get it 
to focus on considering only central government approved housing management 
options. This situation continued to be the cause of much tension among activists 
mistrustful of the council’s reasons for wanting to work with START and TARAs. 
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Edmond, START vice chair and chair of Basegreen and District TARA, said: 
 
You have got to say stop, look, this is where we want control over 
the process […]. They are your [the council’s] targets. We 
[Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together and Tenants and 
Residents Associations] do not want a target unless we have set 
it ourselves. 
 
In late January 2003, the council decided to suspend its funding for START. 
START and the council had already begun an investigation into the ballot 
arrangements that were in place to elect a new chair at the START AGM.  The 
AGM had been held in December 2002 shortly before the council decided to 
suspend its funding for the organization. Roger, the Labour-controlled council’s 
cabinet member for neighbourhoods, suggested it had quickly become obvious 
that there were problems caused, in part, by START’s relations with the previous 
Liberal-Democrat-controlled council. He said: 
 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together was created while we 
[Labour] were in opposition […]. What we have quickly realised, 
having come back into control of the administration, was there 
were problems, there were divisions, and there was not unification 
and that did cause problems. 
 
A report appeared in the Sheffield Star newspaper, on 24 January 2003, 
confirming the council’s decision to suspend its funding for START, and the 
council and START’s decision to undertake investigations into the ballot to elect a 
new START chair. 
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An organization representing Sheffield’s 63,000 council house 
tenants is carrying out an inquiry into the running of a ballot at its 
Annual General Meeting. Sheffield Council suspended its grant to 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together and an internal inquiry 
is under way after complaints about the ballot from tenants’ 
representatives. 
 
Maybe Sheffield City Council could have done more at an early stage to help 
START build the organizational capacity needed to operate effectively, and help 
reduce the chances of administrative and communications problems arising later.  
For example the council may have been able to do more to help START obtain 
access to internal or external advice or training on financial and administrative 
management practice or the development of robust communications systems and 
networking activities. Meanwhile, START’s lack of independence from the council 
meant some prominent activists perceived it to be a council tool used to try to gain 
tenant approval for LSVST. In chapter two, (section 2.2), the role of power in 
collaboration and decision-making processes was examined. For example, 
Foucault (1991) has elaborated on how power, in part, reflects whose views on 
issues are acknowledged and valued at the expense of other views that are 
ignored or suppressed. In turn, the political opportunity structures that exist will 
help to promote or prevent the consideration of different stakeholder views in 
collaboration and the development of opportunities for stakeholders to participate 
in different types of collaboration. However, Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory 
of collaborative advantage does not expand on the role of institutions and power in 
influencing or determining the type of political opportunity structures that will 
emerge and develop. Importantly, issues can be kept out of politics, as Lukes 
(1974, p. 24) says, “[t]hrough the operation of social forces and institutional 
practices.” 
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A gap exists in understanding about different political opportunity structures will 
help to shape the way that groups and individuals participate in collaboration that 
helps to get potential issues into, or keep them out of, politics. In Sheffield, there 
seemed to be insufficient opportunities for activists (particularly those who had 
been aligned with Unity) to participate in the type of values- and institution-
changing ideological collaboration described by Huxham and Vangen (2005). 
More ideological collaboration might have improved the council’s ability to deal 
effectively with some of the tenants’ housing concerns and grievances that were 
ignored or suppressed. For example, the council may have been better able to 
tackle tenants’ concerns about their conditions of tenure, the future of affordable 
housing for rent, and the viability of housing management options that were not 
approved by central government. Ideological collaboration would consist of 
challenging central government culture and values, as well as beliefs about the 
value of council-owned housing and the way policies were formulated and 
implemented. 
 
The next sub-section focuses on the council’s decision to set up ten 
Neighbourhood Commissions to undertake consultations to decide the future of 
council-owned housing in different parts of Sheffield. 
 
The Neighbourhood Commissions 
  
In February 2003, Sheffield City Council began an investigation into START’s 
finances and spending of funds after some activists claimed monies had been 
inappropriately spent on entertainment for some board members. Subsequently, 
START’s autonomy was severely diminished by the council’s decision to take 
control of its finances (a situation that lasted from May through July 2003). Danny, 
START board member and secretary of Foxhill TARA, and William, START board 
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member and chair of Westfield TARA, respectively said: 
 
“[The] council has now taken over the administration, as it 
chooses to put it, of Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together 
finances for a short while. [The council has] put [Sheffield 
Tenants and Residents Together] on probation sort of thing […], 
which is treating you as though you were in the playground 
basically.” 
 
“The council officers now sign the cheques for Sheffield Tenants 
and Residents Together, which I find horrendous. How can we 
say to our membership that we are independent of the council?” 
 
The council also decided to set up ten Neighbourhood Commissions, to consider 
the future of council-owned housing in different parts of the city, in February 2003. 
Linda, the council’s executive director for neighbourhoods, said: 
 
We [the council] have changed […] to a process now which is 
back into neighbourhoods and local commissions and working 
with tenants locally to say what are the priorities […]. We have 
moved away from a citywide solution […] our focus is back onto 
neighbourhood-based tenant involvement […] that is where we 
want the […] discussion and the dialogue and involvement. 
 
Nevertheless, there was still considerable TARA and activist mistrust of the 
council and its decision to devote more time to undertaking neighbourhood-based 
housing consultations with tenants.  In addition, the combination of worsening 
relations between the council and START, and the council’s decision to move 
away from negotiations with activists representing TARAs at a citywide level to 
more neighbourhood-based consultations with tenants, was the cause of some 
activist anxiety.  Roger, the Labour councillor and cabinet member for 
neighbourhoods (that included responsibility for housing matters), had attended a 
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council-convened Citywide Forum meeting where council officers had outlined 
plans for the Neighbourhood Commissions and how they would be set up. He 
said: 
 
Neighbourhood Commissions, […] we [the council] were met with 
immense scepticism from the outset. There is a certain amount of 
guarantees that I have given to reassure people that this is an 
open and transparent partnership that we are going into […]. 
Wherever it sits within the council’s capabilities tenants will have 
ownership of the process. 
 
Prominent activists, who had witnessed a gradual worsening of relations between 
the council and START, remained wary of councillor and council officer promises 
that the new Neighbourhood Commissions would be inclusive and wherever 
possible ‘owned’ by tenants. In particular, it seemed there was a very top-down 
oriented council approach underpinning the introduction of the commissions. The 
council and its representatives could potentially dominate in the new commissions 
being set up, which would further alienate many activists. For example, Colin, 
START board member and Hackenthorpe TARA member, remarked: 
 
They [the council] simply told us this is what you are getting, this 
is how many Neighbourhood Commissions you are getting, this is 
who is on them […] this is what they are going to do, this is how 
they are going to do it. They are going to be chaired by 
somebody from the council, by a councillor or one of the 
triumvirate that runs housing. 
 
The role that activists would have in the new commissions was unclear. What was 
also uncertain was the extent to which the commissions would be able to 
represent the interests of all tenants or try to steer discussions in certain ways. 
The risk was commission consultations might consist mostly of the council 
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providing tenants with information about central government approved housing 
management options, and not spending enough time listening to tenants and 
taking their views and ideas seriously. Indeed, Anne, a member of Westminster 
TARA, felt the Neighbourhood Commissions were likely to be top-down council 
imposed and managed housing consultation structures.32 She said: 
 
The council needs to recognise that when it is dealing with the 
community it is dealing with a community that has got its own 
way of doing things […]. It is a two-way street and it should not 
always be the community that is forced into the mould that fits 
with the council’s processes […] it [the council] needs to bend a 
bit. 
 
It seemed Sheffield City Council’s decision to set up the Neighbourhood 
Commissions was, in part, a response to changes in the national political 
environment. First, central government was promoting the development of more 
small neighbourhood-based as well as large area-based solutions to housing 
problems in response to tenant protest against LSVST. Second, the council’s 
priorities had changed once the Best Value review of housing management and 
estate services was completed. Third, the council’s relations with START were 
becoming increasingly conflictual and difficult. The risk was the setting up of the 
Neighbourhood Commissions would mean there was less scope for a broad range 
of influential activists to be involved in discussions and decision-making on 
strategic housing matters affecting all tenants at a citywide level. 
 
Activists would be split up and dispersed amongst different TARAs. In such a 
divide-and-rule situation, the small number of activists that the council perceived 
was intransigent and not willing to compromise on housing issues would be less 
                                                          
32
 Anne was a questionnaire survey respondent. 
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able to organize at a citywide level and campaign against them. In Sheffield, some 
prominent activists felt the council was trying to implement unpopular central 
government housing policies at the local level by reducing the force of opposition 
to proposals in commission areas. However, there are times when it is important to 
“[d]raw attention to common interests across differences, if the doctrine of divide 
and rule is not to deliver power into the hands of outsiders” (Taylor, 2000, p. 254). 
Often, activists perceived to be difficult to work with by the council will be 
representing the interests of a large number of tenants, albeit in vociferous and 
sometimes outrageous ways. At the same time, conflict does not have to be 
viewed as something that is dysfunctional that should be avoided or suppressed. 
Conflict can be a way of confronting reality and creating new solutions to tough 
problems (Tjosvold, 1997). 
 
The next sub-section considers the continuing and escalating difficulties in 
relations between the council and START. It focuses on the council’s concern that 
START was not meeting certain organizational standards regarding the way that it 
conducted its affairs. 
 
The need for compliance 
 
In March 2003, the council reminded START that it needed to meet certain 
compliance issues regarding criteria set out in the council’s TARA-recognition 
policy and in discussions about business planning by 30 June 2003 (later 
extended to 31 July 2003). The compliance issues included START reaching an 
agreement on a new constitution and Articles of Association. It seemed the council 
wanted START to meet these compliance criteria and be independent. However, 
because the council had invested a lot of resources in START, it also wanted it to 
operate in ways that would help to ensure it was accountable to it for its actions 
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and could contribute to improving neighbourhoods and local services. Simon, the 
council’s head of housing (operations), expressed his disappointment in START 
and its performance, saying: 
 
We [the council] have given them [Sheffield Tenants and Residents 
Together] a lot of time, money [and] staff resources to help them 
be independent of the council and contribute towards improving the 
[housing] service. Despite all that they continue to find it difficult to 
do that. 
 
Meyer and Hyde (2004) studied neighbourhood associations in the US and found 
umbrella organizations could help to provide the structures needed for wider 
collaboration. However, the effectiveness of neighbourhood associations was 
dependent on their capacity to develop and maintain their organizational 
legitimacy. START was losing legitimacy in the eyes of some TARAs because the 
board was frequently involved in protracted and acrimonious disputes with the 
council over the role of START and the way that the council funded it, rather than 
representing tenants’ interests. Nevertheless, the council appeared to be creating 
a situation where START would lose even more legitimacy in the eyes of some 
TARAs because it no longer seemed prepared to provide resources for the 
umbrella TARA that it openly criticised as a failing organization. 
 
Sometimes individuals can find themselves drawn into an ever more dependent 
relationship with other more powerful individuals who increase their influence over 
programme agendas and objectives (Pred, 1983). The first chair of START and 
some other board members had taken a pragmatic approach in collaboration to 
gain access to powerful councillors and council officers, as well as council funds 
and council-convened housing and neighbourhood meetings. However, START’s 
dependence on the council for funds and office space meant councillors and 
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council officers were in a strong position to manage START and council relations, 
and get START to fit with council systems and ways of working. 
 
In the spring of 2003, START seemed to be resolving some of its problems, but 
the council did not appear to want to work with START any longer. Politicians’ 
views on the future of council-owned housing had moved on at the national and 
local level. In Sheffield, powerful councillors and council officers with control over 
funds and collaborative agendas were changing their approach to housing 
consultations and tenant participation in neighbourhood management matters. 
Meanwhile, Sheffield City Council had gained two stars for its housing 
management and estate services following a Best Value inspection. 
 
The next section examines and analyses tenant and resident activists’ efforts to 
rejuvenate START. It shows how these activists’ efforts were too late to make any 
lasting difference. 
 
7.2 Trying to rejuvenate START 
 
Conflict between START board members over START’s role and its relations with 
Sheffield City Council meant it could be unclear what START was doing to help 
TARAs and tenants. For example, William, START board member and chair of 
Westfield TARA, said: 
 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together spends all its time 
contemplating its own internal navel rather than providing 
services [for Tenants and Residents Associations] […]. If you are 
concentrating on survival or [there is] in-fighting, or whatever, 
then you don’t actually do anything productive and that has been 
the name of the game. 
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At a START EGM, held in May 2003, a new constitution, and Articles of 
Association were finally agreed. However, Jonathon, the new START chair 
elected in December 2002 who had been a prominent member of Unity, had 
resigned in March 2003. He had felt there was not enough support coming from 
the council, and the wider tenants and residents movement to take START 
forward. Delia, the chair of Batemoor TARA, had taken over as the interim chair of 
START. 
 
‘No real evidence that is the type of tenant involvement mechanism or 
vehicle we want’ 
 
Delia was optimistic about START’s future when she took over as chair. The 
board had adopted a new constitution and Articles of Association. START also 
had a new business plan that it was preparing to present to the Labour-controlled 
council. In May 2003, Delia said: 
 
I took over about four or five weeks ago, as the chair, and from 
then things have moved very quickly. We have orderly meetings 
[…]. Meetings were horrendous, nobody wanted to go […]. 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together is now all coming 
together. 
 
Delia, START’s second new chair within a period of a few months, felt the 
umbrella organization was on a new and stronger footing. It seemed START was 
re-gaining some of the credibility that it had lost through variability in the quality of 
its business meetings and a lack of productive activity perceived to benefit 
tenants. However, Edmond, the chair of Basegreen TARA and the vice chair of 
START, recognised that it was going to take time to re-establish START and build 
people’s trust in the organization. He commented on START’s new constitution 
  - 258 -  
and Articles of Association, saying: 
 
They are our [the tenants and residents movement] Articles that 
Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together has adopted. We can 
sit back and say right this is why we want more than a twelve-
month programme [to reorganize] because the first twelve 
months […] has got to be a consolidation time. 
 
Delia and her fellow START board members needed time for the new constitution, 
Articles of Association, and business plan to embed. START would become a 
charitable organization limited by guarantee. This would mean board members 
had protection from personal financial jeopardy if the organization got into financial 
difficulties or folded. In addition, START would gain extra independence from the 
council through an enhanced ability to raise funds through grant application 
activities or the provision of services. George, the company secretary for the 
Wisewood Estate Management Board (WEMB), thought a revitalised START 
board was in a strong position to re-build relations with the council and TARAs. He 
said: 
 
I think that once they [Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] 
have had their annual general meeting, elected their board, they 
have every chance then of making plans and meeting all the 
[recognition] requirements for the local authority. 
 
Meanwhile, Delia, and other activists, felt START would be able to satisfy the 
council that it was taking appropriate action to sort out its problems. START would 
once again represent a majority of the city’s TARAs at a citywide level, but also 
ensure that it was not too dependent on the council and could take charge of its 
own affairs. Alas, Marjorie, the Labour councillor who was the cabinet advisor on 
neighbourhoods and regeneration, was not so optimistic about the future of 
START, saying: 
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The new board would say that they had got a business plan in 
place and were looking to the future and had got lots of ideas and 
that but there is no evidence as such to suggest that they are 
making a difference. There is no real evidence that that is the 
type of tenant involvement mechanism or vehicle we want. 
 
The council appeared to be distancing itself from a rejuvenated START and its 
board members. It seemed as if Marjorie and some of her fellow councillors 
wanted to see more evidence of START fulfilling the role of a particular type of 
intermediary support organization or tenant involvement mechanism. For example, 
they wanted to see START helping to get information about national housing 
policies to TARAs, gain TARA support for the council’s TARA-recognition policy, 
and build a coherent TARA view on housing matters after a period of discussions 
and then reaching a consensus on issues. William, START board member and 
chair of Westfield TARA, remarked: 
 
Suddenly, it [Sheffield Tenants and Residents Together] looks as 
if it might become effective because they have got a different 
crowd involved […]. They are more than capable of doing the job; 
I count myself in that number. Now that […] Sheffield Tenants 
and Residents Together looks like being a group that can actually 
be an effective group, suddenly the council are saying, oh no! 
untouchable. 
 
However, Linda, the council’s executive director for neighbourhoods, felt START 
would not be able to deliver on any new business plan that the board agreed on. 
Neighbourhood-based consultations with tenants to decide housing and 
neighbourhood matters worked best in Sheffield, not consultations with an 
umbrella organization. She said: 
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What works the best in Sheffield has been that local activity and I 
am less convinced that the citywide movement, in the three years 
I have been here, can point to real tangible successes as a 
consequence of its existence. 
 
It seemed changed central government views on housing and neighbourhood 
improvement policy, and the ways that institutions can influence or determine what 
issues are important or not were having an impact on some councillors’ and 
council officer’s views on the future of START. There were different perceptions 
about START’s purpose, but changes at the institutional level in thinking about 
housing policy had particular effects on the actions of some powerful councillors 
and council officers. They were the individuals with much influence or control over 
the setting of TARA and council collaborative agendas, the conduct of 
deliberations, and the operation of decision-making processes. Power can also 
take the form of contingent threats that contain a demand by an actor and make 
punishments contingent upon non-compliance (Tedeschi, 2001). At the national 
level, central government is a powerful player, able to influence or determine the 
shape of the political environment and create or eliminate opportunities for 
different types of TARA and council collaboration. It can do this through the 
introduction of statutory instruments promoting collaboration and joined-up action 
to solve complex social problems, and changes to funding regimes to encourage 
TARA and council involvement in certain types of collaborative enterprise or 
activity. 
 
START and TARAs had little direct or immediate influence over the institutional 
and political framework within which TARA and council collaboration was located. 
In turn, START and TARAs had little influence over a powerful institutional 
language of collaboration that favours reaching a consensus on housing problems 
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and finding solutions to them, rather than conflict over who has power and control 
over important resources and agendas. Decisions are choices consciously and 
intentionally made by individuals between alternatives, but Lukes (1974, p. 21) 
says, “The bias of the system can be mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways 
that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individual 
choices.” START and TARAs in Sheffield were able to choose between the 
transfer of council-owned housing to an RSL, a PFI arrangement to obtain extra 
investment for housing repairs, or the setting up of an ALMO that would devolve 
housing management responsibilities to a board comprising tenants, councillors 
and other community representatives. However, different societal-level embedded 
norms, traditions, and customs concerning the value of partnership and 
collaborative working were mobilised and recreated in ways that supported a 
particular type of consensual decision-making at the expense of recognising and 
dealing effectively with conflict. There was a strong central government emphasis 
in much of its literature on collaboration on the value of reaching a consensus on 
issues, and viewing conflict as dysfunctional and to be avoided as far as possible. 
This situation had important consequences for the promotion of the instrumental or 
ideological collaboration described by Huxham (1996). In Sheffield, the council 
and tenants were involved in more instrumental collaboration to produce tangible 
and practical outputs, such as improved completion times for housing repairs, 
rather than ideological collaboration such as disputing and changing council 
values or ways of working. 
 
Different people had different perceptions about START’s purpose. One group of 
TARA activists felt START should note what sort of institutional and political 
environment existed and adopt a pragmatic approach in consultations with the 
council. The aim was to improve access to politicians and funds, and there was a 
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willingness to consider all housing management options including LSVST. Another 
group of TARA activists wanted to challenge aspects of an institutional and 
political environment that meant tenants had limited ability to get their own housing 
management options considered. There was much tenant protest against LSVST 
and some changes were eventually made to central government housing policy, 
including the introduction of the ALMO. However, the main elements of central 
government housing policy remained intact, including the selling-off or transfer of 
council-owned housing to RSLs, the splitting-up of housing strategy and 
management functions, and a moratorium on council-house building. 
 
Meanwhile, some councillors and council officers felt that START needed to 
comply with central government demands on the council to implement national 
housing policies effectively at the local level because it obtained funds and low-
rent accommodation from the council. These councillors took a hard line and 
insisted on START compliance with the council’s TARA-recognition policy. Another 
group of councillors were aware that there was sometimes undue pressure put on 
START to help the council to implement unpopular national housing policies. In 
particular, the council’s tenant participation officers were trying to build trust with 
START and TARAs, and better understand TARA culture and values. However, 
there were only two tenant participation officers and they lacked the status and 
power that professional housing officers possessed. Ultimately, a small group of 
powerful politicians and council officers were able to influence thinking on housing 
matters and take decisions that would have a significant impact on START and its 
operations. They were, in the main, reacting to a changing institutional and political 
environment that altered what they needed to do to satisfy central government that 
appropriate action was being taken to deal with housing problems at the local 
level. This group of councillors and council officers eventually pushed for more 
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neighbourhood-based housing consultations and decided to abandon relations 
with START. 
 
Once again Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative advantage fails 
to provide an adequate explanation of the way that institutions and power are 
involved in shaping political and collaborative environments. The theory focuses 
on phenomena that occur at the organizational level and provides useful insights 
on collaboration. Successful collaboration depends on organizations having the 
right types of capacity and skills, sharing resources and interests, and agreeing on 
aims and objectives. However, the theory fails to provide an in-depth analysis of 
the institutional factors that help to influence or determine not only the shape of 
collaboration but also what organizations will emerge, develop, and receive an 
invitation to participate in collaboration. In addition, a lack of focus on non-
decision-making obscures the impact that it has on the ways that are available to 
organizations to get their own priorities for action onto relevant collaborative 
agendas. Paradoxically, more opportunities to participate in collaboration may 
benefit stakeholders that are more powerful. They have control over important 
resources including information, funds, and expertise and can manage or control 
agenda setting and consultation processes. Less powerful stakeholders may be 
disadvantaged in collaboration because they have reduced freedom to campaign 
on issues, or challenge dominant views and policies effectively. They lack power 
and control over important resources, or the authority to take certain actions in 
collaboration. 
 
The next sub-section explains how Sheffield City Council eventually de-recognised 
START. Then, there is an examination and analysis of the role of institutions and 
power in the final council decisions made about the future of START. 
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‘Just in a pigeonhole and brought out when the council needed us to be 
around’ 
 
In September 2003, TARA membership of START was reported to be well under 
the 50% plus one threshold that it needed to be recognised by the council as the 
umbrella organization representing a majority of Sheffield’s TARAs. Council 
estimates indicated that thirty out of seventy-six TARAs or thirty-nine per cent of 
the total number of TARAs in the city remained affiliated to START (Sheffield City 
Council 2003a). The council decided to de-recognise START. Rosalind, the 
Labour leader of the council, said: 
 
The funding that has been going into Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together will go into the neighbourhoods […]. It is a 
decision that has been discussed and was agreed in the Labour 
group really and that will go into the council’s [decision-making] 
machinery. 
 
On 23 October 2003, START’s first chair made a surprising statement to the 
Sheffield Star newspaper. She said: 
 
There was never a true partnership between the council and her 
group. She told a scrutiny board, ‘we were just in a pigeonhole 
and brought out when the council needed us to be around, when 
there were visiting government ministers. We were just a tick 
box. Looking back, we were not helped at all by the council.’ 
 
Power in a structural sense is a pre-existing constraint in the form of reproduced 
asymmetric relations between organizations and individuals (Layder, 1985). 
Sheffield City Council seemed genuinely to want to work with START and TARAs 
to improve neighbourhoods and local services, but large inequalities of power and 
control over important resources in collaboration were problematic. Tenants and 
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residents stood to benefit from instrumental collaboration that improved 
neighbourhoods. However, a group of influential activists felt there was not enough 
opportunity for them to get involved in strategic housing and neighbourhood policy 
discussions and decision-making processes. The New Labour government made 
genuine, but only partially successful, attempts to devolve more power to 
communities (Newman, 2005). A central government language of collaboration 
developed that focused on organizations participating in collective instrumental 
activity to improve neighbourhoods (see chapter 1, section 1.1). However, as 
Chanan (2003, p. 57) points out, “Partnerships will not succeed unless they provide 
real opportunities for people to express their views, influence decisions, and play 
an active part in shaping the future of their communities.” In Sheffield, some 
prominent TARAs and activists were not able to express their views and effectively 
influence decisions on housing and neighbourhood management policy. 
 
An established and institutionalised language may result in the depoliticizing of 
certain activities (Ng, 2001). START was, to some extent, hamstrung by a central 
government language of collaboration that promoted reaching a consensus on 
issues at the expense of recognizing conflict in collaboration. On the one hand, 
Unity had campaigned against what it perceived to be the privatisation of council-
owned housing and had folded. On the other hand, TARAs opposed to the 
council’s TARA-recognition policy or protesting against the perceived privatisation 
of council-owned housing risked being de-recognised by the council or 
marginalised in housing consultations. For some organizations, it is also important 
to their members that they are not only autonomous but that they appear to be 
autonomous (Blackmore, 2004). Ultimately, START failed to gain the 
organizational autonomy it needed to convince sceptical TARAs and activists it 
could effectively represent their interests. Meanwhile, other TARAs affiliated to 
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START lost interest in an organization run by a board that was involved in a 
protracted dispute with the council over its role and funding. In the end, when 
START’s help to find solutions to housing problems was no longer so important to 
the council, it was not as problematic as it might have been for the council to 
withdraw its funding for the organization and focus on neighbourhood-based 
housing consultations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The effect of changing institutional pressures and the role of power in decisions 
made about the design of collaboration and stakeholder involvement are apparent 
in the spiral of deteriorating relations that developed between START and 
Sheffield City Council. There was a significant amount of TARA compliance with 
the council’s TARA-recognition policy. TARA resistance to the recognition policy 
occurred, but the council’s efforts to gain TARA compliance were largely 
successful but distracted from a focus on the valuing of difference and diversity in 
collaboration. Meanwhile, the introduction of the recognition policy and the way 
that it was implemented had helped to create some new forms of TARA 
marginalization and potential de-recognition by the council. Indeed, the senior civil 
servant with responsibility for tenant participation matters, when he was 
interviewed, stressed that TARA de-recognition by councils was not something 
that central government felt was helpful. 
 
START’s troubles, in part, seemed to reflect a lack of adequate opportunities for 
some influential activists to get involved in ideological collaboration that would 
allow them to challenge established housing and tenant participation policies. 
Some of these activists were also frustrated because they could not get certain 
housing ideas or concerns onto relevant agendas for consideration. In turn, there 
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had been a struggle for organizational legitimacy between START and Unity that 
had resulted in the collapse of Unity and the council recognizing START as the 
umbrella organization representing a majority of the city’s TARAs. However, many 
of the activists that had been involved in Unity were still active and angry because 
they felt marginalized by the council. The internal wrangling within START over its 
role and relations with the council stemmed in large part from a council failure to 
address the housing concerns and grievances of former Unity members who had 
gained seats on the START board. 
 
The changing national political environment helped to cause Sheffield City Council 
to change its views on TARA and council collaboration. Importantly, the council 
was in a difficult position, having to respond to changes in national housing and 
tenant participation policies and try to build trusting relations with TARAs and 
tenants. But the council was ultimately able to take unilateral action to determine 
its relations with START and TARAs. The council worked with START and 
TARAs, but was to some extent divided on how best to structure collaboration. For 
example, there were some housing officers with more traditional views on what 
partnership and collaborative working meant, and tenant participation officers 
trying to push for a more in-depth appreciation of START and TARA culture and 
values. From the outset, START lacked autonomy and the council’s control over 
important resources was always controversial. START’s heavy dependence on 
the council for its survival damaged its credibility because some TARAs and 
activists felt it was a compliant organization and did not represent all of the city’s 
TARAs or tenants. START’s attempts to improve its credibility came at a time 
when the changing national political environment meant it was no longer so 
important for the council to work with an umbrella organization. Internal wrangling 
within START over its role and relations with the council provided some of the 
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evidence that the council used to justify setting up Neighbourhood Commissions 
and de-recognizing START. This caused START’s first chair to conclude that 
there had never been a true partnership between START and the council. 
 
Chapter eight will draw some conclusions about what the study of START and 
TARA relations in Sheffield demonstrates about the need for an enhanced theory 
of collaborative advantage that includes concepts drawn from institutional theory 
and theory on power to show how collaboration can progress in different ways. 
Some of these different ways of progressing may lead to some stakeholders being 
disadvantaged in collaboration. The chapter starts by recounting the central 
government rhetoric on collaboration and examining the reality on the ground. 
Then the research questions are re-visited to assess the extent to which the study 
of TARA and council collaboration in Sheffield has helped to provide insights that 
enhance understanding of collaborative phenomena. Theory on institutions and 
theory on power are viewed as valuable in helping to explain the impact of macro-
level institutional policies and pressure on the activities and actions of 
collaborating organizations. At the same time, the possibilities for enhancing 
theory on collaboration, with its focus on activities and actions occurring at the 
organizational level, are explored. Finally, a new concept is introduced to help 
explain the way that institutions and power are implicated in the shaping of a 
political environment that can result in some organizations and individuals being 
disadvantaged in collaboration, as well as sometimes empowered. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together the evidence on TARA and 
council relations in Sheffield, and how they were affected by the New Labour 
government’s housing, Best Value, and tenant participation policies. It was noted 
in chapter one (section 1.2) that the central government rhetoric on collaboration 
has tended to emphasise organizations’ and individuals’ responsibilities for making 
collaboration work. What is neglected in the central government literature is the 
role of institutions in shaping the environment within which organizations are able 
to emerge or not, and the opportunities that they have to participate in different 
types of collaboration. The main research question, focused on the extent to which 
New Labour policies had changed the political environment within which TARA 
and council collaboration is located and has to operate. Little was known about the 
extent to which TARAs and tenants had been empowered or not. In addition, no 
in-depth research had been undertaken to see how New Labour policies had 
affected opportunities for TARAs to influence council decisions on priorities for 
action to develop housing strategies and improve neighbourhoods. Other sub-
questions emerged after a review of institutional theory and theory on power 
literature. 
 
The first set of sub-questions focus on the extent to which TARA independence 
and empowerment depends on the power and influence collaborative agenda-
setting and decision-making processes. A second set of sub-questions focus on 
the opportunities that exist for TARA involvement in the instrumental or ideological 
types of collaboration described by Huxham (1996) and outlined in chapter two 
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(section 2.1). More specifically, these sub-questions are concerned with the 
chances that TARAs have to participate in collaboration to improve housing and 
local services, or collaboration that challenges housing policies and established 
council ways of working with tenants to deal with housing problems. 
 
This chapter draws together the research findings to examine how institutional 
theory and theory on power help to explain the way that TARA and council 
collaboration developed in Sheffield. Some of Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) ideas 
on what makes collaboration successful can be discerned in the way that the 
council set up collaboration with TARAs but it still did not work well. A re-
examination of institutional theory and theory on power provides insights on how 
macro-level institutional activities impacted on TARA and council relations in 
Sheffield. These institutional activities enabled and constrained different meso-
level or organizational activities in collaboration that resulted in intended and 
unintended collaborative outputs and outcomes as well as new forms of TARA 
inclusion and exclusion in collaboration. Central government and council control 
over important resources in collaboration and collaborative agenda setting 
processes influenced the opportunities that existed for TARA and activist 
involvement in instrumental collaboration that included the day-to-day 
management of neighbourhoods and ideological collaboration that included 
challenging policies and influencing housing and neighbourhood improvement 
strategies. 
 
Theory of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) provided 
insights on the institutional pressures that caused predictable and unpredictable 
consequences to occur at the meso or organizational level and the mico-level and 
individuals in collaboration and their actions (see chapter 2, section 2.2). Sheffield 
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City Council responded in certain ways to central government policies and tried to 
get START and TARAs to fit with its systems and the need to convince Best Value 
inspectors that tenant participation was working well in the city. Lukes’ (1974) 
three-dimensional theory of power was used to examine how central government 
and council power influenced collaborative decision-making at the local level (see 
chapter 2, section 2.2). First, central government and council power prevented 
some potential issues getting onto relevant agendas. The council developed 
criteria and standards that START and TARAs needed to meet to obtain official 
recognition and eligibility to receive a share of tenants’ levy and other monies; this 
affected the focus and trajectory of deliberations and decision-making. Second, 
central government and council power contributed to the maintenance of 
unresolved and latent tenant concerns over housing matters. The council’s actions 
to implement its TARA-recognition policy affected opportunities for TARA 
participation in instrumental or ideological collaboration, and the chances of 
different types of problems being effectively dealt with. Third, central government 
and council power sustained a process of non-decision-making in situations where 
central government housing preferences reduced the scope for START and 
TARAs to think about the different ways that council-owned housing might be 
managed at the local level. 
 
The findings from the research undertaken in Sheffield challenge some of the key 
contemporary political views on collaboration. They also challenge theory on 
collaboration and the theory of collaborative advantage (that suggests that 
collaboration is generally a ‘good thing’ and problems that arise can usually be 
dealt with at the organizational level). A central theme stemming from the research 
findings is the failure of much theory on collaboration and the theory of 
collaborative advantage to consider in enough depth the effect that institutions and 
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power have on the shape of collaboration at the local or neighbourhood level. A 
new concept, that of ‘disempowering involvement’, that emerged from the analysis 
of the research data collected on TARA and council collaboration is used to help 
explain how the activities and actions of institutions, organizations, and individuals 
impacting on each other in complex and often unexpected ways can lead to some 
organizations being disadvantaged in collaboration. It is argued that theory of 
collaboration can be further enhanced by taking into account the role of institutions 
and power in shaping or determining collaborative activities and actions at the 
local level. 
 
8.1 Institutions and collaboration 
 
Chapter two argued that theory on collaboration and collaborative advantage 
focuses primarily on meso or organizational-level phenomena and their impact on 
collaboration. MacDonald and Chrisp (2005) have suggested much of the literature 
on partnership-working focuses only on dealing with meso or organizational and 
partnership level problems to improve the chances of producing benefits. Huxham 
and Vangen (2000a, 2003, 2005) acknowledge that central government policies 
will impact on the environment within which collaboration is located  but suggest 
that a focus meso or organizational and partnership level problems and solving 
them is usually sufficient to ensure partnership working and collaboration is 
successful. However, theory on collaboration and Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) 
theory of collaborative advantage fail to effectively deal with the way that 
institutions and relations of power are profoundly involved in creating and 
maintaining a set of institutionalized core values, beliefs, and ways of working that 
help to shape the activities and actions of organizations and individuals in 
collaboration. 
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Unpacking collaborative advantage 
 
In chapter two (section 2.1), it was shown that collaborative advantage occurs 
when some objective is met that no organization could have achieved working on 
its own and each organization is able to achieve its own objectives better than it 
could working on its own (Huxham, 1993b). To help ensure collaboration is 
successful stakeholder organizations need to carefully decide on who to involve or 
not (Huxham and Vangen, 2000a), the way communications and the conduct of 
meetings will work (Huxham and Vangen, 2000b), and how to build productive 
relationships (Huxham, 1993b). It was also argued that Huxham and Vangen’s 
(2005) theory of collaborative advantage does not pay sufficient attention to the 
role of institutions and power in influencing or determining the shape of the political 
environment and collaboration at the local level. This would include understanding 
the effects of institutionalized traditions, customs, values, and beliefs on the 
actions and activities of collaborating organizations and individuals. 
 
Indeed, chapter two (section 2.1) argues that views on collaboration more 
generally tend to be underpinned by a rational, management-oriented approach 
(Doyle, 2004) and a tendency to ignore or underplay the role of institutions in 
shaping partnership or collaborative discussions and decision-making processes 
(Diamond, 2006). It is the precise characteristics of the relationships that exist 
between institutions, organizations, and individuals that Huxham and Vangen 
(2005) do not elaborate on. Sydow (2006) felt Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory 
of collaborative advantage needed to consider in more detail the way that 
institutions are created by organizations and individuals, and can then 
independently affect their thinking and behaviour. Institutional theory and theory on 
power provided ideas and concepts used to help understand the political pressures 
that created and eliminated opportunities for TARAs to get involved in different 
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types of collaboration. The intention was to examine collaboration to see how it 
may or may not lead to participating organizations experiencing benefits that are 
associated with the creation of collaborative advantage. 
  
The next sub-section considers how central government policies changed the 
wider environment within which collaboration at the local level is located.  
 
Central government and political opportunity structures 
 
The New Labour government, elected in 1997, introduced policies that established 
a new overarching framework for partnership and collaborative working at the local 
level. A dominant central government culture and core values that promoted 
collaboration to decide priorities for action to improve neighbourhoods and solve 
complex social problems were obvious in its housing, Best Value, and Tenant 
Participation Compact legislation. However, there was still central government 
bureaucracy and prescribed ways of working that affected what was going on in 
collaboration at the local level. The government introduced legislation that 
changed the way that councils were organized and their relations with tenants and 
the associations that represent them. At the same time, councils had central 
government housing and neighbourhood improvement objectives to meet and 
were in a difficult position trying to meet central government demands and listen to 
tenants. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of organizational isomorphism provided 
insights that helped to explain how institutional pressure on organizations 
influences how they are involved (or not) in collaborative activities (see chapter 2, 
section 2.3). First, coercive institutional pressure forces organizations to comply 
with legislation, rules, and regulations, or face the prospect of sanctions that can 
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include reduced access to important resources and intervention to take control of 
functions and services. Second, mimetic pressure can cause organizations to 
imitate other organizations that they feel have been successful in obtaining what 
they need to function effectively. Third, normative pressure coming from more 
powerful organizations or individuals can cause less powerful organizations or 
individuals to behave in certain ways. 
 
In Sheffield TARA and council collaboration was affected by coercive pressure that 
came from central government and legislative and regulatory demands that 
impacted on the council and TARAs, backed up with a threat of sanctions for non-
compliance. The New Labour government’s Best Value and Tenant Participation 
Compact initiatives were top-down imposed on councils. The influential TARA 
activists interviewed felt that key aspects of these initiatives were as much about 
central government and the council gaining control over TARA activities as giving 
them new powers and freedoms. The council was experiencing pressure to 
implement national policies effectively at the local level and sanctions might be 
applied if there was non-compliance that included a loss of central government 
funds for housing repairs or intervention to take control of housing or other 
services. Consequently, the council put pressure on TARAs to become more 
formal and operate in ways that helped it to implement national policies effectively 
at the local level. 
 
On the one hand, it may seem reasonable that TARAs should meet some 
organization standards before they are officially recognized and eligible to  take 
part in compact and other relevant council-convened meetings. On the other hand, 
there is the issue of the formalization of what were mostly relatively informally 
organized TARAs, and the risk that they were gradually being incorporated into 
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council systems and made to fit with council ways of working. A group of 
prominent activists felt that TARAs with a long history of independence and protest 
against poor housing conditions were less able to campaign on some housing 
issues.  There was a need to focus on considering the merits of central 
government preferred housing management options rather than challenge the 
reasons for wanting to transfer council-owned housing to RSLs in the first place. 
 
Three significant effects of coercive central government pressure on Sheffield City 
Council and its relations with START were identified. First, the issue of council 
funding for START, and council control over the collection and allocation of 
tenants’ levy monies (an addition of ten pence per week to the rents of 
participating tenants and homeowners making an annual payment) to support 
TARA activities. START’s dependence on substantial council funds of around 
£100,000 each year and council-provided office accommodation at a low rent 
impacted on its independence. It seemed to be in the council’s interests to support 
START to help meet a central government requirement that there was evidence of 
council and tenant discussions to produce a citywide tenants participation compact 
and persuade Best Value inspectors that tenant participation activities were well 
established in the city. At the same time, START’s first chair and some other board 
members had been keen to take a pragmatic approach when considering the 
possible benefits of LSVST. Other high-profile activists perceived START to be 
beholden to the council and locked into an arrangement that meant the council 
that it depended on for its survival overly influenced its views on some housing 
issues. The council was also able to put a lot of pressure on TARAs to meet 
certain organizational standards (relating to the conduct of meetings, officer 
elections, and communications with members) to be eligible for a share of tenants’ 
levy monies that they felt rightfully belonged to them (see chapter five, section 
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5.2). 
 
Key Finding 1 
 
Central government pressure on the council to show tenant participation 
was working well and effectively implement its housing policies helped to 
cause Sheffield City Council to put pressure on START and TARAs to 
operate in certain ways to be eligible for a share of council and tenants’ levy 
monies. This led to disputes between some high-profile activists and the 
council concerning the council’s power and control over funds that 
impacted adversely on collaboration. 
 
 
Second, it seemed the council sometimes wanted to reach a consensus on issues 
relatively quickly whenever possible, without thinking about the implications for 
collaborative discussions and decision-making (see chapter 6, section 6.1). The 
New Labour government had worked out its housing policies and an agenda was 
set with three preferred options for the future management of council-owned 
housing. There was pressure on councils to quickly set up successful collaborative 
ventures. In Sheffield, it seemed more time could have been devoted to 
foundation–building and different organizations getting to know each other well in 
the early stages of TARA and council collaboration to engender trust and respect 
for each other’s values and views. The need for collaboration and its outcomes to 
fit with central government political cycles and elections was not conducive to 
spending time on the development of collaborative structures or ideas at the local 
level. Much scope existed for some tenants’ housing concerns or suggestions not 
to get onto relevant agendas for discussion because they did not fit with 
government policy or were considered impractical in the political circumstances. A 
fourth option for the management of council-owned housing proposed by some 
activists in Sheffield would not be easy to develop given the national political 
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situation regarding policy on housing futures. A more open and transparent council 
consideration of the fourth option might have helped prevent some of the anger 
that activists felt when it was quickly rejected. It seemed there was sometimes a 
process of non-decision-making like that described by Lukes (1974). The non-
decision-making could include missing potential solutions to neighbourhood 
problems because some ideas do not get onto relevant agendas for discussion or 
the constraints on deliberation in collaboration mean some ideas might fail to enter 
into people’s imaginations in the first place. 
 
 
Key Finding 2 
 
There was central government pressure on the council to do things quickly, 
achieve results to fit with relatively short national political cycles and 
timescales, and choose approved solutions to problems. This situation 
impacted adversely on opportunities for tenants to get their housing 
concerns and grievances onto relevant agendas and the potential for 
innovation because reaching a consensus on issues happened too quickly 
without adequate opportunity to think about alternative solutions to 
problems. 
 
 
Third, as TARAs changed to meet the demands of the council and its TARA-
recognition policy some were becoming more like each other.  This need not have 
been a problem but evidence of a loss of capacity for innovation emerged as more 
formalised ways of working reduced the flexibility to look at housing and 
neighbourhood problems from different perspectives. Many TARAs did decide to 
sign up to the recognition policy and they lost some of their independence, 
experienced much council pressure to adopt central government approved 
housing management policies, and failed to change the main thrust of national 
housing policies (even though some TARAs found ways to resist some of the 
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effects of recognition once they were officially recognized). Sheffield City Council 
had introduced a recognition policy to try to deal with some of the uncertainty 
surrounding relations with a diverse range of usually informally organized TARAs, 
and ensure that they conformed with central government demands relating to 
organizational standards and the implementation of national housing policies at 
the local level. However, central government had not anticipated the potential 
problem of a de facto de-recognition policy that excluded non-compliant TARAs 
from important council-convened meetings held to discuss neighbourhood matters 
(see chapter 6, section 6.2). For example, in Sheffield, there was the issue of Unity 
and its exclusion from collaboration because its ideas did not fit with central 
government or council plans for the future management of council-owned housing. 
At the same time, potentially innovative TARAs might be excluded from important 
meetings simply because they did not have the capacity to meet the council’s 
recognition criteria. 
 
 
Key Finding 3 
 
The council’s TARA-recognition policy was introduced to deal with 
uncertainty surrounding relations with a diverse range of TARAs and ensure 
they met central government organization standards. However, it caused 
some organizational isomorphism and loss of capacity for innovation in 
collaboration. Moreover, there was the unanticipated problem of TARA de-
recognition and their exclusion from collaboration. 
 
 
It is not sufficient to focus mainly on the organizational level, as Huxham and 
Vangen (2005) have, to understand how collaboration is located within a wider 
institutional and political environment that organizations and individuals often have 
little direct control over. In some situations where problems affecting collaboration 
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at the organizational level (such as how to agree on who to involve, the sharing of 
resources, and the setting of aims and objectives) are resolved it will still fail or 
underperform because the institutional climate (including its customs, rules, and 
regulations) help to determine what it can achieve.  Coercive pressures were 
reinforced by normative pressures on START and TARAs coming from powerful 
councillors and council officers able to steer discussions in collaboration away 
from ideological matters such as challenging national housing policies (see 
chapter 6, section 6.1). This is not surprising since most council officers would see 
their job as ensuring compliance with central government policies and directives. 
However, the council’s tenant participation officers felt their focus was on helping 
tenants to articulate all their concerns, and there were disputes between them and 
housing officers over the need to better understanding TARA culture and activists’ 
campaigning and advocacy role in collaboration. It was the views of more powerful 
senior housing officers that tended to dominate whilst the views of less powerful 
tenant participation officers risked being ignored or overlooked. 
 
The next sub-section examines how these institutional pressures contributed to 
the creation of different opportunities for START and TARA involvement in 
different types of collaboration, and reduced the chances of collaborating 
organizations benefiting from the creation of a genuinely empowering type of 
collaborative advantage.  
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An imbalance in opportunities to participate in instrumental and ideological 
collaboration 
 
An imbalance in collaborative discussions meant there were inadequate 
opportunities for a group of influential activists to participate in ideological 
collaboration. This situation led to: 
 
• conflict over values, power, resources, and ways of working in collaboration 
to be ignored or suppressed 
• reduced freedom for activists to campaign on some housing issues 
• a lack of opportunities for activists to challenge a dominant central 
government language of collaboration and beliefs about its purpose 
• a lack of opportunities for activists to influence the development of housing 
strategy and policy 
 
These phenomena and activists’ memories of a long history of often difficult tenant 
and landlord relations in Sheffield (see chapter 5, section 5.1) helped to cause 
mistrust of both central government and the council. As Lukes (1974, p. 21) says, 
“Institutions in particular and sometimes organizations or individuals can succeed 
in preventing potential issues from entering into the political arena”. A number of 
influential activists felt there was too much top-down central government imposed 
housing and tenant-participation policy and the council had unfairly marginalised 
Unity and helped START to obtain the TARA support it needed to be officially 
recognized. Much controversy had surrounded the demise of Unity (which had 
opposed the transfer of council-owned housing to RSLs) and activists aligned with 
this TARA coalition viewed START as helping the council to implement unpopular 
national housing policies at the local level. Important tenant housing concerns and 
grievances were left unresolved after the demise of Unity and former supporters of 
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this organization were still about and on the board of START.  Some of the START 
board members who had been aligned with Unity had not supported Jean 
Gleadall, START’s first chair, or her relations with some senior Liberal Democrat 
councillors and council officers. These board members were also critical of the 
way START operated and they worked to undermine the credibility of START 
decisions that they felt were not in the best interests of the tenants that they 
represented. The outcome was a failure sometimes to work together in genuinely 
collaborative and innovative ways. 
 
The next section sets out the new concept of disempowering involvement, used to 
help explain the spiral of worsening relations and crisis in collaborative working 
that developed between START and Sheffield City Council. The concept 
embraces the idea that to understand collaboration at the meso- or organizational-
level, it is necessary to have an in-depth knowledge of macro- or institutional-level 
phenomena and how they impact on organizations and collaborative activities. It 
might be easy to identify some institutional phenomena because they relate to the 
impact of central government housing and tenant participation legislation and 
guidance on TARA and council collaboration. It might be less easy to identify other 
institutional phenomena because they relate to the impact of institutionalised 
traditions, customs, and norms on TARA and council collaboration and how 
individuals think about issues and behave at the local level, which are often implicit 
rather than explicit. 
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8.2 Disempowering involvement 
 
The research shows that different macro-level (institutional), meso-level 
(organizational), and micro-level (individuals interacting) activities and actions are 
complex and interconnected, with phenomena and events that happen at one level 
impacting on phenomena and events that happen at other levels. At the meso- or 
organizational-level, there were problems between START and the council caused 
by differences in organizational culture and difficulties agreeing the purpose of 
collaboration. Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative inertia 
provides insights that show how organizations' inability to share power and 
resources effectively can lead to collaborative outputs or outcomes that are less 
than could reasonably be expected. However, this theory like that on collaborative 
advantage fails to deal adequately with the way that institutions and power shape 
the political environment and opportunities for organizations to get involved in 
different types of collaboration. 
 
Organizations operate in an institutional environment where particular customs, 
laws, rules, and regulations underpin the development of organizational practice 
and ways of working that both enable and constrain activity and action. 
Organizations can influence and change institutions but their ability to do so will 
often be determined by structural constraints on organizational freedom.  Such 
structural constraints include the demands on organizations that come from other 
organizations that they depend on for their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). At 
the institutional-level, central government devised and changed the national 
housing and tenant participation policies that helped to determine how Sheffield 
City Council would work with TARAs and find them either co-operative or un-co-
operative. Central government policies also influenced the council’s decisions to 
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take more control over how monies were collected and allocated to support TARA 
activities and introduce a TARA-recognition policy to try to reduce uncertainty in 
TARA and council relations. Meanwhile, activists in collaboration were treated 
differently depending on how their demands fitted with a dominant central 
government language of collaborative-working. 
 
On the face of it, the New Labour government’s desire to ensure a wide range of 
organizations are involved in collaboration to improve neighbourhoods and local 
services, and apparent support for bottom-up solutions to neighbourhood 
problems, was laudable (Foley and Martin, 2000) because it emphasised the 
importance of empowering community groups (see chapter 1, section 1.2). 
However, a difference is often discernible between what is contained in formal texts 
and the reality of actual day-to-day practice (Foucault, 1978). Mandated 
collaboration can help to sustain dominant–subservient relations between central 
government and organizations at the local level (Sullivan et al., 2006). START and 
council relations and collaboration felt coercive and forced to a significant number 
of prominent activists in Sheffield. They were frustrated because they could not get 
some of their housing concerns and priorities for action to solve neighbourhood 
problems onto relevant agendas. Not enough space existed in collaboration for 
what Mouffe (2005) has called agonistic deliberations in which the positive aspects 
of certain forms of conflict are explicitly recognized. In collaboration that includes 
plenty of scope for agonistic  deliberations the campaigning role of the TARA would 
be better recognized than it has been in the past through a greater focus on the 
value of identifying different as well as similar views and thinking on issues. 
Activists were more involved in collaboration, but often felt frustrated and angry at 
the lack of power and influence they had over important decisions about the future 
of council-owned housing. 
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These findings suggest that institutional pressures on organizations and the way 
that power operates can result in the suppression of conflict and contribute to a 
problematic process of non-decision-making and inertia, or a process of 
‘disempowering involvement’. 
 
More than just inertia 
 
Huxham and Vangen (2004, p. 191) say that collaborative inertia occurs when, 
“The output from a collaborative arrangement is negligible, the rate of output is 
extremely slow, or stories of pain and hard grind are integral to successes 
achieved.” A number of factors at the meso- or organizational-level were found to 
contribute to the onset of collaborative inertia. They are difficulties in:  
 
• agreeing joint purpose 
• communicating because of differences in culture, values, and language 
• developing joint modes of operating 
• managing power imbalances and building trust 
• managing accountability 
• dealing with the sheer logistics of working with others.  
(Huxham and Vangen, 2000a) 
 
However, the circumstances that contribute to organizations and individuals 
experiencing disempowering involvement in collaboration go beyond focusing 
mainly on the effect of phenomena occurring mainly at the organizational-level in 
collaboration. The process of disempowering involvement includes much more 
emphasis on macro- or institutional-level activities and actions that help to 
influence or determine what opportunities exist for organizations to participate in 
different types of collaboration. In this study a combination of central government 
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legislation and regulation steered collaboration in a particular direction that closed 
down as well as opened up deliberative and decision-making opportunities. There 
were also unintended consequences when Sheffield City Council responded to 
legislation by introducing a recognition policy that risked excluding some TARAs 
and extending its control over funds distributed to TARAs to support their activities. 
Even if the council and TARAs had managed to sort out all of the organizational 
problems that could cause collaborative inertia there were institutional phenomena 
impacting on collaboration in ways that would cause difficulties in relations.  For 
example, there was a central government approach to collaborative-working that 
was often quite bureaucratic and prescriptive which combined with the council’s 
responses to legislation, set in motion a train of events that led to START and 
some activists experiencing disempowering involvement in collaboration. The 
different circumstances that contribute to organizations’ or individuals’ 
experiencing the effects of disempowering involvement in collaboration feed into 
each other and can produce a downward spiral in trust, leading to an 
intensification of organizations’ and individuals’ distrust of each other and 
worsening inter-organizational and inter-personal relations. The institutional and 
collaborative circumstances underpinning the process of disempowering 
involvement are set out in figure 15 and include: 
 
• bureaucratic and prescribed ways of working 
• inequalities of power and control over important resources 
• differences in organizations’ level of influence over strategy and 
policymaking 
• imbalances in the opportunities that exist to participate in instrumental and 
ideological collaboration 
• a lack of opportunities to challenge a dominant culture, values, and beliefs 
• reduced freedom for organizations to campaign on some issues 
• conflict is suppressed or ignored in collaboration 
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• a loss of organizational autonomy and organizations becoming more like 
each other 
• reaching a premature consensus on issues and non-decision-making 
• a failure to work together in genuinely new and innovative ways
 Central government 
core culture, values, 
thinking, policy, 
bureaucracy, and 
prescribed ways of 
working 
Failure to work 
together in 
genuinely new 
and collaborative 
ways 
Coercive pressures on councils 
to implement national housing, 
Best Value, and tenant 
participation policies or face the 
prospect of losing access to 
needed central government 
funds or intervention to take 
control of services 
TARA and Council disputes 
concerning power and control 
over important resources 
including funds, information, and 
expertise 
 
Council funding of START and 
the Tenants Levy 
A council tendency to prefer to 
reach a consensus on issues 
relatively quickly and non 
decision-making where ideas 
are dropped early on in 
discussions or do not enter 
people’s imaginations in the first 
place 
A loss of START and TARA 
independence and TARAs 
becoming more like each other 
 
The council’s TARA 
recognition policy and 
organizational isomorphism 
Imbalance between 
opportunities for START 
and TARAs to participate 
in instrumental and 
ideological collaboration 
Reduced freedom for 
START and TARAs to 
campaign on some 
housing and 
neighbourhood issues Sometimes conflict over 
resources, power, 
values, and ways of 
working are ignored or 
suppressed 
START and TARAs 
experienced a lack of 
opportunities to 
challenge a dominant 
culture, values, and 
beliefs 
START and TARA 
disputes with the 
council concerning 
influence over 
housing strategy 
and policymaking 
Figure 18: Factors contributing to organizations 
experiencing disempowering involvement in collaboration 
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In Sheffield, not all TARAs or activists experienced disempowering involvement in 
collaboration and much useful instrumental work was being undertaken to improve 
neighbourhoods and local services. Nevertheless, as the points already outlined 
show, some overly bureaucratic and prescriptive central government policies, 
council reactions to them, and inequalities of power and control over  important 
resources helped cause a situation where there were inadequate opportunities for 
TARA activist involvement in ideological collaboration that challenged central 
government policies and established ways of working.  This caused some TARA 
activists to experience disempowering involvement in collaboration.  They felt 
unable to effectively influence housing policies and strategies or the culture, 
values, and beliefs underpinning collaboration and its purpose. A number of these 
activists were START board members and some had been aligned with Unity, the 
TARA coalition that had opposed the transfer of council-owned housing to RSLs. 
START lacked independence from the council that provided it with most of its 
funds and low rent office accommodation, and dissatisfied activists complained 
about not being able to get some tenant concerns and grievances onto relevant 
agendas for discussion, fewer opportunities to campaign on housing issues, and a 
lack of power needed to ensure a wide range of views and ideas on housing 
matters were debated. Consequently, the fallout from the disempowering 
involvement that these activists experienced was serious, and included damaged 
relations of trust between the council and the wider tenants and residents 
movement, the eventual collapse of TARA representation at a citywide level, and 
in some instances a failure to work together in genuinely new and innovative ways. 
 
The next sub-section elaborates on how a process of disempowering involvement 
affecting organizations and individuals involved in collaboration impacted on the 
types of issues considered, the decisions made, and outcomes. 
  - 290 -  
Missing knowledge and non-decision-making 
 
The New Labour government outlined in different housing and tenant participation 
policy documents how it wanted TARA and council collaboration to consist of 
certain activities and actions (see chapter 1, section 1.1). In Sheffield, the council 
could have obtained extra knowledge about tenant housing experiences as well as 
concerns and grievances through a better dialogue between tenants and their 
representatives. Sometimes it seemed missing knowledge had contributed to a 
process of non-decision-making in collaboration (caused by failure to obtain 
sufficient information about tenant experiences and provide adequate space for the 
development of potential solutions to housing problems).  The institutional 
environment within which TARA and council collaboration was located helped 
prevent some deliberations from happening. 
 
The process of disempowering involvement includes the rejection or suppression of 
some of the views and experiences of a less powerful organization or organizations 
in collaboration by more powerful organizations that deem them inappropriate or 
irrelevant. Indeed, the circumstances in which power is configured can be 
organized so that, consciously or not, certain types of organizational practice are 
privileged over others (Foucault, 1977). Sheffield City Council had much power and 
control over important resources and was able to devise organizational standards 
that TARAs needed to meet to gain official recognition and access to tenants’ levy 
monies that it collected on their behalf. At the same time, it was possible to put 
pressure on TARAs to help meet central government demands concerning the 
implementation of national policies at the local level. An organization’s 
disempowering involvement in collaboration will often consist of taking part in 
activities that mean some types of knowledge or experience are prematurely 
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discounted and potential alternative ways of thinking about problems are not 
explored. These effects might have been mitigated by individuals in the council 
who could have championed or nurtured collaborative relationships and 
collaborative working (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). The status and power of key 
individuals in collaboration is a significant factor in the success of collaborations 
(Huxham and Vangen 2003, 2005). Unfortunately, the council’s tenant participation 
officers, trying to act on behalf of TARAs, lacked the power and status that would 
ensure their views were taken seriously. 
 
In modern times, collaborations have become a key policy instrument in the new 
centralism that consists of the implementation of specific centrally initiated 
programmes of action at the local level (Skelcher, 2004). An increase in 
collaborative activity at the local level was accompanied by new central 
government devised methods of regulating it incorporated into housing and Best 
Value performance management practice. New opportunities for communities to 
be involved in shaping their future may represent a new form of governing ‘at a 
distance’, and can be seen as perpetuating state power through new forms of 
technical and managerial control (Taylor, 2003). The upshot is TARAs are invited 
to participate in different discussions, but lack the power or influence over 
collaborative agendas and strategic policymaking needed to make a substantial 
difference. Organizations can work together whilst existing relations of power 
between them remain largely unchanged (Balloch and Taylor, 2001). 
 
The next sub-section considers how the concept of disempowering involvement 
can be used to develop an enhanced theory of collaborative advantage. 
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An enhanced theory of collaborative advantage 
 
Huxham (1991) is interested in collaboration and the capacity of organizations to 
collaborate. She developed ideas on collaboration and collaborative advantage 
and collaborative inertia while working with public organizations to produce 
strategies for collaborative working. Huxham and Vangen (2003, 2005) recognized 
the environment within which collaboration is located can influence organizations’ 
decisions about its purpose, and even suggested that central government policies 
and funding regimes often steer collaborations at the local level in particular 
directions. However, they do not provide an in-depth understanding of the 
involvement of institutions and power in shaping or determining the political 
environment within which collaboration is located. Nor do they focus much on the 
role that institutions play in creating different opportunities for organizations and 
individuals to participate in instrumental or ideological collaboration. 
 
Institutional structures and social forms are created by organizations and 
individuals, but can take on a separateness of their own and an ability to 
independently enable or constrain organizational activities (Giddens, 1979, 1983). 
The theory of collaborative advantage could be further enhanced, if developments 
in institutional theory and the theory of power are used to improve understanding of 
the effects of a dominant institutionalized language of collaboration and established 
traditions and ways of working on the actions and activities of organizations and 
individuals. It is also useful to consider how central government mandated 
collaboration works where the organizations have very different cultures and 
values and large inequalities of power exist between them. Lukes’ (1974) three-
dimensional view of power helps to show how some organizations can be 
disadvantaged in such situations. First, institutional actions can stop some issues 
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getting onto relevant agendas. Second, institutional pressure on organizations to 
achieve certain objectives can mean the potential for conflict exists where people’s 
real interests are not recognised and met. Third, a process of non-decision-making 
may develop in situations where people’s views and preferences increasingly 
conform with institutionalized practice, and they become less able to imagine any 
alternative to the situation they are in. 
 
The next section considers the value of the research and the scope for future 
research on collaboration especially between large public sector and small 
community-based organizations. 
 
8.3 Limitations of the research and future directions 
 
My interest was in theoretical generalizations not statistical predictions. I was 
concerned not with prediction but aiming to generate new theory that can better 
explain why collaboration can be problematic and lead to inertia or worse actually 
disadvantage some of the parties involved. Kennedy (1979) suggests it is possible 
to generalise or comment on what might happen in various research situations 
using evidence gathered from a single case study if the data collected captures 
the characteristics of the phenomena under examination because similar findings 
are likely to emerge in other similar situations. I wanted to improve understanding 
of mandated TARA and council collaboration and emphasise the potential for the 
transferability of learning to other similar situations where organizations are 
collaborating. In particular, it is likely there will be many instances where 
organizations are faced with one or more of the problems identified in this thesis 
that can lead to one or more of them experiencing a sense of disempowering 
involvement in collaboration.  
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In different parts of chapter 3 (especially sections 3.1 and 3.4), descriptions were 
provided of various research limitations. Three issues that had a noticeable impact 
on decision about the way to conduct the research were: 
 
• The timescale for the completion of the thesis 
• The time that could be spent in the field 
• The availability of financial and human resources 
 
The timescale for the completion of the thesis meant it was necessary to 
undertake fieldwork and obtain the bulk of the interview, observation, and 
secondary data needed over a period of approximately nine months.  There was 
limited scope for preliminary investigations of the case study location and 
opportunities for extended pilot work with relevant individuals to develop ideas 
about semi-structured interview questions and who to interview. A restricted level 
of resources in terms of the finances available to undertake a period of intensive 
fieldwork (and cover the costs of travel, accommodation, and subsistence) helped 
focus attention on the need to avoid spending too much time on data collection 
and being careful to limit visits to the case study location.  The limited time spent in 
the field constrained attempts to build a deeper rapport with people and get to 
know them well.  In addition, there were fewer opportunities than there might have 
been to make contact with different individuals and get them to tell their stories 
about their housing experiences, the role of START, and TARA and council 
collaboration.  The sole researcher involved in research planning and a 
simultaneous process of data collection and analysis must carefully divide their 
time between the different activities to ensure that the effective and efficient 
completion of the research. In such a situation, the amount of time devoted to any 
single research activity must not jeopardise work on other research activities.  No 
scope existed for the employment of other researchers to help with research 
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activities if it was not possible to complete them on time. 
 
Doing some things differently might have helped improve the research.  Even 
within the tight timescales set for the completion of the research more time could 
have been spent on planning fieldwork activities.  First, through devoting more 
time to establishing early contacts with key gatekeepers a reduction in the time 
spent on such work later on when interview and observation activities are taking 
up much time is achievable. Second, an extension of the pilot work phase of the 
research to include more space for thinking about how data collection would link 
with data analysis could have helped prevent some of the early struggles to cope 
with a simultaneous process of data collection and analysis.  The logistics of such 
a process and fitting it in with other research activities proved much more difficult 
than anticipated.  Third, despite the constraints on the time available to carry out 
different research activities some longer periods of days and weeks spent in the 
field might help ensure much richer and varied data is collected. 
 
Further elaboration on the process of disempowering involvement and its effects 
on different organizations and individuals in collaboration would help to more 
accurately determine its pervasiveness and the damage that it does to inter-
organizational relationships. At the same time, it might be possible to identify 
additional factors that contribute to the onset of disempowering involvement. What 
is needed is a much more concentrated focus on the role of institutions and how 
their activities and actions impact on organizations and collaboration. An improved 
understanding of how institutional rules and regulations impact on organizations 
and collaboration at the local level is needed that helps to show how 
institutionalized traditions, customs, norms, and widely accepted ways of working 
affect organizations and collaboration. Much scope exists to better integrate 
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institutional theory and theory on power with a well developed description and 
analysis of the different factors that can contribute to the process of 
disempowering involvement.   
 
And finally… 
 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, 
but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past” 
(Karl Marx 1852). 
 
Embedded institutional values and beliefs can acquire an enduring presence of 
their own in society that guides the actions of organizations and individuals in the 
future (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  This thesis shows that despite the central 
government rhetoric on the value of collaboration it did not work well in Sheffield. 
The council did many of the things that Huxham and Vangen (2005) say are 
important to make collaboration successful but many problems arose. Even if 
organizations have the capacity to collaborate and are able to trust each other, 
share power and resources, and agree common goals, collaboration may still not 
work. Institutional cultures, values, and beliefs, and socially embedded traditions, 
customs, and norms all affect the way institutional pressures, the political 
environment, and political opportunity structures develop and influence or 
determine what organizations emerge and get involved in collaboration at the local 
level. An enhanced theory of collaboration will use the concept of disempowering 
involvement and a three-dimensional view of power to show how institutions can 
cause organizations and individuals to act in certain predictable ways that impact 
on how they collaborate. 
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The research showed how institutional actions and the institutional environment 
impact on collaboration at the local level and contributed to a spiral of deteriorating 
TARA and council relations and a process of disempowering involvement. 
 
Three key conclusions stand out from a theoretical viewpoint. First, Huxham and 
Vangen’s (2005) theory of collaborative advantage fails to deal with the combined 
influence of institutions and power on the purpose of collaboration and what it can 
achieve.  Second, the use of institutional theory and theory on power to explain 
collaborative phenomena has shown how collaboration can lead not just to inertia, 
but a process of disempowering involvement can occur that disadvantages one of 
more of the stakeholders in a collaboration.  These theories have also helped to 
provide insights on the way institutional policies caused expected and unexpected 
activities and actions at the organizational level.  Some of these activities and 
actions caused some stakeholders to feel disillusioned and frustrated with 
collaboration and contributed to the onset of a process of disempowering 
involvement that affected some stakeholders and left them disadvantaged.  Third, 
institutional theory and theory on power can be used to develop an enhanced 
theory of collaboration.  This enhanced theory will have an increased capacity to 
explain the way that institutional activities and actions help shape the environment 
within which organizations emerge in the first place and thrive or not.  A greater 
emphasis will be given to examining the way institutions favour particular types of 
knowledge and experience over others and contribute to the creation or elimination 
of opportunities for organizations to get things onto relevant agendas and get 
involved in decision-making processes. 
 
 
 
  - 298 -  
The thesis also provides some practical findings and conclusions with implications 
for policy.  First, the importance, from the outset, of honesty and clear 
communications about the purpose of collaboration and what it can achieve 
together with warnings about the dangers of creating unrealistic expectations is 
highlighted. Second, the need for a realistic assessment of the extent to which 
collaboration can involve all relevant organizations (including those with a 
campaigning or advocacy role) and deal with ideological deliberations is required.  
Third, it is useful to explicitly acknowledge that collaboration may not always have 
the potential to be a ‘good thing’ or be the best way to deal with complex social 
problems.  Sometimes the institutional environment that exists will cause a 
particular collaboration to fail because it prevents some problems at the meso- or 
organizagtional-level from being solved. Fourth, policymakers and collaborating 
organizations might benefit from an awareness of the potential for a process of 
disempowering involvement to arise that means one or more of the less powerful 
stakeholders in a collaboration are disadvantaged because they have inadequate 
opportunities to contribute to collaboration in ways that ensure they are able to 
provide innovative inputs in discussions and develop their own ideas and solutions 
to problems. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The New Labour Way 
 
The New Labour government, elected in 1997, introduced a type of third way 
politics, “shaped by Thatcherism yet also a reaction against it” (Lister 2001, p.425). 
It was a third way politics that assimilated some Conservative ideas but involved 
much policy adoption or adaption as well. A key aim was to create a new set of 
welfare policies based on rights and responsibilities. At the same time, there was 
an increased emphasis on cooperation and joint-working between public and 
private service providers in a new partnership for a new age (Powell 2000). 
Labour’s programme of policy development and implementation was guided by a 
belief that electoral success had in large part been achieved by renouncing a 
various old Labour welfare state values (Burnham 2001). Meanwhile, as Lister 
(2001, p.431) points out there was a “reluctance to acknowledge the power of 
deep structural inequalities and a shift from a concern with equality to a focus on 
social inclusion and opportunity”. 
 
Bevir and O’Brien (2001) have elaborated on a New Labour approach that builds 
on the idea of a society made up of empowered stakeholder organizations and 
individuals contributing to the social and economic well-being of the UK. In turn, 
central government adopted a managerialist approach that emphasised that what 
matters is what works and promoted more joined up government to help to solve 
carefully demarcated problems (Lister 2001). Central government interest in 
performance measurement also increased despite the old Labour warnings about 
the “dangers of organizations pursuing their own targets to the detriment of overall 
public service goals” (Cutler and Waine 2000, p.322). An enabling state and 
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participating citizens would help to facilitate the development of partnerships 
based on trust and various shared user and provider responsibilities and 
objectives to improve local neighbourhoods and services (Bevir and O’Brien 
2001). However, Burnham (2001, p.128) suggests these new partnerships also 
involved a process of depoliticisation or “placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making”. Meanwhile, central government politicians and 
officials continue to maintain arm’s-length control or influence over important 
resources and deliberations and benefit from the distancing effects of 
depoliticisation. 
 
The Best Value regime, for example, comprises a stakeholder review of services 
to ascertain what services to provide in an area and how they should be delivered.  
Best Value is different from CCT because local authorities are not obliged to 
submit services to a competitive tendering process or privatise services. New 
Labour felt that it was not always desirable to expose public sector services to 
competitive market scrutiny. However, Bevir and O’Brien (2001, p.541) points out 
that central government remained concerned about bureaucratic inefficiency and 
“marketisation is seen as an appropriate response in at least some cases, so that 
‘competition’ will retain an important role in service delivery”. But, Clarence and 
Painter 1998 suggest that despite the apparent flexibility in Best Value policy the 
threat hanging over local authorities of central government intervention to secure 
improvements in services in some situations does not augur well for building trust 
in central and local government relations or increased collaborative working 
between organizations at the local level.  
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A focus on community action is a fundamental part of the New Labour philosophy 
that helps to separate it from both Conservative and Old Labour ideas and target 
the deleterious effects of the market on people and the places where they live. 
Indeed, “community is invoked in the third way as an antidote to the effects of the 
free market in producing inequality” (Levitas 2000. P.194). Much recent interest in 
citizen participation has emerged in response to concerns about a democratic 
deficit, desire to improve the legitimacy of decision making, and protestations by 
disadvantaged people wanting more say in matters that affect their lives (Barnes, 
Newman and Sullivan 2004). Levels of New Labour activity designed to promote 
the inclusion and empowerment of local citizens to improve the areas in which 
they live are substantially higher and different to that seen under the 
Conservatives. In particular, the emphasis is “not just on economic development 
but renewing local democracy and tackling social exclusion” (Bache and Catney 
2008, p.425). In turn, the development of ideas concerning opportunity and the 
building of a political and social environment based on equality and respect for 
each other’s views marks out New Labour philosophy on the role of the 
community. The aim is to ensure the provision of “high quality services delivered 
by local partnerships characterised by high levels of user and community 
participation and offering sufficient consumer choice” (Ellison and Ellison 2006, 
p.338). 
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                                                       Fax: (01908) 655898 
                                                       International No. +44 1908 
655888 
                                                       http://oubs.open.ac.uk 
 
15 November 2002 
 
Caroline Moore      Robert Dalziel 
Tenants Participation Manager    PhD Student 
Sheffield City Council 
 
Dear Caroline 
Collaborative Working Between Tenants and Residents 
Associations and their Local Authority  
In July, I was able to meet with your colleague, Alison Jones, to talk about my 
research interest in collaboration between tenants and residents associations and 
their local authority. I gained a useful insight into some of the collaborative work 
that is going on between associations' and the City Council in Sheffield. I also 
enjoyed very much my visit to a meeting of the Council's 'City-Wide Housing 
Forum' where I listened to a debate on housing management and 'Best Value' and 
talked to some people about their experiences of work with tenants and residents 
associations. There is certainly a great deal of varied association and council 
collaborative activity going on in Sheffield.  
I am now ready, having prepared a detailed research proposal, to begin talking to 
people in different tenants and residents associations and the City Council about 
their experiences of collaborative and partnership working. A useful starting point 
would be a meeting with yourself to talk about your experiences of collaboration 
and partnership working with different associations in the city. I will telephone 
sometime in the next week to arrange a suitable time when we can meet.  
I have enclosed, with this letter, an overview of my research proposal. Please do 
not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or queries about it. I look 
forward very much to meeting you soon.  
Yours sincerely 
Robert Dalziel 
BUSINESS 
 SCHOOL 
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Robert Dalziel 
PhD Student  
 
 
26 November 2002 
 
Ann Pemberton 
Chair START 
 
 
Dear Ann 
Collaborative Working Between Tenants and Residents Associations and 
their Local Authority  
In July, I was able to meet briefly with Joanne Field and Patricia Mason, at the 
START office, to talk about my research interest in collaborative working between 
tenants and residents associations and their local authority. I gained a very useful 
and informative insight into some of the collaborative work that is going on 
between different associations and the City Council in Sheffield. I also enjoyed 
very much my visit to a meeting of the Council's 'City-Wide Housing Forum' where 
I was able to listen to a debate on 'Best Value' and housing management and talk 
to some people about their experiences of the 'Best Value' process. There is 
certainly a great deal happening in Sheffield.  
I am now ready, having prepared a detailed research proposal, to begin talking to 
more people in different tenants and residents associations and the City Council in 
Sheffield about their experiences of collaborative and partnership working. A 
useful starting point would be separate meetings with you, Joanne and Patricia. I 
will telephone early next week to arrange a mutually convenient place and times to 
meet.  
I have enclosed, with this letter a summary of my research proposal. Please do not 
hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or queries about it. I look forward 
very much to meeting you soon. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Robert Dalziel 
 
 
 
  - 345 -  
APPENDIX 4 
 
Research Proposal 
Collaborative Working Between Tenants and Residents 
Associations and Their Local Authority 
Robert Dalziel 
Open University Business School 
Email: r.m.dalziel@open.ac.uk 
 
The Housing Act (2000) and the Local Government Act (2000) have given tenants 
new rights and by changing local government structures altered their relations with 
the local authority. New statutory undertakings including the 'Best Value' review 
and the compilation of 'Tenants Compacts' emphasise the importance of 
collaborative working as a means to more effectively plan and deliver local 
services and meet government neighbourhood management and development 
targets. At the same time various incentives have encouraged tenants and 
residents associations to adopt new practices and formal constitutions to make 
themselves more representative and accountable to funders and their members.  
My research aims to investigate collaboration between different tenants and 
residents associations and their local authority and consider the local context 
within which that collaboration occurs. It will look to see how the recent housing 
and local government legislation has affected democracy and collaboration at the 
local and neighbourhood level. This kind of research is not currently being done 
and there are significant gaps in our knowledge and understanding of collaboration 
between tenants and residents associations and the local authority. I hope that my 
research and the theoretical ideas that it will generate can help associations and 
the local authority to gain a novel insight into their own situations and 
collaboration.  
Collaboration between tenants and residents associations and the local authority 
can help to get things done in an area like making sure that the streets are kept 
clean, the dustbins are emptied when they should be and there is a quick and 
efficient housing maintenance and repairs service. Collaboration can also help to 
ensure that government neighbourhood management and development targets 
are achieved. It may be much more difficult or even impossible to achieve some 
desired objectives where the different organizations in an area work in isolation 
from each other. The local political opportunity structure or the political culture in 
an area which serves to encourage (or not) debate on local matters and 
participation in local decision making has been identified as having a significant 
impact on the possibilities for collaboration and partnership working (Bockmeyer 
2000, Stevenson and Greenberg 2000). 
Collaboration between different organizations is a key component of the 'Best 
Value' review and 'Tenants Compacts' which seek to examine and improve local 
services and show how tenants and residents associations and the local authority 
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can work together to achieve desired neighbourhood management and 
development objectives. Through collaboration the different interdependencies 
that exist between associations and the local authority can be harnessed to 
produce a different and better response to local problems. But, a focus on 
collaboration that is principally about managing the planning and delivery of local 
services may not be the only or the best way to tackle some of the more difficult 
problems that face a neighbourhood. Sometimes new collaborative opportunities 
and structures may have to be created.  If the circumstances are right the different 
people who are involved in collaboration can develop a range of skills and 
capacities, which can help them to achieve desired objectives. Working directly 
with the local authority and its officers or indirectly through different intermediaries 
and brokers, forming strategic alliances and coalitions and taking up positions on 
different committees and boards of the local authority and other local 
organizations.  
I intend to use a qualitative research methodology to get an in-depth account of 
people's experiences of collaboration at the local and neighbourhood level. Using 
a case study approach to focus on collaboration between three or four tenants and 
residents associations and the local authority. Eliciting different perspectives and 
considering what a person's comments reveal about their experiences of 
collaboration and how they can be used to make inferences about the state of the 
actual collaborative environment. The research will entail collecting a considerable 
amount of detailed or 'rich' information about collaboration between tenants and 
residents associations and the local authority. The findings will be used to improve 
our knowledge and understanding of collaboration and develop some of the 
theoretical ideas that are used to describe and explain collaboration and its 
function and purpose at the local and neighbourhood level.  
The methods that will be used to collect information and data on collaboration 
between tenants and residents associations and the local authority are described 
in table 1 below.  
Method What it Involves 
Interviews  
Talking informally and tape-recording conversations with different 
people, in tenants and residents associations and the local 
authority, about their experiences of collaborative and partnership 
working. 
Observation  
Attending different formal and informal meetings of tenants and 
residents associations and the local authority and observing 
events. 
Field Notes  A detailed written account of my observations, thoughts and reflections. 
Focus Groups  
Working with small groups of tenants and residents to learn more 
about their collective experiences of collaborative and partnership 
working. 
Secondary Material  Scanning books and journals, pamphlets, documents, minutes, newspapers, publicity and archive material. 
Table 1: Data Collection Methods 
The issues of confidentiality and anonymity are very important and have been 
carefully considered during the research planning and design phases. The aim is 
to give people clear information about the research and its purpose and tell them 
how the findings might be used in any future deliberations or reports. People must, 
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as far as it is possible, be given the opportunity to consent or not to take part in the 
research.  
Research in the field will last for about one year and focus on collaboration 
between three or four tenants and residents associations and the local authority. 
Between thirty and forty interviews will be carried out with people in the different 
associations and the local authority. Each interview is anticipated to last for about 
one hour and will take place at a mutually convenient time and location. In addition 
I will require access to some of the meetings of the tenants and residents 
associations and the local authority and some of their documents and records that 
are relevant to collaboration between them.  
Bockmeyer, I.L., (2000) 'A Culture of Distrust: The Impact of Local Political Culture on Participation 
in the Detroit EZ', Urban Studies, VoU7, Issue 13, Dec. 2000.  
Stevenson, W.B., and Greenberg, D., (2000) 'Agency and Social Networks: Strategies of Action in 
a Social Structure of Position, Opposition and Opportunity', Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol.45, Issue 4, Dec. 2000. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Robert Dalziel 
Open University 
Business School 
16 April 2003 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Tenants and Residents Associations and Partnership Working 
I am a mature full-time PhD student with the Open University's Business School in 
Milton Keynes. I worked in industry and then the voluntary sector for a while before 
I was fortunate enough to get the opportunity to pursue my research interest in the 
work of tenants and residents associations.  
I would like to talk to different people in Sheffield who are involved with the tenants 
and residents movement. To obtain their views and opinions on the role and work 
of tenants and residents associations and partnership working. I want to produce a 
document that will be a unique reflection of the history of the tenants' movement in 
Sheffield as well as a snapshot of current activity.  
As an active member of the tenants and residents movement I would very much 
like to meet with you to talk about your work at a time and place that is convenient 
for you. Your comments will be very useful and confidentiality is guaranteed. No 
individual will be identified in any report or document.  
I very much hope you can help me and I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or queries. 
Yours Sincerely 
 
Robert Dalziel  
 
Please reply using the most convenient means: 
Open University Business School    Telephone: 07748380769 
Michael Young Building      Fax: 01537 23987 
Milton Keynes       Email: r.m.dalziel@open.ac.uk 
MK 
 
 
  - 349 -  
APPENDIX 6 
Why do Tenants and Residents Associations Collaborate? 
Semi-Structured Interview Themes 
Theme  Possibilities for Discussion  
Local Political Opportunity 
Structure 
How does the local political opportunity structure affect 
opportunities for collaboration? 
 
 
How well do activists and associations understand their 
environment and the local political opportunity structure? 
 
 
How much is known about the different opportunities for 
collective action and collaboration that exist in an area? 
 
 
How might the political opportunity structure determine 
whether collaboration is instrumental or ideological? 
 
 
What local authority help is made available to associations 
and at what cost? 
 
 
To what extent do associations and the local authority 
value each other's role and work? 
 
Strategies for Influence and 
Action  
Who is influential?  
Why are they influential? 
How is influence exercised?  
 
 
What strategies do activists use to gain influence and 
power for themselves and the association they represent? 
 
 
How do activists and others know what they want to 
achieve? 
 
 
What about disruptive strategies and conduct that 
devalues or destabilises collaboration? 
 
 
What is the role of the umbrella federation of tenants and 
residents associations? 
 
 
To what extent does each of the partners in collaboration 
participate and exercise options? 
 
 
What are the time, skills and capacities needed for 
collaboration? 
 
Historical Relations and 
Context  
How have relations between associations and the local 
authority developed over time and what are the 
implications for collaboration? 
 
 
How do historical patterns of collective action affect the 
development of existing organizations, institutions and 
collaboration? 
 
What are the effects of existing traditions and cultures are 
they a help or hindrance? 
 
What are the effects of language, protocol, procedure and 
process on collaboration? 
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Power  
Who has it? 
Why do they have it? 
How do they use it? 
 
 
Is there a 'real' transfer of power from the 
Local authority to associations or can the local 
authority substantially retain its power but in a different 
form? 
 
 
What values, beliefs and interests predominate in 
collaboration? 
 
 
What are the implications for collaboration of power derived 
from mandate and power derived 
from authority? 
 
 
How does power operate in conscious and visible ways and 
unconscious and invisible ways? 
 
 
How are policy preferences decided and implemented? 
 
 
Power is it: one-dimensional where decision-making 
behaviour is observable and it is assumed there will be 'real' 
and observable conflict? 
 
 
People's actions are based on conscious preferences and 
they are aware of their interests and articulate them? 
 
 
Power is it: two-dimensional where the 'mobilization of bias' 
as a concept, that is, a set of predominant values, beliefs 
and institutional procedures (rules of the game) operate 
systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain 
individuals or organizations? 
 
 
Power is it: three-dimensional where decisions are choices 
consciously and intentionally made by individuals between 
alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be 
mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither 
consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular 
individuals choices? The bias of the system is not simply 
maintained by a series of individually chosen acts but also 
by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour 
of groups and the practices of institutions? 
 
 
What about dissident activists and associations 
and resistance to council policies?   
 
  Authority 
Who has it? 
Why do they have it? 
How do they use it? 
 
 
Is responsibility different from authority? 
 
What different domains do the partners in collaboration 
possess? 
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Resources  
What sorts of dependencies exist between associations 
and the local authority?  
  
 
What sorts of interdependencies exist between 
associations and the local authority? 
 
 
What sorts of exchange relationships exist? 
 
 
How are the resources required for collaboration mobilized 
and used? 
 
Control  
 
Who controls access to and use of different resources? 
 
  
Who has access to and control over different channels of 
communication? 
 
 
How is collaboration initiated and by whom? 
 
 
How are the priorities for collaboration decided and 
actions decided? 
 
 
What incentives are there which might encourage 
consensus and compliance rather than conflict and 
resistance? 
 
 
What are the processes, which operate to modify views 
and expectations and reduce or eliminate conflict? 
 
 
What housing and estate budgets and functions are 
controlled by the different organizations? 
 
 
What is the role of the tenants and residents association 
federation? 
 
 
What are the internal and external forces acting on 
organizations and collaboration? 
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Collaborative Purpose  
 
Why collaborate?  
With whom? 
What for? 
 
 
Is collaboration a requirement, needed or even always the 
best way to achieve objectives? 
 
 
Collaboration on what terms? 
 
 
How is collaboration managed? 
 
 
What are the benefits and costs of collaboration? 
 
 
What about free riding (the exploitation of the few by the 
many) making a limited or no contribution but receiving 
'free' public services? 
 
 
What about social structural barriers and unequal power 
that can make difficult or prevent participation (the 
exploitation of the many by the few) and the emergence of 
elites? 
 
 
How does collaboration help organizations deal with 
uncertainty and the problem of scarce resources? 
 
 
What different contributions to collaboration do tenants 
and residents associations and the local authority make 
and why? 
 
 
What are the different meta-goals (for collaboration), 
organizational goals and individual goals? 
 
 
What are the different explicit goals, assumed goals and 
hidden goals of collaboration? 
 
 
Whose capacity is being developed and what for? 
 
 
Is collaboration about empowerment or more responsibility 
without a 'real' shift in power from the local authority to 
associations? 
 
 
How much is collaboration about rational choice, 
contingent choice, serendipity, non-decisions or no choice 
at all? 
 
Task Oriented Instrumental 
Collaboration 
 
How much is and should collaboration be simply about 
day-to-day estate management issues and getting things 
done in an area? 
 
 
How much is this sort of collaboration just about improving 
or maintaining existing procedures, practices and 
institutions? 
 
 
How much and in what ways is collaboration used to 
standardise, institutionalize and control the activities and 
actions of associations? 
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Values and Institution 
Changing Ideological 
Collaboration 
 
How much is and should collaboration be about changing 
values and institutions?   
 
How is difference and conflict dealt with? 
 
What are the effects on collaboration of overarching 
political and institutional frameworks? 
 
 
Should and can collaboration act as a catalyst for change 
in normative structures and accepted ways of doing 
things? 
 
 
Can established institutions adapt sufficiently and quickly 
enough to meet new challenges or are entirely new 
institutions required? 
 
Governance  
 
Whose governance structures, what for and what about 
history and trust? 
 
 
What are the effects of government legislation and local 
authority policies on collaboration? 
 
 
How do performance targets and performance measures 
affect collaboration? 
 
 
Who decides what is measured, how it will be measured 
and what for? 
 
 
What are the effects on collaboration of formal 
constitutions and standardization? 
 
 
What is and what is not measured and what does this 
mean for collaboration? 
 
 
Is it possible to measure everything and the future? 
 
-  
Must associations be democratic, representative and 
accountable; why, what for and who to? 
 
 
Who are included or excluded from collaboration and 
why? 
 
 
What are the effects of bureaucratisation and 
professionalization? 
 
 
What change is possible without either partner in 
collaboration losing confidence in collaboration? 
 
 
Is leadership designed into collaboration, focused with a 
clear vision for the future and high profile leaders; implied 
and fragmented and consensual but confused with an 
implicit vision and sense of direction; or emergent and 
formative, relying on implementation to shape policy and 
pragmatism to develop future direction? 
 
 
What happens when things go wrong or collaboration 
fails? 
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APPENDIX 7 
'Why do Tenants and Residents Associations Collaborate with 
their Local Authority?' 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Theme: 
A The Local Political Opportunity Structure 
1. Can you tell me something about your/your organization's relations with 
tenants and residents associations/the local authority? 
2. Can you tell me about the local issues, which are important to you/your 
organization?  
3. What different opportunities are there to try to deal with these important 
issues? 
4. What different opportunities are there to try to deal with these important 
issues? 
5. Can you say something about how you/your organization works with others 
to try to tackle these important issues? 
6. Are there any other ways in which these important issues could be tackled? 
7. What interest do you/your organization have in changing people’s views or 
the way they do things? 
8. How is your work/the work of your organization assisted by others? 
B Strategies for Influence and Action 
1. Can you tell me something about the different people who are activists or 
leaders or influential in your organization and other organizations? 
2. Do you/your organization/other people work in particular ways to influence 
others? 
3. How do you/how does your organization go about determining its priorities? 
4. Is there anything that does or can disrupt your efforts to work with tenants 
and residents associations/the local authority? 
5. What is the role of START/the City Council/Councillors? 
 
 
  - 355 -  
6. Can you tell me how issues for discussion and options for action are 
determined and considered? 
7. What sorts of skills and capacities are important if working together is to be 
successful? 
C Historical Relations and Context 
1. How have relations with tenants and residents associations/ the local 
authority changed over time? 
2. How have the changes impacted on efforts to work together? 
3. Do past experiences affect relations today? 
4. How do established ways of doing things impact on efforts to work 
together? 
5. Can you say something about the language and rules that surround 
relations with tenants and residents associations/the local authority and 
efforts to work together? 
D Power 
1. Can you tell me something about people who are influential? 
2. Why are they influential? 
3. How do they use their influence? 
4. Can you tell me what capacity your organization has to make decisions or 
take action?  
5. What do you think are the most important things to try to achieve by working 
together?  
6. Can you say something about what sort of authority you/your organization 
has to represent the views of others and act on their behalf? 
7. What sort of things influence your thinking or the views of your 
organization?  
8 How are activities worked out when you are working with tenants and 
residents associations/the local authority? 
9. How are the activities turned into action? 
10. What difficulties or conflict arises when organizations try to work together? 
11. How is dissention or disagreement dealt with? 
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E Resources 
1. Can you tell me something about how organizations working together do or 
do not depend on each other?  
2. How do tenants and residents associations/ the local authority use their 
separate resources when working together?  
3. How do you/your organization go about obtaining the resources you need 
for your work? 
F Control 
1. Can you tell me anything about the ways in which the resources you need 
for your work are held by other people or organizations?  
2. Can you say something about the sorts of ways in which information is 
exchanged between your organization and tenants and residents 
associations/the local authority? 
3. Who are the important players in initiating efforts to work together? 
4. Can you tell me how priorities and actions are decided? 
5. Are there any ways in which agreement on priorities and actions is 
encouraged or discouraged?  
6. How is conflict between tenants and residents associations and the local 
authority resolved? 
7. How are different views and expectations taken into account? 
8. What control do you/does your organization have over what happens in an 
area? 
9. What is the role of START/the City Council/Councillors? 
10. What sorts of things in your organization impact on efforts to work with 
tenants and residents associations/the local authority?  
11. What sorts of things outside of your organization impact on efforts to work 
with others? 
G Collaborative Purpose 
1. Can you say something about why you/your organization works with tenants 
and residents associations/the local authority? 
2. Who do you/your organization work with? 
3. What sorts of things do you work together on? 
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4. What are your thoughts on working together to achieve particular 
objectives? 
5. Are there any other ways in which objectives are achieved? 
6. How are the ways in which tenants and residents associations and the local 
authority work together determined? 
7. What are the pros and cons of working together? 
8. How do you/does your organization contribute to the process of working 
together?  
9. Are there things which make it difficult for you/your organization to 
participate in efforts to work together?  
10. Are there any particular things you wants to achieve through working with 
tenants and residents associations/the local authority?  
11. Are there any particular things your organization wants to achieve through 
working with tenants and residents associations/the local authority?  
12. Are there any ways in which working together can produce benefits to 
society that extend beyond the people and organizations involved?  
13  Has working together improved your capacity/your organization's capacity to 
work more effectively?  
14. Are there any times when organizations working together have seemed to 
be working to achieve different ends?  
15. Can you say something about how decisions are made when tenants and 
residents associations/ the local authority work together?  
16. Can you say something about how decisions are implemented or action is 
taken to achieve objectives that arise through working together? 
17. Are alternative solutions to problems considered or developed? 
18. Is there space when working together for experimentation and a novel 
approach to be taken to deal with issues? 
H Task Oriented Instrumental Collaboration 
1. Can you tell me something about tenants and residents associations/the 
local authority working together to get things done in your area/an area? 
2. Is it important? 
3. How is it organized? 
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I Values and Institution Changing Ideological Collaboration  
1. Can you say something about tenants and residents associations/the local 
authority working together to change peoples views or the way things are 
done?  
2. Has working together changed political structures or thinking or institutional 
practices?  
3. Do you think existing organizations are set up or have sufficient capacity to 
adapt to meet the challenge of modem complex problems? 
J Governance 
1. How is working together between tenants and residents associations and 
the local authority regulated and monitored? 
2. How is trust involved in working together? 
3. How has government legislation affected the ways in which tenants and 
residents associations/the local authority work together?  
4. How have changed local government structures affected the ways in which 
and residents associations/the local authority work together?  
5. How do requirements to achieve particular objectives affect the ways in 
which tenants and residents associations/the local authority work together? 
6. How are the things that are measured/monitored decided? 
7. How are they measured/monitored? 
8. What is the purpose of measurement/evaluation?  
9. How is the structure and set-up oftenants and residents associations/the 
local authority decided? 
10. How is your organization made up? 
11. How does it serve its members?  
12. Can you tell me something about the role leaders play in working together?  
13. What happens when things go wrong?  
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APPENDIX 8 
 
Sheffield City 
Tenants and Residents Associations 
 
22 July 2003 
 
Sir/Madam 
I am writing to you to ask for your help in a study I am conducting as a researcher 
at the Open University Business School. The purpose of the study is to gather 
information that will contribute to understanding how partnership working between 
Tenants and Residents Associations and the City Council in Sheffield operates.  
As an active member of a Tenants and Residents Association, I would be grateful 
if you would complete the enclosed short questionnaire as far as possible. As 
Tenants and Residents Associations differ from each other in important ways, it is 
important that I hear from as many Tenants and Residents Associations as 
possible to obtain a rounded picture of how they work with the City Council. Please 
answer all the questions which you are able to, if there are some questions you 
are unable to answer please leave them blank but do not let this stop you from 
completing the other questions and returning the questionnaire. All replies will 
remain confidential and no individual or association will be named in any future 
analysis or article. A stamped addressed envelope is enclosed for your reply.  
If you are willing to be interviewed I would be really interested to hear your views 
on Tenants and Residents Associations and partnership working. The interview 
would not take very long and would be confidential. Interviewees will not be named 
in any future analysis or article. 
If you have any questions or comments about this study, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 
Thank you for helping with this study. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Robert Dalziel 
Researcher 
 
Telephone: 0987765434 
Email: r.m.dalziel@open.ac.uk 
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The Tenants and Residents Association and Partnership Working 
The aim of the research is to gather some information about your tenants and 
residents association and partnership working with the council. It should take 
about 10 minutes to complete and all replies will be confidential. 
 
Please answer the following questions by entering the appropriate information in 
the space provided or by ticking the boxes that apply.  
1. What is the name of your tenants and residents association? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. What estates, neighbourhoods or districts are covered by the tenants and 
residents association? 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………..  
3. How many tenants and residents on average attend meetings of the tenants 
and residents association? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………….  
4. How does the tenants and residents assoclatlon work with the council? For 
example, is it involved in discussions about housing and neighbourhood 
matters, work on environmental or regeneration projects, or shaping and 
deciding housing and neighbourhood policy? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
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5. How is the tenants and residents association involved in the production of a 
'Tenants Compact' or agreement between the association and the council 
about partnership working and priorities for action in its area?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Has the tenants and residents association signed up to the council's official 
recognition policy for tenants and residents associations?  
Yes    No  
7. If the tenants and residents association has not signed up to the council's 
recognition policy can you briefly say why? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Is the tenants and residents association a member of Sheffield Tenants and 
Residents Together (START)?  
Yes    No  
 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
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9. If the tenants and residents association is not a member of Sheffield 
Tenants and Residents Together (START) can you briefly say why?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Does the tenants and residents association have a constitution? 
Yes     No  
11. Does the tenants and residents association have a business plan? 
 Yes   No  
12. If you are willing to talk to me about your work and experiences in the 
tenants and residents movement please give your contact details below. 
Name 
…………………………………………………………………………………...... 
Contact Address 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………... ………………… 
Telephone 
…………………………………………………………………………….............. 
Email 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE STAMPED AND 
ADDRESSED ENVELOPE PROVIDED 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP 
Robert Dalziel, Open University Business School, The Michael Young Building, Walton Hall, Milton 
Keynes, MK7 6AA, Telephone 07748380750, email r.m.dalziel@open.ac.uk 
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HU: TARA Collaboration. File: [C:\Program Files\Scientific Software\ATLASti\TEXTBANK\TARA Collaboration]. 
Edited by: Super. Date/Time 06/07/04 09:40:53. Codes-Primary-Documents-Table. Code-Filter: ALL. PD-Filter:  
 
 
Interview Sessions 
CODES  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  •  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  "  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  2.  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  3.  40  41  42                  Totals  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Authority and Legitimacy 1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  2  1  2  3  7  0  1  0  8  7  8  1  0  2  1  8  2  2  1  4  1  2  1  0  3  5  3  3  0  6  4  0             .93  
Conformity and Conflict 7  4  3  4  0  1  1  3  0  2  5  1  3  6  7  1  3  0  8  15  6  9 4  13  10  15  10  7  8  17  10  5  13  5  8  10  13  14  5  10  9   9                      284  
Culture  10  8  3  0  5  2  0  0  0  0  1  6  2  3  4  1  0  0  1  3  1  1  5  2  2  4  2  4  3  5  6  0  0  0  3  4  0  2  2  4  1  2                      102  
Difference and Diversity 0  0  0  0  0  3  0  1  0  0  0  2  1  3  2  0  1  1  3  1  0  1  0  1  3  0  2  5  6  1  7  0  3  0  3  0  0  1  1  6  1  0              59.  
Government  0  2  2  0  4  0  0  1  0  6  4  3  0  2  3  1  0  0  2  1  3  2  7  1  1  10  2  4  2  5  3  0  0  0  2  2  3  6  2  8  11  1                       106  
History and Context  2  2  1  1  2  1  1  8  1  0  4  0  1  1  2  0  0  0  0  2  0  2  3  1  2  1  1  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  4  1  0  1  0  0  0  0                48  
Leadership  1  0  1  0  0  3  2  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  0  2  0  3  4  2  3  2  5  0  1  0  2  2  0  4  1  0  0  0                46  
Local Authority  4  6  4  5  2  4  1  6  2  6  18  3  6  7  6  6  10  2  13  21  22  17  8  22  18  39  18  12  12  33  31  9   24  4  15  19  14  20  8  23  22  14                     536  
Monitoring and Performance 1  5  0  0  0  1  0  0  3  1  1  2  1  0  0  1  1  0  4  1  5  3  2  6  2  0  3  1  0  4  7  1  3  0  1  1  0  5  0  3  0  0                69.  
Negotiation and Collaboration 0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  1  10  9 6  6  11  2  18  4  25  12  11  14  6  7  2  16  11  7  13  18  14  10  16  3  15 19  9 20  11  21  13  11                     373  
Networking  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  3  3  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  1  1  2  0  1  1  0  4  1  0  0  2  0  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  2               30  
Power, Influence and Control 2  1  2  1  10  2  2  2  1  6  12  1  3  6  8  3  13  1  11  16  8  12  7  20  6  15  4  9 3  15  9 2  6  1  4  5  9 13  4  14  15  3                       287  
Process  15  13  9 2  12  11  14    4 16  13 19 8  13  8 10  3  15  4  19 15  14  10  10  10  3  19 9 7  11   19 13  0 9 3  11  10  10  8  8  10  11  7                         435  
Recognition Policy 2  3  3  0  2  4  3  1  11  3  5  0  2  2  5  0  1  0  7  8  2  2  4  3  3  5  10  3  2  2  6  1  7  0  1  3  1  4  2  7  6  1                         137  
Representativeness and 
Accountability 3  13  4  2  10  3  8  0  1  5  2  5  6  11  6  0  10  0  15  5  15  13  3  17  10  18  12  5  12  12  10  4  15  1  2  10  6  10  1  11  5  13                       314  
Resources and Access  4  4  3  1  4  6  4 1  4  2  3  2  1  5  7  0  0  1  7  4  11  9 11  14  6  8  11  5  4  8  7  2  8  0  4  6  4  12  1  14  5  6                         219  
Standardization and 
Institutionalisation 0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  2  2  1  6  7  0  2  3  1  0  2  0  0  0  0  2  1  0  3  0                  38  
Structure and Agency  0  3  7  1 9 12  10  6  3  6  7  0  3  2  5  4  7  0  11  5  11  7  8  10  5  11  7  2  2  9 14  2  8  0  4  7  8  13  6  10  5  5                          255  
Tenant Participation  Compact 6  1  1  0  4  11  1  4  5  1  5  4  2  5  2  5  3  1  0  1  1  0  0  2  2  2  3  1  1  5  4  1  2  1  0  5  2  1  3  3  2  1                            104  
Tenants and Resident  10  4  2  0  5  2  9 1  5  0  2  9 5  7  3  1  3  1  7  17  11  8  7  14  6  16  11  2  18  16  11  4 14  1  7  21  14  9 2  11  6  13                         315  
Tenants and Residents Associations 10  3  6  3  4  6  4  1  4  4  13  8  13  11  14  5  6  1  13  18  17  11  2  24  24  14  22  11  11  30  20  7  24  4  5  28  17  15  0  21  7  14                         475  
Timescales  1  0  3  0  4  5  2  2  3  0  3  0  0  6  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  2  3  2  1  0  3  4  0  2  0  0  4  0  0  0  0                    56  
Uncertainty and Change 0  2  4  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2  1  0  2  4  0  3  0  5  8  3  3  2  5  1  2  1  1  6  1  3  0  3  0  2  1  4  5  0  0                    75  
Values and Beliefs  2  0  0  0  4  2  0  1  0  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2  4  1  0  1  0  3  2  3  4  0  6  1  7  2  3  6  3  9 0  2  1  3                    75  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Totals  81  75  59  20  87  79  63  42  63  57         118  67  76  98         103  35  9'7  16         160       158      158      134  94          180      109       219     157    99        125      211      191    55       173    25         102      166      118      177  62        190      127      105                     4531  
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